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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
ALEX PESTELL DPHIL 
GEOFFREY HILL: POETRY, CRITICISM AND PHILOSOPHY 
SUMMARY 
 
This thesis examines the role played by philosophy in the poetry and criticism of Geoffrey 
Hill. Despite countless references to philosophy throughout Hill’s critical authorship, there 
exists no study of any length on this vital aspect of his thought. Through close readings of 
his poetry, criticism, and archival material, I attempt to demonstrate that philosophy has 
played a more crucial role in Hill’s work than has hitherto been assumed.  
 Hill’s sceptical attitude to philosophy is intimately connected with his 
understanding of poetry as a sensate form of cognition. My thesis examines the ways Hill’s 
poetry and criticism responds to the challenges imposed upon this scepticism by a tradition 
of philosophy that emphasises the importance of the aesthetic to its analyses of modernity’s 
contradictions. I argue that a tradition of Anglophone Idealist thinkers, from S.T. Coleridge, 
via T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley, to Gillian Rose, is of sustained relevance to Hill’s work, 
shaping the way he thinks about politics, ethics and literature.  
In particular, German Idealism’s attempts to negotiate universality and particularity 
via an emphasis on the aesthetic bases of critical thought lay the groundwork for an 
understanding of poetry as a mode of cognition. Reading Hill’s poetry from For the 
Unfallen to Oraclau/Oracles, I try to show the ways in which problems traditionally 
conceived of as philosophical can be cognised in prosody and syntax. In part a vindication 
of Hill’s elevation of poetry over philosophy, these readings also show the degree to which 
Hill’s ‘craft of vision’ is indebted to conceptual and aesthetic models supplied by 
philosophy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
What follows is a study of the role philosophy plays in the work of Geoffrey Hill. 
Philosophy is often presented by Hill as ancillary or even antithetical to poetry. Poetry is, or 
ought to be, ‘simple, sensuous and passionate’: a matter of the instinctual apprehension of 
sensate particulars.1  By contrast, philosophy is suspected of flattening out the granular 
surface of lived experience in the name of a systematic model of this experience. 
Philosophy might offer coordinating perspectives in Hill’s work, as when F.H. Bradley is 
quoted in the epigraphs to Hill’s Collected Critical Writings and Without Title, or when 
Simone Weil stands at the head of ‘The Pentecost Castle’, but in the main its role in what 
Hill calls ‘the craft of vision’ – the effort to obtain critical purchase on objective truth – is 
downplayed. 2  Perhaps for this reason, critics have not yet produced any study, book 
chapter, article or monograph devoted to understanding Hill’s relationship to philosophy.  
Briefly, the argument in this thesis is not only that philosophy warrants this kind of 
attention, but that Hill’s conception of poetic ambition, of what poetry can and should strive 
to achieve, rests to a large extent on concepts and practices supplied by philosophy. 
Moreover, I will argue that Hill’s investment in philosophy is in fact committed to a 
particular tradition, that of an Anglophone Idealism derived from German Idealism. This is 
a tradition about which Hill has written at some length: most obviously in his essays on 
T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley, but also in occasional meditations on the thought of Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge and Gillian Rose. But my evidence for Hill’s commitment to this tradition 
                                                 
1
 Blake Morrison, ‘Under Judgment’, New Statesman 2551 (1980), 212-4, at 212. Hill is quoting Milton, ‘Of 
Education’. 
2
 See CCW vii, WT vii, CP 137. 
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will be drawn not just from a study of Hill’s critical commentary upon these writers, but 
from close readings of his prose style and his poetry, in order to demonstrate the impact of 
Anglophone Idealism upon the texture of his writing. In reading the syntax and prosody of 
Hill’s criticism and poetry in the light of the ideas developed by Coleridge, Green, Bradley, 
and Rose, I hope to disclose a far greater reliance upon philosophy’s modes of cognition 
than heretofore suspected. 
The rest of this introduction considers in what ways poetry and philosophy might be 
thought to inhabit overlapping domains of inquiry. In particular, it focuses upon the ways in 
which both poetry and philosophy, through a diagnosis of contradictions and an imagining 
of alternatives to contemporary experience, express a dissatisfaction with modernity. It 
offers some theoretical context, setting out the main outlines of the philosophical tradition 
in which I argue Hill’s work is most invested. It then offers a detailed close reading of an 
early Geoffrey Hill poem in an attempt to demonstrate what a philosophical poem might 
look like from the point of view of its syntax and prosody, rather than from the point of 
view of any content which might be taken to be philosophic. First, though, I will briefly 
consider some of the concepts, attitudes, and practices at stake in Hill’s poetic practice as 
they bear upon philosophy. 
 
1. ‘Vision’ as the domain of poetry 
 
What is the status of visions in Hill’s work? On occasion, as here in ‘Of Commerce and 
Society’ (CP 46-51), Hill betrays a deep suspicion for the claims of the visionary: 
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Statesmen have known visions. And, not alone, 
 Artistic men prod dead men from their stone: 
 Some of us have heard the dead speak: 
 The dead are my obsession this week 
 
 But may be lifted away. 
 (CP 49) 
 
This suspicion is audible in the poem’s metre. The first stanza begins with two lines of 
pentameter, but almost immediately the trochees of the first sentence come up against the 
rhythmic ambiguity of ‘have known’. The emphasis might rest on either syllable. If it rests 
on the ‘have’, the sentence appears defensive or regally insistent: politicians have known 
visions, whatever others might say. Alternatively, it might be read with the emphasis on 
‘known’, in which case the weight is more equally distributed, and suggests some kind of 
narrative. In what way have statesmen ‘known visions’? How is this different from the 
visionary experiences attributed to prophets and artists? But the issue isn’t seriously 
considered, or is assumed as incontrovertible fact, for a new sentence importunately breaks 
into the rhythm: ‘And, not alone, / Artistic men prod dead men from their stone’. A claim 
for artistic vision opportunistically butts in, rather as the molossus ‘men prod dead’ 
interrupts the presiding rhythm. We then hear the voice of artistic connoisseurship as the 
following lines relax into irregular tetrameters, padded out by unstressed syllables to 
reinforce the informality of the occasion. ‘Some of us have heard the dead speak’ coyly 
hints at arcane knowledge, but makes light of the affair the better to impress the audience; it 
comes across as the diction of a creative writing veteran vaunting his vatic status. No 
wonder Jeffrey Wainwright can write of this passage, ‘No sooner has the speaker pretended 
to visionary knowledge than the claim is undermined, trashed even, by a scepticism that 
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sees it as an affectation, something like a nervous headache’.3  Vision, here, is barely 
distinguishable from narcissism. 
 However, Hill’s scepticism is not impervious to the seductions of the visionary 
tradition. In a much later poem, ‘On Reading Milton and the English Revolution’, occurs a 
line which is suggestive for Hill’s understanding of poetry’s role in modernity: ‘The craft of 
vision is what I make of this’. Vision, on this account, clearly has a role to play in Hill’s 
‘craft’. Note, here, how vision’s status is downgraded to a contingent, spontaneous object 
of artifice rather than a heaven-sent gift: art is subjective, provisional, and not subordinate 
to any pre-existing universal concept, category or criterion. This is a familiar position in the 
theories of continental aesthetics, from Hegel onwards. 4  No longer subject to the 
coordinating authorities of the church and monarchy, art acquires a degree of autonomy, 
and with it the privilege of critical distance. That Hill conceives of this distance as critical, 
and not just as the expulsion of art into the domain of the pastime or the decorative, is 
suggested by his use of the theologically-loaded ‘vision’. Vision suggests a faculty more 
transcendent than simple sight, though close natural observation is a staple of Hill’s poetic 
gestural repertoire. Hill has written that ‘“vision” is too commonly taken to mean effortless, 
unimpeded rapture’ (CCW 318), and it will become clear that a deep suspicion of the 
unimpeded intellect is a recurrent feature of Hill’s authorship. But in a paradox that will be 
frequently encountered in what follows, vision, as a diagnostic grasp of some objective 
                                                 
3
 Jeffrey Wainwright, Acceptable Words: Essays on the poetry of Geoffrey Hill (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005), 19. 
4
 See G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, tr. T.M. Knox, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 
i, 51. For more recent examples, see J.M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to 
Derrida and Adorno (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992) and Gerald L. Bruns, On the 
Anarchy of Poetry and Philosophy: A Guide for the Unruly (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006). 
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configuration of the world claimed by the author to be in some way true, also sits at the 
heart of this authorship. 
Furthermore, vision, or truthful insight into some objective element of reality, is 
explicitly conceived of as a privilege of lyric poetry. Vision is ‘what I make of this’, ‘this’ 
being the poem under construction, the lines written by an agency pronominally brought 
into the poem, Hill’s version of Pound’s ego scriptor. Questions are provoked by this 
statement which will be examined in the chapters that follow: about the constitutive nature 
of the subject, and this nature’s antagonisms with syntax in literary production; about the 
kinds of truth-claims art is able to make in a modernity which relegates art beyond the 
domain of truth; and about the relationship between the singular, contingent quality of this 
poetic assertion and the scientistic, generalised quality sometimes evident in Hill’s 
criticism. 
 For an example of this quality, we might turn to the essay ‘What Devil Has Got Into 
John Ransom’, in which Hill alludes to ‘[Ransom’s] celebrated definition of the poem as 
“nothing short of a desperate ontological or metaphysical manoeuvre”’ (CCW 128). Hill 
quotes this statement, or a truncated version of it, on three separate occasions in the 
Collected Critical Writings. So despite Hill’s criticism that it appears ‘a formula at once all-
embracing and exclusive’, it seems to carry some explanatory weight for him (CCW 128). 
Several contrasts with Hill’s line on the ‘craft of vision’ are immediately apparent. 
Subjective agency is given a less dominant role, for example. Far from poetic ‘craft’ being 
subordinate to the constructive abilities of the author, the crafting subjectivity is conceived 
of as floundering in an element which permits only ‘desperate ... manoeuvre[s]’. Under 
such conditions, any diagnostic insight will be something snatched from a manifold of 
sensory and metaphysical data, rather than a calmly considered report. Second, these 
11 
 
 
 
conditions are named as bearing upon the ‘ontological or metaphysical’ aspects of the 
writing subject: to speak of these aspects brings into play the possibility of a mode of 
cognising them, which in turn raises the spectre of philosophy, of the extension of 
knowledge beyond what is subjective and contingent, to questions of freedom, community 
and law. In other words, despite the sense of inadequacy and incompletion suggested by 
‘desperate’, the very inclusion of metaphysics within this definition brings a far larger 
domain into the scope of Hill’s ‘vision’ than was perhaps apparent before. Lastly, this 
quotation is taken from a critical essay: unlike the ‘craft of vision’ (in which a modern art 
banished from scientific, rational domains of truth-speaking is obliged to come at 
objectivity via other, aesthetic means), the diagnostic options available to critical prose are 
closer to those of rational discourse. Note, for example, that Hill is quoting Ransom’s 
‘definition’: the notion of truth implicitly offered is one of defining, of the rational 
subsumption of particulars under universals, rather than that of the interaction of the 
material and communicative elements of language. Yet if criticism is not to set itself in 
opposition to art’s truth-claims, it must make some account of its distance from the object 
of its analysis, and it will be shown that Hill’s prose style is profoundly affected by the 
repercussions of this account’s necessity. 
 These two quotations contain within them the two poles governing the terms of my 
thesis. On the one hand, the poetic is seen as a mode of critique, of subjective agency and 
autonomy; on the other hand, this critical capacity is seen to be embedded in a wider, more 
general scene of activity which threatens to deprive it of its specificity and freedom. Hill is 
drawn to these poles of poetic activity again and again in his criticism and poetry, as many 
commentators have acknowledged. What is less often remarked upon is his equally 
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immersive preoccupation with philosophy as a rival to poetry in the crafting of vision, and 
as a productive way of thinking about these poles.  
 Philosophy’s role as rival and spur to the ‘craft of vision’ is the subject of this 
thesis. If a struggle between the totalising view of human experience and a conception of it 
as fragmentary and unique exists, as I have argued above, in Hill’s conception of the poetic, 
this struggle is reproduced in his encounters with philosophy. Taking in the systematic or 
scientistic approaches (for example, Kant), and the ad hoc, empirical approaches (J.L. 
Austin), Hill’s chosen avenues into philosophy mirror similar paths in his poetics. I will 
argue that Hill is fully aware of this rivalry between poetry and philosophy, and in fact is an 
enthusiastic debater on the side of poetry. And yet I will also argue that philosophy, 
whether as thought-provoking opponent or indeed as repository of valuable cognitive 
perspectives, contributes a great deal to Hill’s idea of the ‘craft of vision’. Furthermore, my 
thesis will demonstrate that Hill’s adversarial embrace with philosophy is remarkably 
cohesive, being almost entirely concerned with a particular tradition: British philosophy 
derived from German Idealism; in other words, the work of S.T. Coleridge, T.H. Green, 
F.H. Bradley, and Gillian Rose.  
It should be pointed out at the outset, though, that this cohesiveness is frequently 
masked by Hill’s apparent urge to marginalise philosophy’s role in his thinking. A case in 
point is the final essay in Hill’s Collected Critical Writings, ‘A Postscript on Modernist 
Poetics’. The title promises to its readers a summary of its author’s attitudes to poetic 
practice. It also happens to contain more allusions to philosophy per page than almost any 
other essay in his Collected Critical Writings barring the explicitly philosophical pieces. It 
views poetry in terms that constantly recur throughout Hill’s prose: poetry has an ‘arbitrary 
nature’; it depends on ‘the intertwining nature of the arbitrary, the arbitrariness, in the 
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senses of free choice, arrogation of free choice, and the despotic’. This notion of the 
arbitrary, ‘by a long process of semantic conglomeration, is at once freedom of will and the 
will obdurate in itself and subject to, and in service to, a greater obduracy’ (CCW 571-73). 
These are central themes in Hill’s poetics. 
And yet Hill advertises the essay’s marginal status in its title: it is a ‘postscript’. He 
presents it as an afterthought, an addendum, something nonessential to the main argument. 
In doing so he is conforming to a career-long attitude towards the organised presentation of 
ideas or theories. Such assemblages of thought, his attitude suggests, are liable to have their 
carefully-defined borders blotted by the first experience that does not conform to them; or 
experience itself risks damage at their edges. If Hill calls upon a wide range of philosophers 
in the course of the essay (including Bradley, Peirce, Rose, Weil, Kant, Adorno and 
Arendt), this can only confirm the experimental, ancillary status of the essay, rather than its 
serious intellectual ambitions. Hill’s suspicion of jargon is certainly a part of this: 
elsewhere he has written of the challenge ‘of resisting the attraction of terminology itself, a 
power at once supportive and coercive’ (CCW 3). It’s notable, for instance, that Hill rarely 
if ever engages with the work of any of the theorists whose projects have involved the very 
critique of modernity Hill might be thought to assent to. To judge from remarks in his 
poetry and interviews, his attitude to philosophy is lukewarm at best. His poetry contains 
some of his most disparaging comments: ‘Philosophy, / in general, seems groundless’, 
‘more potent by far than metaphysics’, ‘What a wonder [man the philosopher] is, and how / 
abysmal’, ‘whatever it is that is sought // through metaphysics’.5  Hill recently said in 
interview that he has been ‘completely moved by philosophy only two times in my life: by 
                                                 
5
 T1 (np) ; TL 56; WT 25; C 5. 
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Simone Weil when I was young; more recently, by F.H. Bradley’. 6  In linking the 
experience of reading a philosopher with immediate emotional reaction, Hill thereby 
sweeps aside the aspects of philosophy which do not and very likely could not have such an 
impact, but which may still make valid contributions to the ‘craft of vision’. 
It is characteristic that in the act of affirming the emotional power of one or two 
thinkers, he implicitly downplays the many occasions on which philosophy has moved him 
to construct or elaborate his own thoughts about poetry, politics and ethics. But in ‘A 
Postscript on Modernist Poetics’, as I’ve said, the range of philosophers alluded to is 
remarkable. They supply the terms to which he often has recourse in his elucidation of 
freedom and obduracy, even if only negatively. Poetry’s relation to the world isn’t Pierce’s 
‘logical thought’ vs ‘purposive action’ opposition, for example. It is closer to the ‘broken 
middle’ of Gillian Rose or the conditions of judgement of F.H. Bradley (CCW 566-7). This 
is just one instance of dozens in Hill’s critical work where he deploys ideas from 
philosophy as placeholders for strategies, directions and obstructions in the work of vision. 
Admittedly, Hill’s habit of understating the influence of philosophy upon his work should 
be taken seriously: his thought is equally informed by the controversies following the 
political and religious settlement of Elizabeth I. But to accept Hill’s self-distancing from 
the language and concepts of contemporary academic thought, and more broadly from 
modern philosophy as a whole, risks losing sight of this important constituent of his attitude 
towards modernity. His intellectually self-isolating position should not be taken at face 
value: his thought is quite consonant with a trend of post-Enlightenment thinking of which 
Hill has explored one of the tributaries – Anglophone Idealism – at some length. 
                                                 
6
 Anne Mounic, ‘Le poème, “moulin mystique”: Entretien avec Geoffrey Hill’, Temporel 6 (2008) 
<http://temporel.fr/Le-poeme-moulin-mystique-Entretien>, accessed 6 December 2009. 
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2. Anglophone Idealism’s dissatisfaction with modernity 
 
To read Hill, or to read some of his more partisan critics, is to be frequently reminded of his 
marginal status – in contemporary literary culture, in the spectrum of moral conviction, in 
political and religious affiliations. Seemingly untouched by contemporary intellectual 
concerns, reluctant to comment upon his academic and poetic contemporaries, his thought 
seems to tread a line completely sui generis. Even when his thought becomes allusive – as 
it does repeatedly in his essays and poetry – the act of allusion is represented as a highly 
personal choice. Certain figures, indeed certain phrases, are cited and re-cited, cumulatively 
giving the effect of a private display cabinet. We get the impression that Hill’s constellated 
figures are chosen to illustrate his theme, rather than his theme being determined by their 
thought. Even textuality and allusion, then, do not mitigate the instinctual, sensuous tact 
that is emblematic of Hill’s solitary position in contemporary culture.  
 However, if Hill’s subjects and satisfactions are, for the most part, conceptually and 
chronologically distant, he is only conforming to an intellectual trend that has reverberated 
through modernity. For Hill’s manifest dissatisfaction with modernity is what makes him 
quintessentially of his epoch. It is very much part of his participation in the intellectual 
landscape of modernity that he is so suspicious of modernity and the assumptions it is 
founded on. It is true that Hill can only with difficulty be captured in the same conceptual 
frame as the writers and theorists who have dominated the period covered by his writing 
activity: he is reluctant, in his prose, to admit intellectual trends and terminologies that are 
yet to possess an interrogable history of usage. But one might argue that what defines 
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thought in what used to be known as postmodernity is its suspicion of theoretical 
completion, of unequivocal assertion, and of explanatory confidence. An analytical prose 
style that creates its own formal laws, its own rhythms, syntax and vocabulary is the 
unmistakable marker of modern thought which is critical of modernity. Hill’s approach to 
essay writing is of a piece with the valorisation of aesthetic, non-identity thinking which 
gives so much theory its idiosyncratic flavour.  
 In Hill’s work it is apparent that he shares with much modern thought the notion 
that, for all the progress of Enlightenment rationalism, the technological advances of 
modernity, and the trumpeted global spread of Western values, the earth radiates disaster 
triumphant. Civilisation and barbarism are seen to be entwined in histories Hill’s poetry 
unravels with its ironic equivocations and dilated syntax. Again, like much so-called 
‘postmodern’ thought, Hill punctures the universals to which civilised culture had looked 
for its explanatory concepts. In place of guiding conceptuality Hill defines a sceptical 
approach to truth-claims: doubt, failure, blindness are given more value than confidence, 
clarity and success. And yet (in what might be interpreted as yet another instance of his 
intellectual recusancy) unlike postmodern thought, Hill’s is deeply imbued with a 
humanism and a sporadic faith in traditional models of experience. In all this, though, he is 
not a lone figure crawling from the wreckage of Europe; rather, he is following quite 
consistently a tradition of intellectual speculation which forms the basis of this 
investigation into Hill’s engagement with philosophy. 
 Conceived of as a radical break with modernity, as a proclaimed end-of-modernity, 
postmodernism can now seem premature in its diagnoses and naive in its responses. As 
Robert Pippin has argued, we should view the period now thought of as postmodernism as 
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the latest in a series of modern expressions of dissatisfaction of and with modernity.7 Pippin 
looks to the early nineteenth century for the origin of these expressions, and specifically to 
the tradition of German Idealism beginning with Kant and Hegel. Bearing in mind his 
analysis of the contribution made by these thinkers to a critique of modernity, and the 
weight placed upon Kant and post-Kantian philosophy in the studies of artistic autonomy 
by J.M. Bernstein and others, it is perhaps no surprise that when Hill chooses to engage 
with philosophy it is usually the British heirs of Kantian thought to whom he turns. Before 
considering Hill’s reception of their body of work, I’ll give a brief overview of this 
theoretical background. 
 Central to the critique of modernity espoused by these more recent thinkers is the 
division of human activity into discrete realms, a division seen to have been caused by 
Enlightenment rationality and most spectacularly theorised by Kant. Bernstein writes that 
‘Modernity is the separation of spheres, the becoming autonomous of truth, beauty and 
goodness from one another, and their developing into self-sufficient forms of practice: 
modern science and technology, private morality and modern legal forms, and modern art’.8 
One result of this splintering of domains of knowledge is the removal of the possibility for 
humans to cognise a totality by which they can orient their judgements. Kant’s legacy is the 
problem of how to self-regulate our cognitions in the face of this deprivation: the 
systematic philosophies of German Idealism are attempts at such a self-grounding 
investigation. (This has also been a critique expressed by the theorists from the 1960s 
onwards – the philosophers I have described above as postmodern.) But unlike the 
postmodern theorists, for whom the role played by idealist metaphysics was seen as 
                                                 
7
 Robert Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfactions of European High Culture, 
2nd edn. (Massachusetts and Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). 
8
 Bernstein, Fate of Art, 5-6. 
18 
 
 
 
damagingly totalising, more recent academics have reconsidered the role played by Kant 
(especially in his Critique of Judgement) in informing ways of thinking about this division 
productively rather than simply reiterating or confirming it. In accounts of the thought of 
Derrida, Adorno, Heidegger and others, these academics have argued that the aporiae 
postmodern theorists claimed to have found to inhabit the philosophical systems of 
Enlightenment philosophy are less unconscious byproducts of a naive scientism than  
conscientiously retained concessions to the fragmentary nature of thought.  
Writing in the eighties, Peter Dews noted how the new French philosophy was 
characterised by a return to Kant, under whose aegis notions of universality were permitted 
to re-enter intellectual activity after having been banished by the post-structuralist thought 
of the sixties and seventies: ‘Kant’s virtue, in the eyes of contemporary French 
philosophers, is to have definitively unmasked the claims of totalizing metaphysics ... 
without undermining the objectivity of moral principles, and without ruling out entirely the 
use of totalizing concepts, which are attributed a specific regulative status’.9 The anti-
humanist philosophy with its decentred, disintegrated subject, its critics thought, was 
unable to elicit an ethical or political set of positions equal to the ranged forces of 
domination it originally sought to analyse and deconstruct. If the answer is not to be found 
in a transcendent universalism – if that indeed is seen to be part of the problem – to dispose 
of all objectivity entirely eliminates the possibility of judgement at all. It is this paradox – 
that ‘vision’ is called into action by the diremption of fact from value while requiring the 
healing of this break to operate at all – that led some British thinkers to summon Kant’s 
third Critique to their aid. 
                                                 
9
 Peter Dews, Logics of Disintegration: Post-structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory (London 
and New York: Verso, 1987), pp. xiii-xiv. 
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For example, two years after Dews, Howard Caygill argued that while Derrida and 
Lyotard paid attention to the aporetic quality of Kant’s critical system, they saw this aporia 
as an unintended consequence of Kant’s investigations. Caygill argues that, on the contrary, 
Kant explicitly foregrounds the aporetic nature of his system, so that ‘the knot, or aporia, is 
itself framed, and brought to judgement’.10 Similarly, J.M. Bernstein helpfully elucidates 
those features of Kant’s third Critique which bring it within range of a potentially universal 
but not dogmatically constitutive objectivity. Two of these ‘central concepts’ include 
aesthetic reflective judgement, which ‘questions the paradigm of knowing as subsuming 
particulars under universals’, and the concept of the sensus communis, which ‘installs a 
notion of an epistemic community that breaks with the claims of methodological solipsism 
and permits a reinscription of sensibility’.11  Both of these concepts will be helpful in 
thinking through Hill’s encounters with philosophical problems and their articulation in his 
chosen philosophers. 
These two concepts bring us within earshot of Milton’s ‘simple, sensuous and 
passionate’, emphasising as they do the sensate nature of their particular form of cognition. 
In a work which defends the notion that Kant explicitly foregrounds the aporetic in the third 
Critique, Anthony Cascardi argues that sensuous cognition was thought by Kant to play a 
role in the understanding of the fissures between our different methods of knowing: 
 
What lies at stake in the third Critique is not any quality that inheres in ‘works of 
art’ qua objects, but how the subject feels the divisions between fact (‘is’) and value 
(‘ought’), between pure theoretical reason (cognition) and pure practical reason 
(morality), the phenomenal and the noumenal realms. If any basis for relating these 
domains is to be found – if the subject is to feel the world as a whole – Kant thinks 
it must take as its point of departure the particular pleasures or pains that remain 
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 Howard Caygill, Art of Judgement (Oxford, Blackwell, 1989), 7. 
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unaccounted for when all pragmatic and economic interests have been subtracted, 
and likewise when all desire for or interest in the existence of objects has been 
removed.12 
 
At stake is ‘how the subject feels’ the divisions created by Enlightenment rationality. In 
other words it is in the most peculiarly subjective regions of human experience – sensory 
experiences like pleasure and pain – that an objective understanding of the way we 
experience life, including the divisions it creates within the act of understanding itself, 
might be produced. The name given to this understanding in Kant’s Critique of Judgement 
is aesthetic reflection. It is a form of judgement quite unlike the one proposed in his first 
Critique, since rather than subsuming the particular (sensible intuition) under a given 
universal (conceptuality), it operates as if the particular is able to harmonise with a concept, 
without however that concept being given: ‘if only the particular is given and judgment has 
to find the universal for it, then this power is merely reflective’.13  Another critic who 
deploys this Kantian insight in the name of art’s critical capacity is Robert Kaufman. He 
writes  
 
The key idea is that aesthetic thought-experience, while feeling itself to be cast in or 
aiming for conceptual thought, is not yet substantively-objectively conceptual. In 
proceeding via the feeling that it is objective (that it is keyed to judgments that 
could be universally shared), aesthetic thought-experience maintains the form – but 
only the form – of conceptual thought. The inherently experimental exercise of that 
formal capacity can produce, to paraphrase Kant, a wealth of thought-emotion that 
cannot be reduced to any determinate, presently existing concept, and that thus can 
create the materials with which to construct new concepts and the socio-political 
dispensations that would correspond to them.14 
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 Anthony J. Cascardi, Consequences of Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 56. 
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 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, tr. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianopolis: Hackett, 1987), 18-19. 
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 Robert Kaufman, ‘Aura, Still’, October 99 (Winter 2002), 45-80, at 76. 
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Kaufman argues that precisely this reading of Kant leads to Adorno’s aesthetics, but in the 
first chapter I will show how much earlier, some post-Kantians, especially Schelling,   
viewed art as the privileged source of such an understanding, and that this view became 
important for Coleridge and, after him, for Hill. 
 Uncongenial to Hill’s work as the lexicon involved in this digression may be, I 
argue that it goes some way towards explaining why it is that, when Hill does choose to 
engage with philosophy, it is typically a philosophy derived from German Idealism. For 
although his criticism (which, rather than his poetry, is where the majority of his encounters 
with philosophy take place) engages with a range of philosophers from outside this 
tradition (including Simone Weil, J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein), it is the primary 
and secondary texts of idealism (albeit a British strand of idealism) to which he returns 
most frequently. In particular, S.T. Coleridge, T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley sit close to the 
heart of Hill’s understanding of the ‘craft of vision’, and each, to varying degrees, is 
profoundly influenced by German Idealist philosophers like Kant, Schelling and Hegel. 
Coleridge’s understanding of a community founded on the sensate apprehension of 
metaphysical detail; Green’s Wordsworthian ethics of rationalised nature; Bradley’s 
metaphysics of approximation and becoming: all derive from German Idealism, and all are 
to some extent realised aesthetically in Hill’s work. More recently, Hill’s interest in Gillian 
Rose only cements his connection with the academics mentioned above. Rose’s critique of 
poststructuralist philosophy mirrors the return to objectivity noted by Dews, although rather 
than Kant it is Hegel upon whom she depends to restore this metaphysical foundation. 
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3. Poetry’s dissatisfaction with modernity 
 
As I have hinted above, at stake in Hill’s readings of philosophy are the competing claims 
of philosophy and poetry to the ‘craft of vision’, or to the possibility of attaining knowledge 
of some objective constellation of facts about the world. Insofar as this is true, his is one 
further reaction in the history of reactions of artists to Plato’s initial expulsion of poetry 
from the realm of social efficacy. It is common to observe that this first banishment comes 
within a dialogue – that is, within a fictional, crafted work of artifice – and thus that it 
opens the possibility that philosophy is anxiously invested in poetry, or that poetry, rather 
than philosophy, can claim to be the originary ‘visionary’ expression.15 Certainly, in his 
analyses of T.H. Green and J.L. Austin, Hill is acutely interested in the moments when their 
arguments depend upon poetry, whether as antagonist or as quotable resource. At these 
moments Hill recognises that various opportunities for exegesis are in play. A potentially 
common repository of apprehension may be perceptible, in which the syntactic and acoustic 
resources supplied by poetry both offer support to philosophy’s endeavour to understand 
the world, and are in turn validated by being petitioned by this Saturnine tradition. On the 
other hand (and perhaps more often) the presence of poetry in a philosophical text signals 
philosophy’s grandiose but unfulfilled ambitions: importing poetry as an earnest of its 
oceanic comprehensiveness, philosophy ends by misunderstanding poetry’s materiality, and 
remains moored in the solipsism it sought to overcome.  
At such moments, poetry is arraigned, belauded, or otherwise exploited in the name 
of some kind of limit: as David Wood writes, ‘philosophers have often run up against the 
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limits of what can be said. ... [I]t would matter enormously for philosophy if poetry could 
reach the parts that eluded a theoretical discourse’.16 There are many ways of conceiving 
these limits: as the break between subject and object, between thought and being, between 
nature and culture. In the following chapters I will be exploring the possibility advanced by 
Hill that lyric poetry can achieve a degree of ‘vision’ that is able to recognise these limits. 
In other words it does not just fall silent at first sight of them but has the power to say 
something about them.   
Lyric’s special relationship to such limits has been theorised by many poets and 
critics, and almost always revolves around the interactions between the communicative 
(public, transparent, rule-bound) and the material (private, sensuous, arbitrary) aspects of 
language. Where poetry might be thought able to transcend philosophy’s constitutive limits 
is in this very combination of the abstract and material. Abstraction’s sovereignty is, as we 
have seen in the case of grand claims for ‘vision’, viewed with suspicion. Yet it bears a 
power to which Hill is undoubtedly indebted. When, for example, Hill writes  
 
I have learned one thing: not to look down 
So much upon the damned. They, in their sphere, 
Harmonize strangely with the divine 
Love 
(CP 61) 
 
the poem must be read in a way which confronts the sovereignty – albeit the divided, 
enjambed sovereignty – implicit in the words ‘divine / Love’. A reader’s response to the 
invocation of ‘divine / Love’ will vary according to the experiences and assumptions 
prescribed by the social and cultural institutions in which his or her attitude towards ideas 
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of the sacred are continually formed and reformed. The phrase might appear excessively 
compensatory, a capitulation to the fantasy of a commonalty of eternal values; or an 
engagement with theological scholarship which, as a response to an event that has 
challenged the assumptions of any eschatological perspective, now appears inadequate.17 
On the other hand, faced with the argument that ‘divine love’ is the only proper response to 
the Holocaust, that a singular atrocity requires a singular atonement, one might suspect 
another kind of piety, the ‘Holocaust piety’ Gillian Rose discerns in cultural and political 
responses to the Holocaust, a piety which prevents political and sociological analysis in 
favour of permanently deferred mourning.18 The point is that no abstraction, no matter how 
hallowed, is meaningful apart from its manifestations in the lived experience of actual 
human beings, and that the corollary of this is that lived experience is meaningless without 
the coordinating aid of abstractions. 
‘Requiem for the Plantagenet Kings’ is one of the first poems in Hill’s authorship to 
register this compaction of the private and the public, or the particular and the general, in its 
prosody: 
 
For whom the possessed sea littered, on both shores, 
Ruinous arms; being fired, and for good, 
To sound the constitution of just wars, 
Men, in their eloquent fashion, understood. 
(CP 29) 
 
Symptomatically, the poem deliberately runs the risk of being misunderstood to be a 
repository of nostalgic emblems. It all but beseeches us to read it as an elegy for a period of 
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feudal privilege and violence. The almost onomatopoeic accumulation of Old English and 
Old French words – ‘blood’, ‘hacked’, ‘Budge’, ‘daubed’ – advertises an aesthetic 
sensibility for which the past has a very real presence. The poem’s culminating image is a 
kind of unveiling: ‘and the sea / Across daubed rock evacuates its dead’. The abraded, 
disfigured nature of this revelation (the dead have ‘sleeked groin[s]’ and ‘gored head[s]’) 
only adds to its instructional value. This revelation stands as a warning or a rebuke to we 
who have forgotten our own history. The poet, in this interpretation, stands over against the 
objects of his regard: history is a spectacle waiting to be revealed, and the poet will do this 
with the appropriate skill and tact.  
However, a more complex conception of history is revealed upon examination of 
some key words in the text. Central to Hill’s vocabulary in this and other poems is a notion 
of non-identity, revealed in his compulsive habit of equivocation. In phrases like ‘fired, and 
for good’, ‘to sound the constitution of just wars’, ‘Relieved of soul’, ‘their usage, pride’ 
and ‘they lie’, dual meanings betray the complex contradictions inherent to the concepts 
involved. As a result we are shown how these concepts possess identities which are not 
fixed and knowable but fluid and speculative. Abstract notions like virtue (‘for good’), jus 
ad bellum (‘to sound the constitution’), court culture (‘usage’), and ancestral piety (‘they 
lie’) are revealed to be sites of conceptual conflict, in which the subjective and objective are 
interdependent rather than separate. These equivocations document the experience of 
private morality, on the one hand, and reasons of church and state, on the other, marking 
and remarking their boundaries. Rather than following postmodern thought and depositing 
these phrases into the category of the ‘liminal’ or ‘undecidable’, this interpretative conflict 
mirrors real historical conflict, in which religious and political identities struggle to define 
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themselves against each other. Their radically divergent meanings expose the lack of 
identity, the real historical conflict, at the heart of their supposed referents.  
 The subjects – individual and national – in Hill’s texts are constituted by the 
anxieties, failures and triumphs involved in the work of negotiating between, on the one 
hand, abstract notions of order, and on the other, those of human, corruptible order. Both 
abstract and human order are viewed, in these texts, as powerful conceptual sites to which 
political ideologies have been drawn in order to justify their world-views. We can return to 
the poem with which this chapter began, ‘Of Commerce and Society’, to see how these 
ideas are played out in poetry’s forms: 
 
 The dead are my obsession this week 
 
 But may be lifted away. 
 (CP 49)  
 
As this excerpt indicates, the poem is concerned with aftermaths – how to ‘lift away’ the 
destruction of war, the guilt of colonialism, the horror of genocide. However, it deliberately 
avoids using these morally-loaded terms. Terms like ‘the horror of genocide’, far from 
describing any event of real ‘horror’, more closely resemble ‘moral slogans’, earnests of the 
writer’s own sensitivity.19 They posit a stance of sympathetic impotence masquerading as 
ethical comprehension. The first poem in the sequence, ‘The Apostles: Versailles, 1919’, 
creates a kind of miniature of the aftermath of the First World War, a model of moral 
complacency which reduces complex historical outrages to a conceptualisable minimum. 
Its blunt, brief declarative sentences establish a mock simplicity – ‘They sat. They stood 
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about. … They sat. // They were appalled’. In the meantime, the scene of devastation is 
restored as a mechanical vignette of simple objects: ‘The bells / In hollowed Europe spilt’, 
‘The sea creaked with worked vessels’, the repeated consonants l and k bluntly delimiting 
the scope of the vowels (CP 46). There is no attempt, in this poem, to imagine the scale of 
the political situation, but this is not Hill’s intention. ‘The Apostles: Versailles, 1919’ is 
rather about the deliberate reduction of horror to the level of graspable civic dignity: ‘coin’ 
and ‘salt’, whose traversal of the sea breaks the ‘silence’ of the war’s aftermath, are 
emblems of a society endowed with the kind of morality that allows stock responses, in 
easily available language, to death on an unimaginable scale.    
Scale continues to be a theme in the next poem in the sequence, ‘The Lowlands of 
Holland’. Europe has become adorned with labels and is ‘looking up’ – optimistic, but also 
perhaps like a ‘Stuffed’ animal raising its eyes to ‘invite use’ (CP 47).20 Its cities’ features, 
as in a balsa-wood architect’s model, seem ‘Shrunken, magnified’: reduced in scale but 
thereby more available to the gaze. Europe is described as ‘Not half innocent and not half 
undone’. But what can ‘Not half innocent’ mean here? There is the ghost of a notion that 
Europe is not half one thing and half another thing – in this case half innocent and half 
undone; but the repeated ‘not’ undermines this reading (which would require ‘Not half 
innocent and half undone’). Colloquially, ‘Not half’ indicates understatement – Europe 
having been ‘not half undone’ meaning, of course, that it’s more ‘undone’ than not. But in 
what sense might one apply a similarly quantitative evaluation of Europe’s ‘innocence’?  
One reading of this strange construction is as an invitation for the reader to dwell at 
length on its constituent elements. The experience of reading this line is akin to that 
recorded by William Empson, in his analysis of a line from Keats’s ‘Ode to Melancholy’:  
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‘No, no; go not to Lethe; neither twist’ tells you that somebody, or some force in the 
poet’s mind, must have wanted to go to Lethe very much, if it took four negatives in 
the first line to stop them.21  
 
As Empson suggests, there is, in Keats’s line, a logic inherent to its parsable meaning, and 
a logic brought about by the simple preponderance of negatives, and both are audible 
simultaneously. As the poet turns away from Lethe, the force of its attraction is tangible in 
the emphatic ‘No, no … not … neither’. Analogously, Hill sees innocence as a motivating 
concept in the construction of post-war Europe: ‘Not half innocent and not half undone’. 
Yet through its negation it is revealed to have been ‘undone’, mitigated by commercial 
forces. The syntax dramatises the argument: ‘Not’ places ‘innocence’ in a relation to its 
contamination. ‘Innocence’ is posited only to be negated; but the phrase remains on the 
page (‘Not half innocent’) as a reminder of the experience of this argument.  
One source of innocence’s confutation is the accumulation of real political events 
that mark and mask the history of Europe’s development, a development culminating in the 
‘attested liberties’ of the first stanza. Hill dwells on the multiple senses of ‘liberty’ in his 
essay on Jonson, ‘“The World’s Proportion”: Jonson’s Dramatic Poetry in Sejanus and 
Catiline’: there is a liberty ‘involved with property and heredity’, a liberty ‘synonymous 
with licence’, and a moral concept which can be deployed to virtuous or vicious ends (CCW 
43-44).22 Many of Europe’s liberties may be traced back to 1789, the year of the French 
Revolution, and of the publication of Blake’s Songs of Innocence: ideas of birth, promise, 
and love are inextricable from the concept, as is, perhaps most importantly, the idea of 
Enlightenment rationality. Those liberties which allow citizens to ‘profit from custom’ are 
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also part of the picture. ‘The Lowlands of Holland’ refuses to record any of the political 
events that mark and mask the history of Europe’s liberties. But this accumulation of 
sociopolitical ordinance, gradually covering an originary idea of freedom or emancipation, 
is, I argue, documented in the poem’s syntax. 
Taking a broader look at the poem’s syntax, we can see that its sixteen lines 
compose one sentence, split into a series of clauses separated by colons and semicolons. As 
Vincent Sherry writes, ‘The stop-and-go action of Hill’s syntax … seems to pause, shed 
one perspective with a syntactic unit, move forward in the next to assume another point of 
view’.23  In the poems ‘Elegiac Stanzas’, ‘The Re-Birth of Venus’ and ‘Requiem for the 
Plantagenet Kings’, sentences containing multiple colons and semicolons create a sense of 
sequence without a concomitant sense of direction. Semicolons, for example, typically 
allow meaning to be arrayed in a horizontal sequence of separate semantic units, none of 
which is required to bear a relationship to its neighbour, but all of which relate to one 
central clause of the argument. The use of colons traditionally implies a causal or otherwise 
meaningful relationship between the divided units; when a second colon is added, without 
the first having brought the argument to a conclusion, the relation between the divided 
clauses becomes a source of perplexity for the reader: 
 
Profiting from custom: its replete strewn 
 Cities such ample monuments to lost 
 
 Nations and generations: its cultural 
 Or trade skeletons such hand-picked bone: 
 Flaws in the best, revised science marks down: 
 Witness many devices 
 (CP 47) 
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If we are to take the colon as signifying something more than a pause, as, that is, a sign that 
a premise or prelude has been given and its expansion or conclusion will follow, the above 
lines are an epitome of logical and grammatical perplexity. While, as Sherry argues, each 
severed clause offers a new perspective, it is not so much that the old perspective is ‘shed’: 
rather, perspectives accumulate with each fresh start.  
Reading the passage above, the cities’ repletion in the second clause could 
conceivably be interpreted (thanks to the colon) as the result of the ‘Profiting’ in the first 
clause, which is thereby amplified and explained. But the next clause (‘its cultural / Or 
trade skeletons…’) has a more uncertain provenance – does it look back to Europe’s profit, 
its cities, or both? The very presence of two colons provokes a moment of hasty rereading, 
a search for the point of reference this putatively conclusive line hangs from. As we read 
yet another colon at the end of this line, all hope of maintaining the conceptual integrity of 
the sentence in one’s memory disappears. Does the next line, ‘Flaws in the best’, refer to 
the ‘trade skeletons’? Must it not also, by virtue of its position in a chain of colon-separated 
clauses, bear at least a degraded relationship to the first clause in the sequence? Finally, 
‘Witness many devices’, perhaps an imperative addressed to ‘Europe’, bears, by virtue of 
the colon preceding it, some causal connection to the preceding observations. Layers of 
meaning have accrued to the subject (‘Europe’), and parentheses and new subjects have 
been superadded, to the point that the force of the verb, when it finally comes (repeatedly: 
‘Witness … witness … Witness’), is distributed over these dispersed units. Its appearance 
has been postponed to the point that its object is lost in a fog of syntax: each colon takes the 
reader further from the source of the verb’s energy. It enfolds the historical contingencies 
joined by arbitrary linkages in the preceding lines to an injunction to ‘witness’: witnessing 
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being an institutionally hallowed attestation of knowledge. After the epistemological 
uncertainties created by a series of colons (making the relations between subject and object 
in the sentence ambiguous), to enjoin witness is to require, in the teeth of these 
uncertainties, some grounding perspective.  
 
*** 
 
I hope it is clear from the above examples that Hill’s dissatisfaction with modernity 
includes questions with which philosophy is especially concerned, especially the possibility 
of ethics in a society governed by an enlightened technocracy. Philosophy’s claim to 
‘vision’ – to the perception of contradictions and their possible resolution – competes with 
poetry’s claim. Poetry’s ‘craft of vision’, unlike philosophy’s, is not dependent on the 
establishment of premises, propositions and conclusions, but on the more contingent basis 
of sensuous resources like assonance, rhythm, and syntax. However, unlike certain 
poststructuralist bodies of work, in which contingency or play is conceived of as an 
adequate riposte to the authoritarian strictures of reason, Hill is bound to certain objective 
truths, to the possibility of ‘witness’.  
My thesis is divided into three sections, each subdivided into two chapters. My first 
section will explore the tensions brought into Hill’s work by this conflict between a sense 
of a grounding, legitimating whole and a sense of experience and history as fragmented and 
contingent. Through a reading of Hill’s many references to Coleridge, whose philosophic 
legacy will be argued to be a German Idealism supplemented by a compensatory 
Christianity, the chapter will bring to light connections between Hill and an author whose 
significance for Hill’s work is often acknowledged but rarely investigated. As well as 
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examining the areas of Coleridge’s thinking that are of most importance to Hill, the chapter 
will introduce some of the key ideas of idealist aesthetics which will form the backdrop of 
the subsequent chapters, especially aesthetic reflection, the possibility of objective 
judgement, and the ideal of a community of sense. It incorporates a close reading of Hill’s 
long poem The Triumph of Love, drawing links between the Anglophone Idealist ideas of 
community and the sensuous fragment as conceived by Coleridge, and the thematic and 
prosodic investments of the poem. I focus in particular on ‘vision’ as a social function: the 
imagining, planning and construction of new social spaces (especially post-war urban 
spaces), and the material, aural and affective consequences they give rise to.  
 Having given an account of Hill’s engagement with Coleridge, perhaps the first 
writer to bring German Idealism to Britain, my second section moves on to consider Hill’s 
interest in two later nineteenth century British Idealists, T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley. 
Centering on the notion of judgement, I argue that the ‘craft of vision’ as Hill sees it 
requires an objectivity that cannot mesh cleanly with an objectivity already existing in the 
world. I introduce Hill’s lately-expressed apprehension of the struggle between thought and 
syntax (further explored in chapter 6), and suggest that this implies a shift in thinking as 
regards the degree to which the lyric ‘I’ is constituted by external pressures. Bradley, with 
Green as a minor forerunner, contribute to Hill’s critical writings ways of thinking about 
the formulation and communication of critical thought, and of the surges into 
individualistic clarity and lapses into solipsism such thought is prey to.  Such surges and 
lapses are then discovered to be operative in two of Hill’s later volumes, Canaan and 
Speech! Speech! The first is read as a transitional text, retaining the reluctance to employ 
the first-person pronoun of Hill’s earlier work, but suggesting in its prosody a greater 
spontaneity than was hitherto visible. Speech! Speech! is then read as a text which opens to 
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scrutiny the earlier tendency towards self-effacement. Its asymmetric prosody and didactic 
diacritics are read as markers of the difficulty of judgement, of the stresses undergone by 
subjective expression attempting to establish binding, objective vision.  
Conflict between belief in a unifying, grounding objectivity and a spontaneous, 
contingent subjectivity accounts for much of the sometimes stifling, sometimes intoxicating 
self-reflexiveness of Hill’s verse. A similar self-reflexiveness characterises Hill’s criticism. 
If anything, the conflict is more acute in his critical prose, which has received such epithets 
as ‘tortuous and tortured’, than in his poetry.24 This is especially the case when he writes 
about philosophy, since he is forced back on the logic of traditional discourse, while 
simultaneously writing about logical, communicative language and its failings. He wants to 
define very closely the varieties of syntactic expression while revealing the errors into 
which such empirical definition is liable to lapse. This is why Hill’s interest in the 
philosopher J.L. Austin, about whom he wrote in the essay ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’, is 
particularly relevant to an understanding of his attitude to objectivity. In the third section, I 
explore Hill’s investigation of Austin’s claims, which are part of a wider philosophical 
project called ordinary language philosophy. This project pays particular attention to 
minute distinctions in language and their origins in historical experience. Clearly this is an 
attractive approach for Hill, but its radical empiricism disallows metaphysical speculation, 
and Hill is forced back on an idealist perspective in order better to grasp the contradictions 
inherent to Austin’s philosophy. The metaphor of blindness becomes important as 
descriptive of a non-determinative function that conceives of the ‘craft of vision’ as a 
critical faculty that is not reliant on pre-existing conceptuality, but at the same time is not 
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entirely arbitrary. At the same time it describes a situation in which poetry’s critical 
apprehension of the social is fated to be unheard by the wielders of communicative, 
legislative language. I explore the use of this metaphor in The Mystery of the Charity of 
Charles Péguy and the poems collected in A Treatise of Civil Power, ending with Hill’s 
elegy to Gillian Rose and an analysis of his relationship to her late philosophy.  
Throughout what follows I will make extensive use of Hill’s Collected Critical 
Writings. I hope to show that it is an essential resource for thinking about Hill and 
philosophy not only because it contains his most extended writing on philosophy and 
philosophers, but because his prose style is to a great extent a corollary of his attitudes 
towards definition, critical distance, aesthetic reflection and objective judgement. In other 
words, while I will rely on his essays to a very great extent for their explicit philosophical 
content, I will also have occasion to subject them to close reading, as I would a poem, in 
order to bring to light the philosophical issues that contribute towards their form. In 
addition I will be making use of the materials made available in the Geoffrey Hill Archive 
at Leeds. This comprises a large collection of notebooks and papers including previously 
unpublished lectures, lecture notes, poetry notebooks, journal cuttings, and early drafts of 
published essays and articles. Some are of particular value because they represent early 
stages of Hill’s thought on philosophy, before it is integrated into the less easily 
paraphraseable surfaces of his published prose. Others offer useful contextual information 
illuminating the broader argument. 
In order to better sketch some of the connective tissue that binds Hill to the 
intellectual climate of his day, I will have recourse to the thinking of those writers 
mentioned above (Bernstein, Caygill, Dews and Rose) whose work represents a turn from 
the postmodern scepticism in the face of metaphysics towards a belief in the necessity of 
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reason despite its occasionally damaging normativity. The primary reason for my seeking 
aid in the works of these thinkers is their perception (which runs contrary to the 
predominant intellectual currents of their day) of the relevance which the thought of the 
German Idealists could still possess in the twentieth century. This will also necessitate 
some engagement with a thinker – Theodor Adorno – whose relevance to Hill is not 
immediately obvious, but who has been taken by these thinkers as exemplary for their 
understanding of the aesthetic as a privileged mode of cognising the social. If Adorno’s 
intellectual background bears little resemblance, and his politics even less, to Hill’s, the fact 
that they still share a wide cultural and moral common ground merely testifies to the 
multiple political directions German Idealism can take, and did take in the nineteenth-
century. Gillian Rose’s presence as an informing theorist is less surprising. Her late 
conversion to Catholicism puts her among the throng of converts of which Hill is especially 
fond. More importantly, as a writer who begins as a specialist on Adorno, before 
articulating a philosophy which derives from Hegel and explicitly, in the later work, 
propounds an understanding of rationality that recognises the necessity of both objectivity 
and contingency, she can shed valuable light on the issues that follow. 
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SECTION I: COLERIDGE’S INFLUENCE
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CHAPTER 1: IMAGINATION 
 
‘They have conceded me ... power of determination’: Hill’s remark in The Triumph of Love 
is expressive of a degree of confidence in the diagnostic power of lyric poetry. Later in the 
same sequence, though, he casts doubt over this efficacy, asking ‘Incantation or 
incontinence – the lyric cry?’1 This chapter will begin to explore the avenues through which 
Hill pursues the possibility of a diagnostic, determinative poetics, and the doubts and 
anxieties inherent to his search for the grounds of objective judgement. In particular, the 
intention is to show that Hill’s most enduring aesthetic principles have arisen in response to 
Coleridge’s critical, philosophical and moral work, and that, to a great extent, Hill’s 
attention to the objectification of thought in philosophical discourse is prompted by 
Coleridge’s ambivalent position vis-à-vis German Idealist philosophy.  
It has become common practice to claim literary kinship between the two writers, 
but these observations rarely go beyond noting Hill’s reliance on certain aphorisms drawn 
from Coleridge’s notebooks, letters, and criticism. Hence the first half of this chapter will 
trace the philosophical background of Coleridge’s statements, and try to restore some life to 
phrases which have by now (at least in the context of criticism on Hill) lost much of their 
meaning. It will do this through a reading of Hill’s important, and most Coleridgean essay 
‘Redeeming the Time’. Coleridge offers a way into understanding the ambiguities in Hill’s 
attitude towards the persuasive aesthetic power of certain forms of nineteenth-century 
thinking. At stake in this understanding will be Coleridge’s wish to ground immediate, 
sensuous modes of understanding in universal principles, and to give objective reality to 
                                                 
1
 TL 3, 79. 
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what begin as subjective, abstract ideas. Coleridge is doubly important in this respect, since 
not only does his thought stand historically behind the attempts of nineteenth-century 
ideologues to form a community sense (a sensus communis which will be defined later in 
this chapter), but this seemingly self-contradictory task (to reconcile subjective, aesthetic 
apprehension with objective, social fact) also lies behind the rich contradictions in Hill’s 
poetry. 
 Coleridge’s importance is not limited to Hill’s investment in the nineteenth century. 
It extends to Hill’s entire critical and poetic authorship. This chapter will argue that 
Coleridge’s theories of aesthetic reflection, grounding the claim that aesthetic subjectivity 
can be the medium by which commonalities of interest, purpose, or experience can be given 
objective reality in the world, are given new expression in Hill’s poetry and criticism. 
Coleridge’s ideas on aesthetic reflection have left a lasting impression upon Hill’s concept 
of ethically responsible writing. Nineteenth-century intellectual culture is second only to 
that of the seventeenth-century in its significance for Hill’s understanding of the 
relationship between politics, ethics, religion and language, and the figures from that epoch 
to whom Hill returns are all demonstrably inheritors of Coleridge’s thought: Newman, 
Hopkins, Green and Bradley. In taking an overview of Hill’s relationship to this tradition, 
philosophy will become an essential object of study.  
 Alongside my analysis of ‘Redeeming the Time’, I will read Hill’s long poem The 
Triumph of Love in the light of the Coleridgean ideas that emerge from this analysis. In the 
process I hope to demonstrate that this poem, with which Coleridge has not previously been 
associated, is at all levels – thematically, structurally, syntactically, and prosodically – 
deeply saturated in Coleridgean habits of thought, diction, and imagination. Taken as a 
whole, I hope that by examining Coleridge’s ambivalent attitude to philosophical thought, 
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this chapter and the next will help readers to recognise Hill’s own paradoxical dependence 
upon and suspicion of philosophy.  
 
1. Lyric as diagnosis 
 
In describing what he was trying to achieve in the sonnet-sequence ‘An Apology for the 
Revival of Christian Architecture in England’, Hill said that ‘to the best of my ability, I’m 
offering a diagnosis’ of English nostalgia.2 Taken together with his comments, in the same 
interview, about the ‘political and sociological reasons’ for his approach, this suggests a 
serious ambition for poetry: a ‘diagnosis’ backed by systematic sociopolitical knowledge. 
What though are the conditions under which language – particularly something as distant 
and muted, to the ears of politicians and sociologists, as lyric language – can effect any 
kind of diagnosis? 
‘An Apology’ carries two epigraphs. The first is an extract from an 1895 
compendium of entries from Coleridge’s then-unpublished notebooks, Anima Poetae: ‘the 
spiritual, Platonic old England…’ (CP 152). Coleridge’s phrase strikes the note of 
capricious abstraction for which he was notorious, and which led to Peacock’s caricature of 
him as a ‘lover ... of shadows’.3 Hill’s understanding of the spiritualised nation fills it out 
with visible and audible detail, but this doesn’t quite dispel the impression of the abstract 
swallowing the particular that Coleridge’s epigraph creates: 
 
                                                 
2
 John Haffenden, ‘Geoffrey Hill’, in Viewpoints: Poets in Conversation with John Haffenden (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1981), 76-99, at 93. 
3
 The character of Mr Flosky in Thomas Love Peacock’s Nightmare Abbey is widely recognised to have been 
based on Coleridge. Peacock writes in a note that ‘Flosky’ is ‘A corruption of Filosky, quasi Фιλοσκιος a 
lover, or sectator, of shadows’. See Nightmare Abbey and Maid Marian (New York: AMS Press, 1967), 9. 
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 Pitched high above the shallows of the sea 
 lone bells in gritty belfries do not ring 
 but coil a far and inward echoing 
 out of the air that thrums. Enduringly, 
 
 fuschia-hedges fend between cliff and sky; 
 brown stumps of headstones tamp into the ling 
 the ruined and the ruinously strong. 
 Platonic England grasps its tenantry 
 (CP 158) 
 
Who are the ‘tenantry’ in Hill’s poem? Coleridge’s ‘spiritual, Platonic England’ is 
constituted by ‘Sir P. Sidney, Shakespere, Spenser, Milton, Bacon, Harrington, Swift, 
Wordsworth’, but Hill’s sequence conspicuously declines to name names.4 We are given 
the information in the preceding lines that, whoever this ‘tenantry’ are, their bodies are 
intimately connected with a picturesque landscape, that their ‘Platonic’ endurance is 
indebted to nature, specifically to the English countryside. They maintain an attenuated 
existence – to the point of airy nothingness – given aesthetic figuration in the echoes that 
sound within stanzas and over the stanza breaks, ‘sea’ calling to the ‘sky’ and ‘tenantry’, 
‘ring’ to ‘ling’ and ‘strong’, and so on. Indeed the sequence as a whole thrums with 
acoustic invention but is short on empirical fact: scenarios, landscapes, architecture are 
rendered with a deliberate combination of blur and close-up, giving the impression of 
intermittently strong recall in a maze of amnesia:  
 
The twittering pipistrelle, so strange and close, 
 
plucks its curt flight through the moist eventide; 
the children thread among old avenues 
of snowberries, clear-calling as they fade. 
(CP 159) 
                                                 
4
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Kathleen Coburn, 4 vols. 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), ii, 2598. 
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The precision with which ‘plucks its curt flight’ mimics the rapid movement of the 
pipistrelle is indeed ‘strange and close’, but it is then absorbed in the ‘moist eventide’, 
before the attention is distracted by Eliotic echoes of unnamed ‘children’. Distraction in this 
sequence is precisely defined in acoustic remnants that bespeak a recently departed 
presence: the geographical spaces – the country house grounds and drawing rooms, 
domestic chapels, colonial forts and aerodromes – retain legible traces of the lives that 
inhabited them.  
Clues to the tenantry of these spaces are provided in the poems’ titles. ‘Loss and 
Gain’, the title of the first poem quoted above, echoes the title of John Henry Newman’s 
novel Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert (1848). Newman’s fictionalised account of his 
conversion to Roman Catholicism in 1845 evokes the anxieties of identity inherent to the 
struggle to define and preserve a particular community (in this case the Anglo-Catholic 
community). 5  These anxieties are also invoked by the title of Hill’s sequence, which 
duplicates the title of Augustus Pugin’s study An Apology for the Revival of Christian 
Architecture in England, an argument for a return to an architectural style which embodied 
Pugin’s religion and customs. The frontispiece of this tract displays an elevated view of the 
twenty-four Roman Catholic cathedrals, churches and chapels Pugin had been 
commissioned to design, huddled shoulder to shoulder against a faintly-sketched pastoral 
landscape. A New Jerusalem whose project was never fulfilled, it is nonetheless a 
memorable symbol of the projected renaissance of Gothic architecture, springing from the 
                                                 
5
 John Henry Newman, Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert (London: Burns & Oates, 1962). 
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soil of England as a natural emanation of her spirit.6  Hill’s second epigraph is from 
Disraeli’s Coningsby: ‘“Your situation”, said Coningsby, looking up the green and silent 
valley, “is absolute poetic”’.  Here country-house culture is depicted as spiritualised nature, 
continuing the connection between architecture and nation, and, significantly, viewing such 
a binding of culture and nature as the especial preserve of poetry. 
That such ideas became a vital part of the texture of people’s lives is testified to by 
Hill’s poem (the ‘elopement’ in the third sonnet, for example, takes place in the 
surroundings of ‘new-burgeoned spires that sprung / crisp-leaved as though from dropping-
wells’).7 The creation of public forms of community – whether through legal, aesthetic, or 
political means – leaves behind it a cultural landscape tingling with visible and audible 
traces: hence the strong flavour of nostalgia that has made the sequence one of Hill’s most 
provocative texts.8 While critics have been correct to defend Hill’s sequence against some 
of the more extreme accusations of nostalgia, there has been a reluctance among his 
defenders to recognise the sympathy Hill feels towards the ideals and cultural products of 
the culture he depicts, a reluctance perhaps encouraged by Hill himself. His comment that 
there are ‘good political and sociological reasons for the floating of nostalgia’ suggests an 
experimental or provisional attitude which obscures the investment the poems have in a 
                                                 
6
 Augustus Pugin, An Apology for the Revival of Christian Architecture in England (London: St Barnabas 
Press, 1969), frontispiece. 
7
 For a discussion of the connection between Gothic architecture and Catholicism, see Avril Horner, 
‘“Linnaean Pentecosts”: Geoffrey Hill's “An Apology for the Revival of Christian Architecture in England”’, 
Literature & Theology, 4/1 (March 1990), 84-103, at 94-98. 
8
 For a defence of Hill’s poem against accusations of nostalgia, see Avril Horner, ‘“Linnaean Pentecosts”’; 
Andrew Michael Roberts, ‘Geoffrey Hill and Pastiche: “An Apology for the Revival of Christian Architecture 
in England” and The Mystery of the Charity of Charles Péguy’, The Yale Journal of Criticism, 13/1 (2000), 
153-166; Jonathan Bolton, ‘Empire and Atonement: Geoffrey Hill’s “An Apology for the Revival of Christian 
Architecture in England”’, Contemporary Literature, 38/2 (Summer 1997), 287-306. 
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past whose cultural artefacts they make shine.9 This sympathy is evident in the sensual 
solidity with which Hill memorialises the material and intellectual possessions which also, 
to be sure, he deplores in his recognition of the interdependence of civilisation and 
violence.  
 Published just a year before several of the poems which make up ‘An Apology’ 
made their first appearance in journals, Hill’s essay ‘Redeeming the Time’ focuses on 
comparable topics: the possibility of cultural ‘diagnosis’, the possibility of the creation of 
community feeling, and the impact of social change upon the nineteenth-century 
imagination. 10  It also represents Hill’s first substantial engagement with Coleridge’s 
authorship.  Both ‘Redeeming the Time’ and ‘An Apology’ show that Coleridge enters 
Hill’s thought precisely where the possibility of aesthetic diagnosis becomes an issue. But 
the philosophical aesthetics of German Idealism, which informed Coleridge’s thinking 
about sensate cognition, are not a reference point in Hill’s essay. As irrefutable as the 
German Idealist sources of Coleridge’s aesthetics are, Hill displays a romantic demand that 
philosophy’s axioms be proved upon our pulses, or, in the case of ‘Redeeming the Time’, 
upon the pulses of industrial workers in the nineteenth century.  
A useful entrance point to the arguments of ‘Redeeming the Time’ is its assertion 
that language is shaped by its users’ social circumstances. Hill’s essay begins with the 
assertion that the nineteenth-century, far from being a period in which the voice of the 
dispossessed went unheard, in reality heard this voice ring out with unobstructed vigour. 
But the vigour didn’t wholly belong to these dispossessed, since embedded in the meetings 
and pamphlets under discussion in Hill’s essay was often, as E.P. Thompson writes, a 
                                                 
9
 Viewpoints, 93. 
10
 ‘Redeeming the Time’, Agenda 10/4 – 11/1 (Autumn 1972 / Winter 1973), 87-111. Subsequently reprinted 
in LL and CCW. 
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‘demagogic element … which encouraged the wholly unconstructive rhetoric of 
denunciation’.11 It is more the voice of the public orator than of a collectivity of workers 
that one hears in many of the recorded speeches and pamphlets of the time. Yet if Hill 
inculpates the excesses of radical demagogic oratory, other specimens of radical prose are 
greeted more warmly. Against demagogic soapbox zeal, judged to be ultimately self-
defeating, for example, Hill places ‘the declaration of the Nottingham branch of the United 
Committee of Framework-Knitters, c.1812’: its language, Hill asserts, presupposes a 
scepticism with regards to certain areas of social efficacy, but retains the prerogative to 
critique its authors’ employers.  
Such conclusions might comfortably be drawn from an analysis of the content of 
archival documents. Perhaps more tendentiously, though, Hill wishes to transfer to rhythm 
some of the symptomatic virtues empirical data has for the historian. Social change 
reverberates – so goes Hill’s argument – in language use, and the early to mid nineteenth-
century therefore saw ‘a drastic breaking of tempo and … an equally severe disturbance of 
the supposedly normative patterns of speech’ (CCW 88). In one of Hill’s most frequently-
quoted apothegms, he writes: ‘If language is more than a vehicle for the transmission of 
axioms and concepts, rhythm is correspondingly more than a physiological motor. It is 
capable of registering, mimetically, deep shocks of recognition’ (CCW 91). Literary 
precedent for this assertion is given in Wordsworth’s ‘Ode: Intimations of Immortality’, in 
particular the break between stanzas eight and nine, and the metrical gear-shift which 
ensues (Hill’s assertion, as he acknowledges, derives from Gerard Manley Hopkins’s 
recorded delight at the ‘magical change’ the ninth stanza embodies). More tendentious still 
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 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 682. Quoted 
CCW 88. 
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is Hill’s next assertion, that this ‘silence between stanzas eight and nine and … the 
immediate, abrupt surge with which the “joy” of nine’s opening lines resists, pulls away 
from, the gravitational field of the closing lines of stanza eight’ – this manipulation of 
literary convention – in fact ‘redeem[s]’ the ‘shock to be suffered’ by English radicals later 
in the century. ‘Wordsworth transfigures a fractured world’: in Hill’s essay, art lays claim 
to the power to recognise and reconfigure objective suffering (CCW 92). Coleridge hasn’t 
yet been mentioned in the essay, but in these words the aura of the Coleridgean imagination 
is clearly perceptible.12  
 
2. The imagination’s role in subjective aesthetic reflection 
 
Imagination has been a key concept in Coleridge’s twentieth-century critical heritage, from 
I.A. Richards’s classic study Coleridge on Imagination onwards.13 In the context of British 
literary history, imagination is presented as a reaction to prevailing neoclassical aesthetic 
norms – order imposed from external, already existing sources – supplying instead a notion 
of autonomous creativity, of laws derived from the reflective, creative capacities of the 
artist. This is the distinction figured by the title of M.H. Abrams’s classic study of romantic 
aesthetics, The Mirror and the Lamp: if the neoclassical mirror merely reflects pre-existing 
forms, the romantic lamp gives rise to its own forms. ‘The primary source and subject 
matter of a poem, therefore,’ Abrams writes, ‘are the attributes and actions of the poet’s 
                                                 
12
 No mention is made anywhere in Hill’s work of Coleridge’s politics which, needless to say, were not in 
sympathy with those of the radicals mentioned in ‘Redeeming the Time’. We can attribute this to the general 
tenor of the work on Coleridge that Hill would have been reading. As E.P. Thompson observed, in an article 
published in 1979, Coleridge’s reception had been mostly at the hands of literary critics, apt to displace a 
consideration of his politics ‘from a political to an aesthetic court of judgment’. See E.P. Thompson, The 
Romantics: England in a Revolutionary Age (Woodbridge: Merlin Press, 1997), 149. 
13
 I.A. Richards, Coleridge on Imagination (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962). 
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own mind; or if aspects of the external world, then these only as they are converted from 
fact to poetry by the feelings and operations of the poet’s mind’.14 
 Imagination was endowed by the romantics with the faculty of apprehending, or 
construing, the real. Imagination acts as the envoy of a grounding principle (whose name 
varies according to the modes in which it appears): this principle’s divinity is reproduced in 
human consciousness by means of the imagination. In the final book of the 1850 Prelude, 
for example, Wordsworth writes ‘This spiritual Love acts not nor can exist / Without 
Imagination, which, in truth, / Is but another name for absolute power / And clearest 
insight, amplitude of mind, / And Reason in her most exalted mood’.15 The emphasis on the 
creative, spontaneous contribution of the artist’s mind to the work of art was paralleled in 
contemporary philosophy. To quote Abrams again, the ‘change from imitation to 
expression … was an integral part of a corresponding change in popular epistemology – 
that is, in the concept of the role played by the mind in perception which was current 
among romantic poets and critics’.16 The transition, in the conception of the human mind, 
from one of passive tabula rasa or mechanically-associative machine to the spontaneous, 
constitutive subjectivity of Kant’s philosophy was pivotal in Coleridge’s thought. But at the 
same time a desire to preserve a foundational source from which imagination took its 
bearings was at work, and led to the writings – such as The Friend and Aids to Reflection – 
which seek to ground cognition in a set of principles derived from Christianity: these are 
the texts by Coleridge from which Hill draws most frequently.  
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 M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1953), 22. 
15
 William Wordsworth, The Prelude 1799, 1805, 1850, ed. Jonathan Wordsworth, M.H. Abrams and Stephen 
Gill (New York and London: Norton, 1979), 469. 
16
 Abrams, op. cit., 57-8. 
47 
 
 
 
 Coleridge’s famous statement about the imagination occurs at the end of the first 
volume of Biographia Literaria. He writes:  
 
The IMAGINATION then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary 
IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human 
Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the 
infinite I AM. The secondary I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with 
the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, 
and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, 
dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet 
still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as 
all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead.17 
 
This is followed by Coleridge’s definition of fancy: 
 
FANCY, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with, but fixities and 
definites. The Fancy is indeed no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from 
the order of time and space; and blended with, and modified by that empirical 
phenomenon of the will, which we express by the word CHOICE.18 
 
The fancy, faced with the obduracy of ‘definites’, is restricted to an ordering, organising 
role which is unable to envision a world that is not determined by these definites. The 
imagination, on the other hand, is where the diagnostic and constitutive possibilities of art 
reside. Coleridge’s distinction between the primary and secondary imagination bears a 
family resemblance to certain elements in the philosophy of Kant and Schelling. The 
primary imagination – ‘the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception’ – on the 
face of it repeats the role played by the imagination in Kant’s critical philosophy. (In his 
transcendental deduction, Kant gives the name ‘imagination’ to the faculty that matches up 
                                                 
17
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, or Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and 
Opinions, ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate, 2 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), i, 175. 
18
 Ibid., 305. 
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our subjective concepts with the sense data from the objective world.)19 But, as several 
critics have pointed out, the creative aspect of this faculty (‘a repetition in the finite mind of 
the eternal act of creation’) brings it closer to Schelling (whose System of Transcendental 
Idealism is the source for the controversial plagiarised passages which preceded this 
definition of imagination in the Biographia). On this account, the primary and secondary 
imaginations correspond to Schelling’s ‘productive intuition’ and the ‘poetic faculty’.20 
This creative aspect contributes to an epistemology which sees the two-tier model of 
Kantian metaphysics as a threat to philosophical relevance. As Mary Warnock puts it, 
‘what was an active function, constituting the world-as-it-appears-to-us, in Kant becomes, 
in Schelling, a properly creative function constituting the world as it really is’.21  
The secondary imagination (corresponding to Schelling’s ‘poetic faculty’) has the 
power to combine materials supplied by the perception, and – importantly for Coleridge’s 
aesthetics – to unify them into a single object. It ‘dissolves, diffuses’ hard, objective reality 
– what is seemingly fixed and unalterable – in order to reorganise its elements, and finally 
produce something new and whole. This unifying process is what makes the products of the 
secondary imagination objective, i.e. it is what underwrites the aesthetic product’s claim to 
say something about the world. Fancy, by contrast, plays a vital but subsidiary role in 
aesthetic creation, organising the facts imagination deals with but unable so to organise 
them as to produce new, vital interrelations and hence new configurations of the real. 
                                                 
19
 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, tr. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), A 78/B 103, 211. 
20
 See G.N.G. Orsini, Coleridge and German Idealism: A Study in the History of Philosophy with 
Unpublished Materials from Coleridge’s Manuscripts (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1969), 224-5. 
21
 Mary Warnock, Imagination (London: Faber, 1976), 91. 
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Let us see how these ideas might have relevance to a poem of Hill’s. The long poem 
The Triumph of Love (1998) has been read as ‘a study of the theology of grace’,22 ‘an 
exemplary study in ruination’, ‘the text of a projected old poet with distant detractors’,23 an 
‘act of oblation offered for guilts incurred’, 24 and a ‘quotidian epic’ and satire.25 What I 
hope to show in the following pages is that it is also a deeply Coleridgean poem, as two 
passages near the beginning of the poem show. These passages reverberate with 
Coleridgean ideas about aesthetic reflection, and establish the poem’s kinship with 
Coleridge’s annotative, fragmentary approach to philosophy.  
The first passage is section VI: 
 
 Between bay window and hedge the impenetrable holly 
 strikes up again taut wintry vibrations […] 
 From the front room I might be able to see 
 the coal fire’s image planted in a circle 
 of cut-back rose bushes. Nothing is changed 
 by the strength of this reflection. 
(TL 2) 
 
Several critics have noted this section’s affinity to Eliot.26 It is true that there are hints here 
of East Coker’s ‘purgatorial fires / Of which the flame is roses’, or Little Gidding’s ‘knot of 
fire’ in which ‘the fire and the rose are one’. But what hasn’t been noted is a possible 
connection with Coleridge. Hill’s passage irresistibly recalls an article in the second edition 
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 P. K. Walker, ‘“The Triumph of Love”: Geoffrey Hill’s Contexture of Grace’, Sewanee Theological Review 
44/3 (Pentecost, 2001), 275-298, at 284. 
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 Peter Robinson, review of Geoffrey Hill, The Triumph of Love, Notre Dame Review 8 (Summer 1999), 138-
142, at 140. 
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 Jeffrey Wainwright, Acceptable Words: Essays on the poetry of Geoffrey Hill (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005), 89. 
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 Michael Edwards, ‘Quotidian Epic: Geoffrey Hill's The Triumph of Love’, Yale Journal of Criticism, 13/1 
(Spring 2000), 167-76. 
26
 See e.g., ibid., 172-3. 
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of Coleridge’s The Friend which is concerned with the role aesthetic reflection plays in 
religious experience: 
 
The window of my library at Keswick is opposite to the fire-place, and looks out on 
the very large garden that occupies the whole slope of the hill on which the house 
stands. Consequently, the rays of light transmitted through the glass, (i.e. the rays 
from the garden, the opposite mountains, and the bridge, river, lake, and vale 
interjacent) and the rays reflected from it, (of the fire-place, &c.) enter the eye at the 
same moment. At the coming on of evening, it was my frequent amusement to 
watch the image of reflection of the fire, that seemed burning in the bushes or 
between the trees in different parts of the garden or the fields beyond it, according 
as there was more or less light; and which still arranged itself among the real objects 
of vision, with a distance and magnitude proportioned to its greater or lesser 
faintness27 
 
Coleridge’s passage is ostensibly an attempt to justify how the mind is sometimes able to 
project visions and dreams in its waking state. If, Coleridge goes on to write, he were to 
begin his projected work on dreams, visions, and ghosts,  
 
I might then explain in a more satisfactory way the mode in which our thoughts, in 
states of morbid slumber, become at times perfectly dramatic ... and by what law 
the Form of the vision appears to talk to us its own thoughts in a voice as audible as 
the shape is visible28 
 
Dramatic form in this example means visions, ghosts, specifically Luther’s vision of Satan 
at Warteburg, but it might be extended to mean any interaction of conceptuality and 
sensory intuition, or, further, a confrontation of patterns of thought, apprehension and 
affect: the very issues which The Triumph of Love will go on to elaborate. 
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 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Friend, ed. Barbara E. Rooke, 2 vols. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1969), i, 144-5. 
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 Ibid., 145. 
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The second of the two Coleridgean passages occurring early in Hill’s poem 
similarly attends to the possibility of purely formal structures acquiring concrete existence. 
It reads as a sort of journal entry in The Triumph’s patchwork: 
 
 On chance occasions –  
 and others have observed this – you can see the wind, 
 as it moves, barely a separate thing, 
 the inner wall, the cell, of an hourglass, humming 
 vortices, bright particles in dissolution, 
 a roiling plug of sand picked up 
 as a small dancing funnel. It is how 
 the purest apprehension might appear 
 to take corporeal shape. 
(TL 4) 
 
I have not been able to discover who these ‘others’ are, but this is a quintessentially 
Coleridgean passage, which, in its microscopic attention to detail, its digressive, 
explanatory syntax, and its final leap from nature to spirit, might have been lifted from the 
earlier poet’s notebooks. (A possible source is a letter from Coleridge to Thomas Poole, 
dated 19 January 1801, in which he describes a series of symptoms affecting his testicles, 
which have left him ‘in ruin, like a column of sand, that had been informed & animated 
only by a whirl blast of the desart’.29) Its descriptive clauses are both carefully empirical 
and self-reflexive, in that their acoustic organisation – the miscellaneous vowel sounds in 
‘wall’, ‘cell’, ‘bright’, ‘roiling’, ‘plug’ delimited by reiterated l and ll sounds – imitates the 
controlled turbulence of their referent, while this very act of liquid coming-into-being 
confirms the stanza’s thematic intent. In its evocation of the unsettling and reorganisation 
of material elements (the ‘bright particles’) choreographed by a metaphorised breath, the 
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 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Earl Leslie Griggs, 6 vols. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), ii, 664. 
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stanza is almost a manifesto for the renovating potential of aesthetic – specifically lyric – 
construction. Indeed Hill’s use of the word ‘dissolution’ recalls Coleridge’s secondary 
imagination – the creative, aesthetic faculty which ‘dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order 
to re-create’. 
 Perhaps we can see, in these Coleridgean sketches, and by extension in Coleridge’s 
conception of the secondary imagination, the notion of aesthetic reflection as rehearsed by 
recent thinkers like Bernstein and Cascardi. This would be thinking which exceeds the 
restrictions of Enlightenment reason through an emphasis on sensory subjectivity, which, in 
Cascardi’s words, ‘seeks … to validate the “subjective” moment – the moment of affect, of 
pleasure or pain – that goes unaccounted by the conceptual frameworks associated with 
cognition and morality’.30  Already, in Kant’s Critique of Judgement, the aesthetic (the 
faculty of judgement) had been privileged with the capacity to bridge the gap between 
freedom (cognisable by reason) and experience (cognisable by the understanding). 31 
Although, as Cascardi’s statement suggests, for Kant the aesthetic meant not only art but 
the senses as such (from αισθέσθαι, ‘to sense’), to Kant’s successors, especially Schelling, 
art was especially valued in this respect. Schelling wrote that ‘art is the only true and 
eternal organ and document of philosophy ... it is art alone that can succeed in making 
objective, with universal validity, that which the philosopher can represent only 
subjectively’.32 His System of Transcendental Idealism, as one critic puts it, seeks to prove 
that the artwork ‘discloses the “absolute” to us in a non-discursive way that is nonetheless 
                                                 
30
 Anthony Cascardi, The Consequences of Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3. 
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more authentically true to the ultimate nature of reality than scientific or even philosophical 
knowledge can ever hope to be’.33  The rift between fact and value, inaugurated by a 
Humean scepticism which restricted the domain of philosophical statements to those which 
could be empirically verified, ruling out of court any judgements on value (hence 
effectively separating philosophy from most forms of human experience), is healed, so 
Schelling thought, by art’s reconciliatory power. Though Coleridge was abruptly to 
abandon, in the second volume of Biographia, the Schellingian theses (in fact direct 
translations) which close the first volume, their importance for that volume’s culminating 
definition of primary and secondary imagination is undeniable.  
 
3. Imagination and the common sense 
 
When Hill turns to Coleridge’s celebrated definition of the imagination in ‘Redeeming the 
Time’, it is with a view to criticising the fantasies of possession on offer to the population 
of nineteenth-century Britain. He writes that  
 
the significance of Coleridge’s distinction between primary and secondary 
imagination, particularly when read in the light of later pronouncements in Table 
Talk, is that the first represents an ideal democratic birthright, a light that ought to 
light every person coming into the world. In the event, the majority is deprived of 
this birthright in exchange for a mess of euphoric trivia and, if half-aware of its loss, 
is instructed to look for freedom in an isolated and competitive search for 
possessions and opportunity. Therefore the secondary imagination, the formal 
creative faculty, must awaken the minds of men to their lost heritage, not of 
possession but of perception. 
(CCW 101) 
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In this reinterpretation of Coleridge’s famous passage, Hill transforms the original 
distinction into an ethical norm, dislodging in the process the German Idealist philosophy 
that forms its cornerstone. The ‘later pronouncements in Table Talk’ in the light of which 
Hill reinterprets the passage in all likelihood is an allusion to a passage from Table Talk 
already quoted in Hill’s essay. In it, Coleridge deprecates the metaphysical ambitions of 
Biographia’s Schellingian passages: 
 
All that metaphysical disquisition at the end of the first volume of the Biographia 
Literaria is unformed and immature; it contains the fragments of the truth, but it is 
not full, nor thought out. It is wonderful to myself to think, how infinitely more 
profound my views now are, and yet how much clearer they are. The circle is 
completing; the idea is coming round to, and to be, the common sense. 
(Quoted in CCW 97) 
 
To read Coleridge’s passage on the imagination ‘in the light of’ this passage, then, is to 
dissolve to a great extent the influence of Schelling upon Coleridge’s (and, by extension, 
Hill’s) thought. It is to tidy away the formative contribution of German Idealist philosophy 
to Coleridge’s concept of aesthetic judgement, and to supplement the fragmentary quality 
of his earlier thought with an idea – common sense – which has its own philosophical 
pedigree, but which, in Coleridge’s later thought, acts as a cover under which philosophy 
can be rounded off by a subjective ‘wisdom’ partly funded by the poet’s reputation.  
When Coleridge writes, of the idea first articulated fragmentarily in Biographia, 
that it ‘is coming round to, and to be, the common sense’, he is getting to the heart of what 
philosophy means for him, and, I would argue, for Hill. In Biographia, Coleridge had 
written that ‘it is the two-fold function of philosophy to reconcile reason with common 
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sense, and to elevate common sense into reason’.34 What this would mean, if successfully 
carried out, would be the end of philosophy, or rather the absorption of philosophy in 
common sense. With ‘common sense’, Coleridge invokes a long history of reflection upon 
the notion of a community sense, the sensus communis first theorised by Aristotle as that 
which grounds our separate faculties, but which came to mean an affective consciousness 
of community which might ground our judgements (in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s words) in 
‘not the abstract universality of reason but the concrete universality represented by the 
community of a group, a people, a nation, or the whole human race’.35 More pertinently, 
common sense features centrally in Kant’s Critique of Judgement, where it is conceived of 
not as an intellectual capacity (the means by which the majority of people understand the 
world) but as a sensuous understanding: ‘a subjective principle, which determines only by 
feeling rather than by concepts’.36 It is therefore akin to aesthetic reflection, the subjective 
apprehension of sense data which is received as if by reference to a pre-existing concept but 
is in fact not so received. It is another way of naming the objective necessity of judgements 
of taste, their property of subjectivity which, however, is not arbitrary. 
On this account, what Coleridge appears to think was misguided in his metaphysical 
derivation of the imagination in Biographia would be its fragmentary articulation (working 
against an organicism increasingly viewed by Coleridge as essential to society) and its 
technical language. As Noel Jackson notes, there are premonitions, in the significance 
Coleridge places on common sense, of Gramsci’s ambition to reduce the gap between 
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academic thought and common sense.37 The important difference, as Jackson emphasises, is 
that for Coleridge the process begins with the individual – the genius whose insight into his 
modes of cognition, properly articulated, is able to reform common sense – rather than with 
common sense itself. Common sense is first overturned in order to push the subject inward, 
away from any ‘preexisting community of taste, sympathy, or doctrine as the ground for 
aesthetic, ethical, or political relations’ only to be restored when selfhood is eventually 
found to be predicated upon community.38  
 Thought, then, is figured for Coleridge as a process of unveiling and veiling 
philosophy under the cloak of common sense – a retreat from and return to the social, under 
the motive force of subjective affect. Insofar as this is true, nothing could better encapsulate 
Hill’s own circling around philosophy, at times dependent upon its claims for objective 
purchase on the world, at times dislodging them in favour of an empirical fidelity to lived 
experience. Hence Hill’s rewriting of the primary/secondary imagination distinction in 
political terms, where the primary imagination – in Coleridge’s terms ‘a repetition in the 
finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM’ – becomes ‘an ideal 
democratic birthright’ of which nineteenth-century capitalism robs the people. In place of 
this lost, primary imagination, we have what Hill calls ‘the formal creative faculty’ 
(secondary imagination). As I shall argue in the next chapter, however, Hill’s retreat from 
the social into solitary thought is not quite as calmly self-possessed as the picture Coleridge 
paints in the above passage from Table Talk. 
 What is it that Hill’s poem The Triumph of Love would like to create, or re-create? 
One thing it tries to make newly legible, or audible, in its pages are the elements with 
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which an idea of shared being – objectivity or universality – might begin to be constructed. 
Political and technocratic solutions to the construction of a shared objectivity are integral 
participants in Hill’s reimagining of Petrarch’s allegorical trionfi. Its stanzas catalogue 
several bad examples, notional collectivities in the name of which individuals are given 
historical agency, though rarely with propitious outcomes, prompting Hill to doubt the 
virtue of such subsumption: 
 
 Bring out Behemoth – so; a sullen beast – 
 unentreated of the people. It has come 
 close to your name, with nominal disclaimer, 
 for your single glory, should that be spoken of, 
 your ignominy by nameless attribution.  
(TL 17) 
 
Hobbes is ‘the last great / projector of Europe’ (TL 52), but Behemoth, Hobbes’s study of 
the Civil War, is the shadow of Leviathan, his ideal political order. The fear engendered by 
the sense of powerlessness when a body politic acts in the name of, but with scant regard 
for, the individuality of its populace is dramatised in the enjambement aping the unalterable 
combination of proximity and hiatus between political force and private selfhood: ‘It has 
come / close to your name’. Legal issues are disposed of with a ‘nominal disclaimer’. As if 
musicality were a dangerous critical quality, a certain ominous flattening of the voice is 
apparent in the repeated stifling of vowel-sounds by m and n: ‘Behemoth … sullen … 
unentreated … come … name … nominal … ignominy’. 
There are still other examples of projection – the construction of models of 
commonality – whose failures are built in to foundations (Hill writes that even ‘Leviathan / 
towers on basics rather than from roots’ [TL 52-3]) the fractures of which are sounded out 
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through aesthetic reflection. For example, Hill’s satire on post-war city planning relies on a 
series of puns for its critical effect: 
 
Unveil the dust-wrapped, post-war architects’ 
 immediate prize-designs in balsa wood, 
 excelling fantasies, sparsely inhabited 
 by spaced-out, pinhead model citizens   
(TL 14) 
 
In this projective process of imaginative reflection the majority of individuals get deleted 
(this model is ‘sparsely inhabited’), and those that remain are ‘spaced-out’ – their spatial 
coordinates predetermined, their thoughts flattened to a drugged amnesia – ‘model 
citizens’. If the sensus communis is dulled – relations between members of this community 
dictated from on high, rather than developed through lived experience – in stark contrast 
the project is ‘immediate’: both opportunistic (with its swift response to destruction) and 
indifferent to those empirical facts (such as already existing institutions and lives) which 
mediate lived experience. 
Social engineering’s antagonism to the human spirit is a historical commonplace, 
but art’s aesthetic constructivism – the attempt to give objective form to an imagined 
reconfiguration of the elements of material reality – is no more immune to the temptation to 
subordinate individual suffering to the organising principle of the whole. Artworks 
composed to memorialise the dead are subjected to The Triumph’s satire for their 
dependence on institutionalised technique:  
  
 Trauermusik, musique funèbre, funeral 
 music, for male and female  
 voices ringingly a cappella, 
 made for double string choirs, congregated brass, 
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 choice performers on baroque trumpets hefting, 
 like glassblowers, inventions 
 of supreme order  
(TL 6-7) 
 
Proliferating instrumentation and musicological taxonomy blot out any originating 
calamity. The musicality here is too insistent, and deliberately so: the doubled ing in 
‘ringingly’ is echoed by ‘double string’ in the next line, and mutates into the tripled a in ‘a 
cappella’, before the stuttered vowel-sequence of ‘congregated’ is resolved in ‘brass’.  For 
all that song might be thought to give a kind of sensuous intelligence to art’s grasp of 
political injustice, this stanza targets an industry that has thrived upon art’s assumption of a 
privileged position vis-à-vis suffering. (Among the compositions Hill may have had in 
mind is Luigi Dallapiccola’s Tempus Destruendi – Tempus Aedificandi (1971), a twelve-
tone choral composition ‘for a cappella choir’, concerned with the destruction and 
rebuilding of Jerusalem, with symbolic resonances for post-war Israel. Hill’s poetry 
notebooks in the Leeds University Library Archive reveal that the working title for The 
Triumph of Love was Tempus Aedificandi Tempus Destruendi.)39  
Deprived of the primary imagination, we have the secondary imagination as an 
aesthetic faculty through which knowledge of the world, and insight into its unfreedom or 
injustice, might be given. The uses to which this faculty are put vary, as Hill shows in 
‘Redeeming the Time’, examining a series of specimen texts that in one way or another 
engage with the industrialisation of Britain. Following his redefinition of the imagination, 
Hill writes that ‘even such virtues as “rigorous self-improvement” might be fanciful rather 
than imaginative’ (CCW 101): in other words, an accommodation to the status quo rather 
than an attempt to diagnose social wrongs. We have already seen Hill’s assessment of the 
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‘vital’, penetrative aesthetic of Wordsworth’s Ode, and the ‘inert’, defeated prose of the 
radical demagogues. To these Hill adds a third category of response: the calculative, 
opportunistic diction of the technocrat. Hill quotes a passage from Andrew Ure’s The 
Philosophy of Manufactures: 
 
It is, in fact, the constant aim and tendency of every improvement in machinery to 
supersede human labour altogether, or to diminish its cost, by substituting the 
industry of women and children for that of men; or that of ordinary labourers, for 
trained artisans. 
(Quoted in CCW 99) 
 
As Hill suggests, the ‘brutal power’ of the connective ‘or’ here pitilessly facilitates the 
calculation of the relative rewards and costs of employment strategies, in the process 
eliding the space in which workers’ voices might be heard. This habit of elision is 
infectious, spreading too to those figures whose sympathies are avowedly radical. Hill cites 
a description, by the reformist politician George Howell, of the 1851 Great Exhibition: 
  
I cannot express my feelings as I entered that vast palace of iron and as I glanced 
around the multifarious and magnificent collection of the products of the world 
there represented. All dreams of fairy land were eclipsed in a moment. 
(Quoted in CCW 100) 
 
Hill goes on to observe that ‘[i]f Fancy deals, as Coleridge says, with “fixities and 
definites”, then Howell’s delight at the Crystal Palace is fanciful, not imaginative’. It is 
content to stop at the facts in front of it, the ‘multifarious and magnificent collection of the 
products of the world’, rather than imaginatively to recreate the social relations which 
brought them into existence. Yet, as Hill notes movingly, it’s the stupefaction engendered 
by industry, and its correlative, calculation, which is striking: ‘One’s protest is directed not 
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so much against as on behalf of Howell’s dream. It is the blatant coexistence in nineteenth-
century England of his “I cannot express” and Dr Ure’s “or” that distresses’ (CCW 100). 
 Against Howell’s ‘ballooning platitudes’, Hill places a passage from a pamphlet 
from the 1830s written by the Huddersfield Committee, and which deals with many of the 
concerns animating the factory movement of the period. Hill writes that ‘[t]he Huddersfield 
men are perceptive … but they are also overborne, and know it’ (CCW 100; my emphasis). 
Their imagination is made manifest in the perception that they are not free. By contrast, 
Howell’s unfreedom is hidden from him. His enthusiasm is, in Hill’s words, symptomatic 
of ‘a diremption between perception and utterance, energy and effect’ (CCW 100). Behind 
both examples seems to lie the calculative, risk-assessing prose of Ure, which partly 
composes the force that Hill asserts deprives humanity of the ‘birthright’ of the primary 
imagination, enslaving men and women to the fantasy that freedom can be found ‘in an 
isolated and competitive search for possessions and opportunity’. Aesthetic evaluation and 
critique (or the secondary imagination), which ‘awaken[s] … perception’, then must be a 
countervailing force to calculative ingenuity.  
This conflict between aesthetic reflection and Enlightenment rationality is one of 
the central themes of Hill’s poem The Triumph of Love. Documentary evidence – another 
supposed source of unimpeachable objectivity – does not escape the inherent subjectivity 
framing its judgement. One passage in The Triumph imagines the point at which the 
aesthetic grasp of suffering becomes, through repetition, a token gesture in the repertoire of 
sentimental reaction to the Holocaust: 
 
Permit me: 
refocus that Jew – yes there, 
that one. You see him burning, 
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dropping feet first, in a composed manner, 
still in suspension, 
from the housetop. 
It will take him for ever 
caught at this instant 
of world-exposure. 
In close-up he maintains appearance – 
 Semitic ur-Engel –  
terminal agony none the less 
interminable, the young 
martyrs ageing in the fire –  
thank you, Hauptmann – Schauspieler? –  
Run it through again and for ever 
 he stretches his wings of flame 
 upon instruction. 
 (TL 10-11) 
 
This is the objectivity of the technocrat. Prosodically, the stanza appears drained of syllabic 
musicality, each line delivering a minimum of communicative data before breaking. A 
mood of stasis is suggested by the words immediately before and after line-breaks: 
‘refocus’, ‘still’, ‘suspension’, ‘caught’ reinforced by the deictics ‘there’, ‘that’, ‘that’, 
‘this’. Rational objectivity is economically encapsulated in the instruction to ‘refocus’ the 
image of the Jew, for ‘focus’ is a spectacularly overdetermined word: the OED cites several 
usages from the late eighteenth-century, testifying to the burden of Enlightenment 
rationality concentrated in its two syllables. Derived from the Latin for ‘hearth’ or 
‘fireplace’, ‘focus’ has acquired a range of senses germane to Hill’s critique, including ‘the 
adjustment ... necessary to produce a clear image’, ‘a centre of radiant heat’, the ‘burning 
point’ at which rays of light converge, and, in a now obsolete usage, ‘the best-illuminated 
part of the stage’. The Jew is a focal-point in all these senses: on the stage of history, the 
object of definition, the object of the clarifying and sharpening of attention, a burning point 
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of light on film, and a combustible object in flames.40 Terms from aesthetics – ‘composed’, 
‘close-up’ – reinforce the complicity with the rationalising gaze (it’s hard not to think of the 
sham objectivity of the Nazi’s scientific experiments upon concentration camp inmates) 
against which art cannot fully indemnify itself. 
Hill had been reading Gillian Rose’s posthumous volume Mourning Becomes the 
Law around the time of the publication of The Triumph of Love, and may have already 
known her chapter ‘Beginnings of the Day – Fascism and Representation’. 41  Rose’s 
understanding of ‘the sentimentality of the ultimate predator’ resonates with this stanza.42 
Sentimentality in which pathos is objectified – made separate from the observer, with the 
result that the observer is absolved of responsibility (one might say of the need to cultivate 
community sense) – can be gratified and fostered by certain aesthetic forms, as Rose argues 
it is by Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List. In such artworks, Rose asserts, ‘[t]he audience 
is ... spared the encounter with the indecency of their position’.43 Such art ‘leaves us ... in a 
Fascist security of our own unreflected predation’.44 (Including Rose in our thinking about 
this stanza also sheds light on a reference in Hill’s stanza which has met with puzzled 
critical reaction. Gerhart Hauptmann – grand old man of German letters – stands in 
relationship to the Jews in a position similar to Schindler’s. His ambiguous status within the 
Third Reich – unwilling to go into exile, but maintaining a privately critical attitude 
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towards the Nazis – demonstrate the implicatedness of ethics and power which is glossed 
over in Spielberg’s film.)45  
Contra Benjamin, for whom the mechanical reproduction of images eliminates the 
cult of the image, this stanza confirms the hypnotic power technology can wield when 
applied to aesthetic forms.46 The object of perception in section XX is literally animated by 
the mechanical action of a film projector: as the film is wound back to the start and 
replayed, the man is transfigured by ‘stretch[ing]’ flames engulfing his body. If ‘aura’ – the 
retention of subjective agency within the work of art – is effaced by photography and film, 
Hill here shows how a different kind of aura replaces it, the ‘wings of flame’ which now 
decorate the burning victim giving him primordial significance as a ‘Semitic ur-Engel’. 
What is lacking (Hill’s stanza implies) is the imaginative creation of a community sense – 
of a sense of one’s own relations with others: not only of how one’s actions impact upon 
other lives, but of how our most private intellectual and affective grasp of others affects 
communities as a whole. So much of Hill’s poetry repeatedly asserts that some measure of 
the facility with which suffering is transformed into graspable images must be incorporated 
into the representation of suffering. Here, the Jew is robbed of all identity beyond that of 
being what Rose calls ‘the sublime other of modernity’: hence the notion of a communality 
of thought or of being is travestied. 47  This is the consequence of, in Rose’s words, 
‘holocaust piety’, which, enshrining a particular with the status of an absolute (absolute 
suffering, or absolute silence) in the name of the restoration of community, abolishes the 
objective, rational grounds of community. Aesthetic reflection – the non-determinative 
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apprehension of particulars in such a way as to imagine their harmony with a possible 
conceptuality – aims to avoid this quick conversion of the non-identical into a familiar 
response. As I shall argue in the next chapter, however, Coleridge’s aesthetic strategies 
frequently conceal an egotistical sublime under the cover of non-determinative 
conceptuality.
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CHAPTER 2: THE DRAMA OF REASON 
 
1. The ‘drama of reason’ 
 
To those readers of Hill’s criticism (and of criticism about Hill, which so often seems to 
subsist on his terminology) habituated to the recurrence across the years of Coleridgean 
phrases whose repetition has leant them an almost talismanic quality, it can be surprising to 
rediscover that the majority if not all of them occur in the space of two pages in 
‘Redeeming the Time’. The first of these, and that which introduces Coleridge into the 
essay’s discussion, is that of the ‘drama of reason’. Judging from the abundance of its 
appearances in the prose of critics writing on Hill, ‘the drama of reason’ contains in nuce 
all of Hill’s aesthetics, ethics and politics.1 As Hill describes it, ‘the drama of reason’ is the 
opposite of what Coleridge thought of as ‘unconnected writing’ (a phrase from a letter to 
Thomas Poole, dated 28 January 1810). ‘Unconnected writing’, Hill writes, is writing that 
has ‘been run down into the “fixities and definites” of a mere “law of association”, into the 
inert “general taste” and cliché-ridden fancy that served to gloss over the barbarous 
prejudice of “the polished part of society”’ (CCW 94). Note the implicit association of 
‘unconnected writing’ with ‘fancy’ in the reference to ‘fixities and definites’. By contrast, 
Coleridge’s style insists upon the notion that divagation and parentheses serve the ends of a 
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conception of reason which bears some relation, as we shall see, to the imagination. Hill 
quotes a passage from the letter: 
 
Of parentheses I may be too fond – and will be on my guard in this respect –. But I 
am certain that no work of empassioned & eloquent reasoning ever did or could 
subsist without them – They are the drama of Reason – & present the thought 
growing, instead of a mere Hortus siccus (CCW 94). 
 
Two pages later comes perhaps Hill’s most cited critical catholicon. It applies to two 
quotations – the first from Biographia Literaria, and the second an entry (quoted in the 
previous chapter) from Coleridge’s Table Talk, which reads as follows: 
 
The metaphysical disquisition at the end of the first volume of the Biographia 
Literaria is unformed and immature; it contains the fragments of the truth, but it is 
not fully thought out. It is wonderful to myself to think how infinitely more 
profound my views now are, and yet how much clearer they are withal. The circle is 
completing; the idea is coming round to, and to be, the common sense. 
 
In response to this Hill writes: ‘[Coleridge] surely foresaw the obligation to enact the drama 
of reason within the texture of one’s own work, since nothing else would serve. His 
parentheses are antiphons of vital challenge’ (CCW 97). 
But digression can be pretence or diversion as well as self-criticism, and the passage 
of Coleridge’s which inspires Hill’s praise is in fact serenely sure of its position (‘It is 
wonderful to myself to think how infinitely more profound my views now are’). The danger 
is that self-correction can become an indulgence, so that, like Keats’s reported meeting with 
Coleridge on Hampstead Heath, which one critic cites as evidence of Coleridge’s ‘drama of 
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double touch’, it can more often come across as narcissistic monologue.2 Peter Robinson 
describes the problem with precision: 
 
When [Hill] describes how a writer may enact the ‘drama of reason’ by including 
‘the antiphonal voice of the heckler’, his word ‘antiphonal’ indicates a problem: the 
church-music term converts into a composed counterpointing of voices a nettled 
inruption of dissent in another’s seamless mid-flow. It has been reported of leading 
politicians that as young men they sometimes asked ‘supporters to heckle them to 
enliven dull meetings’. The composition of heckling voices into lyric poems is 
vulnerable to such party management.3 
 
Hill’s poetry certainly displays little of what Robinson calls the ‘stylistic rawness’ that 
results from relinquishing a confidently-held sense of aesthetic judgement, especially at 
those moments when aesthetic judgement is ostentatiously thrown away. Later in this 
chapter I shall look more closely at the problems produced by this masking of a self-
sufficient consciousness under the cover of intersubjectivity. But I believe Hill’s critical 
prose faces the challenge enjoined by Coleridge’s critique of ‘unconnected writing’ with 
more success. Without obscuring the insight that Hill’s prosody is predisposed to refuse the 
turbulence of contingent noise (though it can perhaps simulate it as antiphonal 
counterpoint), his sense of ‘the drama of reason’ does open his work to an intellectual 
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Land of Logic (London: Continuum, 2007), 38-9. 
3
 Peter Robinson, ‘Reading Geoffrey Hill’, in Peter Robinson (ed.), Geoffrey Hill: Essays on his Work (Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press, 1985), 196-218, at 216-7. 
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freedom in which politics and aesthetics are allowed to shape one another, by virtue of an 
assumed ground which it is reason’s especial virtue to seek. 
 The parenthetical is, on the face of it, more likely to encourage unconnected writing 
than not. The OED’s entry for ‘parenthesis’ speaks of it in terms of explanation, but also of 
disconnection and irrelevance, as an afterthought, an aside or a hiatus. However, Hill 
implicitly links his citation on the ‘drama of reason’ to the philosophical background of 
Coleridge’s thought, which gestures towards a way of thinking about the generation of a 
intellectual commonality based on the fragmentary and disconnected. When Coleridge uses 
the term ‘reason’, he means something more definite than everyday cognition. As he 
reminds us in Biographia, ‘one main object’ of his periodical The Friend was ‘[t]o establish 
the distinction’ between reason and the understanding.4 In Essay IV, ‘On the Principles of 
Political Philosophy’, he writes: 
 
By the Understanding, I mean the faculty of thinking and forming judgements on 
the notices furnished by the Sense, according to certain rules existing in itself, 
which rules constitute its distinct nature. By the pure Reason, I mean the power by 
which we become  possessed of Principle, (the eternal Verities of Plato and 
Descartes) and of Ideas, (N.B. not images) as the ideas of a point, a line, a circle, in 
Mathematics; and of Justice, Holiness, Free-Will, &c. in Morals.5 
 
The understanding, then, is the faculty which enables us to organise our sense perceptions 
into a coherent set of experiences. Reason, on the other hand, is the faculty which enables 
us to have knowledge of grounding principles. Reason in this sense gives us access to 
                                                 
4
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, or Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions, 
ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate, 2 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), i, 175. 
5
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Friend, ed. Barbara E. Rooke, 2 vols. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1969), ii, 104. 
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spiritual objects.6 In contrast to Kant, Coleridge sees reason as a faculty to which questions 
about freedom, necessity, and divinity are accessible. 
 I mention this because it will help to show how ‘the drama of reason’ is not just the 
spectacle of a subject conversing with him- or herself. It is also the event in which the 
specific objects of reason (as opposed to the understanding) – justice, freedom, and 
morality – are made to speak, are made accessible to human cognition by means of 
aesthetic figuration. What is at stake in ‘the drama of reason’ – the very notion of ethical 
utterance to which Hill clings so fiercely – requires this philosophical context to be 
comprehensible; otherwise it is difficult to see how simple parentheses can carry such a 
weight of responsibility. Yet it is also clear that this faith in reason, while it doesn’t efface 
the possibility of intersubjectivity and hence dissent, difference, or the non-identical, 
nevertheless assumes a common ground from the start. In this respect it works confusedly 
against the principle of non-determination at the heart of aesthetic reflection. 
As if aware of the problems that arise with Coleridge’s notion of reason, Hill both 
silently alludes to this philosophical context and suppresses it. As part of what Hill sees as 
‘a striking continuity and consistency in [Coleridge’s] meditation of many years upon the 
drama of reason’, Hill cites a passage from Coleridge’s Table Talk. Hill writes: 
 
Of crucial significance is his [Coleridge’s] desiderated ‘moral copula’ which would, 
he believed, ‘take from history its accidentality and from science its fatalism’. 
(CCW 94) 
 
Hill doesn’t quote the context, even though without it we might struggle to understand how 
this connective device – the moral copula – works. The phrase comes from the entry in 
                                                 
6
 See also The Friend, i, 157. 
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Table Talk of September 11, 1831. Coleridge is speaking about his never completed 
philosophical system, which he hoped would harmonise all knowledge through a process 
that bears a marked resemblance to the procedure described in Hegel’s preface to The 
Phenomenology of Spirit:  
 
[I]t opposes no other system, but shows what was true in each; and how that which 
was true in the particular in each of them became error because it was only half the 
truth. I have endeavored to unite the insulated fragments of truth and frame a perfect 
mirror. I show to each system that I fully understand and rightfully appreciate what 
that system means; but then I lift up that system to a higher point of view, from 
which I enable it to see its former position where it was indeed, but under another 
light and with different relations; so that the fragment of truth is not only 
acknowledged, but explained.7 
 
Coleridge goes on to say that ‘I wish in short, to connect by a moral copula Natural History 
with Political History – or in other words, to make History scientific, and Science historical 
– to take from History its accidentality – and from Science its fatalism’.8 Upon this view, 
epistemology becomes subsumed under a connective principle that respects the breaks in 
epistemology’s development. By means of this connective ‘copula’, the subjective 
perspective is deprived of too determinative a role in the construction of philosophical 
explanations of the world (‘to take … from Science its fatalism’): instead, narratives about 
our relationship with the world are constituted – as in a drama – by the interaction of 
successive perspectives, not always in agreement with one another. With this system of 
thought in place, Coleridge believed we would be in a better position to ‘take from history 
                                                 
7
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Table Talk: Recorded by Henry Nelson Coleridge (and John Taylor Coleridge), 
ed. Carl Woodring (London: Routledge, 1990), 248-9. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A. 
V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 2. See also T.H. Green, The Works of Thomas Hill Green, 
ed. R. L. Nettleship, 3 vols. (London: Longmans Green, 1885-8), i, 1-2; and Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes 
the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7-8. It should be 
observed, however, that Coleridge probably did not read Hegel’s Phenomenology. 
8
 Coleridge, op. cit., 249. 
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its accidentality’, in other words to contrive a vision of social justice which views members 
of a state not as atoms buzzing in individualistic activity but as inter-related agents. 
Coleridge’s position here is a philosophical one, but – in keeping with the Schellingian turn 
to aesthetic modes of apprehension of our relations with objects in the world – it is Hill 
who reconfigures it in terms of language. Yet the very process described in this suppressed 
passage is the drama of reason writ large: the interaction of metaphysical explanations and 
their productive contradictions, from which Coleridge seeks to establish a firm ground for 
knowledge.  
 A clear indication of this Coleridgean ‘mosaic’ aesthetic – and of Hill’s 
ambivalence vis-à-vis art’s critical prerogative –  is embedded in one of the earliest stanzas 
in The Triumph of Love: 
 
 But how could there not be a difficult 
 confronting of systematics – the scale 
 of articulation notched up one grade at a time? 
 They have conceded me – I think, beyond question –  
 power of determination but without 
 force of edict. 
If I were to grasp once, in emulation, 
 work of the absolute, origin-creating mind, 
 its opus est, conclusive 
 otherness, the veil 
 of certitude discovered as itself 
 that which is to be revealed, 
 I should hold for my own, my self-giving, 
 my retort upon Emerson’s ‘alienated majesty’, 
the De Causa Dei of Thomas Bradwardine. 
(TL 3) 
 
‘Power of determination’: the ability to diagnose a problem, to clinch an argument, to 
identify an object, or just sheer obstinacy – these are the aesthetic qualities ‘They’ (who I 
take to be his critics) have conceded Hill. At the same time, any social efficacy or objective 
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impact (‘force of edict’) is denied by these readers. And in fact these lines do seem 
curiously determined to dispense with any of the acoustic and organisational resources with 
which poetry might normally be supposed to leave an impression on the minds of its 
readers. Certainly, as some critics have complained, this passage is marked by an 
anticlimactic accumulation of subordinate clauses only to sputter out in a couple of dry 
scholarly references. This is one of several stanzas in The Triumph of Love whose language 
– digressive, prosaic, cerebral – appears to parody the ruminative syntax of academic 
discourse. (Thomas Day has argued this position with respect to a later stanza.)9 I would 
agree that there is an element of performance in these stanzas. Hill as much as admits that 
the poem requires ‘a difficult / confronting of systematics’ – a Coleridgean ‘mosaic’ of 
descriptive, intellective, confessional and prescriptive compositional styles: the drama of 
reason. But if, as Day argues, the bathetic syntax of the more recondite, digressive stanzas 
indicates satire, I read in them traces of Hill’s attempts to objectify judgement by means of 
a tradition of philosophical explanation against which he also actively struggles. For this 
stanza contains a perfectly coherent and forceful summary of certain aesthetic 
organisational principles which, having their origin in Coleridge’s thought, Hill takes very 
seriously. 
 For example, there is the quintessentially Coleridgean wish ‘to grasp, in emulation’ 
the ‘work of the absolute, origin-creating mind’. This, surely, is an abridgement of 
Coleridge’s primary imagination (‘a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of 
creation in the infinite I AM’), where Hill’s desired ‘emulation’ of the divine creative act 
echoes Coleridge’s ‘repetition’ of this act in the human mind. We have seen Hill 
                                                 
9
 See Thomas Day, ‘Sensuous Intelligence: T.S. Eliot and Geoffrey Hill’, Cambridge Quarterly 35/3 (2006), 
255-280, at 261-62. 
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reformulate this as ‘an ideal democratic birthright, a light that ought to light every person 
coming into the world’ of which ‘the majority is deprived … in exchange for a mess of 
euphoric trivia’, and that Hill conceives of the secondary imagination, the creative faculty, 
as playing a compensatory role insofar as it enables the cognition of social relations, though 
only through the historicised medium of aesthetic form. If he were to ‘grasp’ the perceptive 
faculty of the primary imagination, this would mean having objective knowledge of the 
world – ‘conclusive otherness’ – rather than the imprisoned perception which alienates 
thinking. Hill’s shorthand for the perception of the possibility of this objective knowledge 
is ‘Emerson’s “alienated majesty”’.  
 Hill is alluding to Emerson’s essay ‘Self-Reliance’, but the words ‘alienated 
majesty’ also form the framing title for three essays in Hill’s Collected Critical Writings. 
One of these, ‘Alienated Majesty: Ralph W. Emerson’ clarifies what is, in the stanza quoted 
above, a rather gnomic allusion. The essay begins with a quote from ‘Self-Reliance’: ‘In 
every work of genius we recognize our own rejected thoughts: they come back to us with a 
certain alienated majesty’. ‘Genius’ here means not the unique talent of a particular writer, 
but something close to Coleridge’s imagination: elsewhere, Emerson asserts that ‘Genius is 
in the first instance, sensibility, the capacity of receiving just impressions from the external 
world, and the power of coordinating these after the laws of thought’. 10  Emerson’s 
aphorism is preceded by a passage exhorting his readers to attend to moments of 
imaginative illumination in their own minds. His words indicate the possibility of a 
commonality of perception – a common sense – shared between all men and women, if not 
as a realisable objective, then at least as a normative horizon.  
                                                 
10
 Quoted in Patrick J. Keane, Emerson, Romanticism, and Intuitive Reason: The Transatlantic ‘Light of All 
Our Day’ (Columbia, Missouri: Univeristy of Missouri Press, 2005), 13. 
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As we have seen, this horizon elicits acts of community-founding at various 
conflicting levels: in this stanza the conflict between objective and private thought is 
enacted with a flicker of humour in the contrast between the putatively clarifying syntax 
(each comma-separated clause miming the act of refining the sense yet further) and the 
obscurely private allusions. Its anticlimactic concluding lines are, with their suggestion of 
bibliographic mustiness, the source of the stanza’s unanswerable irony, since Hill’s ‘retort’ 
upon the mediated discursive structures indirectly suggested by ‘alienated majesty’ is just 
another bit of alienated majesty, the rejected thoughts coming back to him in Bradwardine’s 
De Causa Dei. The irony and the sincerity – since Hill would ‘hold’ these thoughts as his 
‘own’ – cannot be disentangled: as the syntax unwinds, with each clause absurdly raising 
the stakes, we are led into a position where matters of mounting importance and seeming 
objectivity (thanks to the increasing refinement of explanation supposedly supplied by each 
clause) are sequestered in ever more capriciously esoteric allusions. One critic writes that 
the ideas in this stanza ‘are precisely the ones which are most important to the poem, and 
thus precisely the ones that ought to have been described in the original language of Hill’s 
poetry rather than being reduced to mere tics of allusion’.11 But it’s in these ‘tics’ that Hill 
is being most faithful to the Coleridgean ideas about objectivity which are so important to 
the poem. In the ‘confronting of systematics’ – the collocation of systems of knowledge of 
different thinkers from Bradwardine to Emerson – Hill is imitating Coleridge’s ‘moral 
copula’, which, as we have seen, is part of Coleridge’s desire to compose a system from 
fragments of knowledge in colloquy with each other.  
                                                 
11
 Brian Phillips, ‘A Colder Spell to Come’, review of Without Title and Scenes from Comus, Poetry 188/2 
(May 2006) <http://www.poetryfoundation.org/journal/article.html?id=178087>, accessed 15 June 2010. 
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 From this, perhaps, can be derived some of the awkwardness with which Hill 
deliberately infuses the discursive passages in The Triumph of Love. As he writes in The 
Orchards of Syon: ‘Let’s think / about the nature of impasse: metaphysics’ / biochemical 
mystery’. Truth includes an element of awkwardness (‘Wisdom / conspires with 
unwisdom’) including, Hill writes, ‘STC’s compunctions’ (OS 64). Hill’s compunctions are 
embodied in the breathless zeal and punctilious syntax of his metaphysical passages in The 
Triumph of Love. One of the defining stanzas in this respect is section CXXV, addressed to 
‘Vergine bella’, the Virgin Mary, a stanza which  
 
    may indeed be my last 
 occasion for approaching you in modes 
 of rhetoric to which I have addressed myself 
 throughout the course of this discourse. Custom 
 is strange – as I believe, ma’am, you well know –  
 not least in its familiar 
 power of estrangement. Estrangement itself 
 is strange, though less so than the metaphysics 
 of tautology, which is at once vain 
 repetition and the logic of the world 
 [Wittgenstein]. Some of its moves – I mean  
 tautology’s – call to mind chess-moves: moves 
 that are in being before you – even as 
 you – make them.  
(TL 66) 
 
This passage and the others like it allow us to overhear the anxieties of the intellect bound 
to the enterprise of objectivity. Hill’s methodology is here openly stated – the pitching 
towards one another of different modes of discourse, one form of ‘rhetoric’ addressing 
another. Day convincingly presents the tone of this passage as (quoting ‘Dividing 
Legacies’) one of ‘tentative authority’, a mix of assertion and self-doubt in a manner 
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recalling F.H. Bradley’s ‘curious blend of humility and irony’.12 The stanza as a whole 
proceeds with a moving helplessness in response to the necessity to recalibrate theories in 
the face of historical contingency. Definition succeeds definition with self-correcting and 
self-forgetting rapidity, encountered in the eager-to-clarify digressions (‘– I mean’) and the 
stuttered ‘estrangement. Estrangement’. The stanza recalls a tradition of ratiocination which 
Hill clearly feels is indispensable for the understanding of history, ethics, and aesthetics, 
but which, as the comically surface-skimming allusiveness suggests, he also views 
sceptically. Reason – which in Kant’s philosophy pursues the syllogistic chain from 
condition to condition, in pursuit of the final, grounding absolute – here assumes various 
guises. From Wittgenstein’s concept of tautology the stanza moves to theological 
articulations of the unconditioned:13 
  
             Tautology, 
 for Wittgenstein, manifests the condition  
 of unconditional truth. Mysticism is not 
 affects but grammar. There is nothing 
 mysterious in grammar; it constitutes  
 its own mystery, its practicum. Though certain 
 neologisms – Coleridge’s ‘tautegorical’ 
 for example – clown out along the edge, 
 τò αυτό enjoys its essential being 
 in theology as in logic. The intellectual  
beauty of Bradwardine’s thesis rests 
in what it springs from: the Creator’s grace 
praecedentem tempore et natura [’Strewth!!! 
‘already present in time as in nature?’ – ED] 
 and in what it returns to – our arrival 
 at a necessary salvation.  
(TL 67) 
 
                                                 
12
 Day, op. cit., 262. 
13
 See Jeffrey Wainwright, Acceptable Words: Essays on the poetry of Geoffrey Hill (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005), 90-91, for an analysis of Hill’s use of Wittgenstein in this stanza. 
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Concepts and their authors spring unheralded, mid-line, into the discussion – tautology, 
grammar, Coleridge, Bradwardine – with a hasty nervousness that forestalls any possibility 
of matching these concepts up to the experiences of suffering, courage, and artistic 
response inscribed elsewhere in the poem. Candour and mockery alternate, so that the 
seeming sincerity with which Hill welcomes Bradwardine’s ‘intellectual beauty’ is 
mitigated by a jokey editorial intervention, and a Coleridgean concept which (as we shall 
see) has some importance for Hill is dismissed as marginal. Early poems in Hill’s 
authorship had a formalism that sprung from a belief that art’s critical capacity inheres in 
impersonality, syntax, and the weighting of syllables. By contrast, there is an abstraction in 
this passage that embodies as substance the confusions of a private nature attempting public 
discourse: its critical act inheres in the abstract arrangement of allusion, hesitation, 
confidence and doubt evident in these lines. Hill’s criticism is a body of work where the 
enterprise of definition and evaluation must confront its own procedures and assumptions, 
in the process inevitably encountering this paradigm of hesitation and speculation. I will 
now turn to consider the effect of Coleridge’s thought upon this confrontation.  
 
2. Coleridge’s aesthetics and literary criticism 
 
In Hill’s poetry, literary criticism is exposed to critique no less than are the pedantic 
explanations sometimes imputed to academic discourse. A stanza in The Orchards of Syon 
takes this topic up: 
 
 Blackened as Rouault’s Miserere, a body 
 splays for the camera, the camera 
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 staying put, except it probes further 
 the human midden. […] Then immediately 
 peace brings The Armed Vision, a work of courage 
 and quick advantage. Who dares show himself 
 embusqué in this verdurous new terrain 
 to be fought through? Did HYMAN go to the wars? 
 Empson didn’t, nor did I. Armed Vision 
 is of course COLERIDGE. 
(OS 44) 
 
‘[T]his verdurous new terrain’ is, in the context of the volume as a whole, the eponymous 
Orchards of Syon: Hill’s investigation in verse of the possibility of establishing an ethical, 
devout communality of feeling through often very private material (‘All along, I’m 
labouring to try out / a numen that endures, exactly placed’ [OS 59]). But Hill (this passage 
realises) must be answerable to the same allegation he directs at advocates of opportunistic 
documentary realism: that his position is one of paid inquiry using a medium encrusted 
with a gestural repertoire prone to obscure the object of inquiry. (Hence the vilification of 
literary theorists as literary technocrats which has repeatedly accompanied jeremiads 
against academic theories of literature.) 14  In the above stanza Hill traces the 
professionalisation of literary criticism – epitomised in the title of Stanley Edgar Hyman’s 
book The Armed Vision, where ‘armed’ refers to the putatively autonomous methodology 
touted by the New Critics – back to Coleridge. The source is in Biographia Literaria: ‘The 
razor’s edge becomes a saw to the armed vision’ – the ‘armed vision’ being vision 
augmented by a magnifying glass, an instrument for bringing its object into focus.15 As Hill 
implies in the polysemous word ‘embusqué’, meaning ‘one who avoids military service’, 
                                                 
14
 For the tradition of this charge, and for Hyman’s role in the development of academic criticism, see Evan 
Carton and Gerald Graff, ‘The Emergence of Academic Criticism’, in Sacvan Bercovitch (ed.), The 
Cambridge History of American Literature, Volume 8: Poetry and Criticism 1940-1995 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 281-304. 
15
 Biographia Literaria, i, 118. 
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but also literally ‘ambushed’, with roots going back to Syon’s ‘bocage’ mentioned at the 
start of the stanza – the professional observer is vulnerable to isolation from the rest of the 
community.  
Yet it is a fact that Coleridge the godfather of professional literary criticism is more 
important to Hill than Coleridge the metaphysician. We have seen some of the ways Hill 
has minimised the significance of metaphysics in favour of a historical interpretation of 
Coleridge’s ideas. However, Paul Hamilton, in his study of Coleridge and German 
Idealism, astutely notes the ways in which the two disciplines inform one another in 
Coleridge’s work: 
 
if practical criticism is the substance of Coleridge’s philosophy, as I.A. Richards 
thought, it certainly informs his interventions within the German philosophical 
framework. In other words, it is in his interest in and grasp of the problems of 
expressing and communicating various philosophical positions that Coleridge could 
make his own contribution. This originality, now metacritical, did not appear in 
grand modifications of metaphysical schemes but in criticism of the language of 
those schemes.16 
 
Coleridge pursued a project to refine the terms with which thinking could be carried out for 
the benefit of a community of thinkers. The criticism and clarification of terminology, or 
more broadly, of the diction and syntax in which philosophical thought is couched, would 
be a contribution to the development of a common sense, a shared perceptive faculty. The 
tool with which this clarification might be carried out is a kind of ‘drama of reason’. Much 
post-Kantian philosophy conceived itself to be following the ‘spirit’ rather than the ‘letter’ 
of Kant’s thought: attempting to arrive at the same conclusions it thought Kant had rightly 
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 Hamilton, op. cit., 17. 
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aimed for, but via different argumentative routes.17 If Coleridge’s thought is revivified by 
the translation (and plagiarism) of his German contemporaries, so, for example, Schelling’s 
responses to Kantian philosophy are characterised as a dramatic dialogue, during which 
certain shared formulations and terminologies are scrutinised and refined. As Hamilton 
writes, 
 
The possibilities of experience emerge inter-subjectively in the course of employing 
different languages that contrast dialogically with each other, and quash any single 
vocabulary’s claim to exclusive authority. This ongoing and irresolvable process is 
signalled by the fragmentary quality of much Romantic philosophy and by its 
tendency to involve poetic, religious, political and other discourses as part of its 
articulation.18 
 
A case in point would be the mixture of autobiography, metaphysics, literary criticism and 
theology that constitute Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria. Hamilton’s argument is not just 
a convincing account of the aesthetic foundation of much romantic philosophy. It also 
offers an explanatory model for situating Coleridge within a tradition to which his 
relationship is not one of simple belonging. Coleridge’s ambivalence towards the 
systematism of German Idealism has often been noted. One critic describes how romantic 
writing as a whole is interested in ‘the problem of knowledge … even as it attempts to 
conceal that involvement’, with the result that it oscillates between knowledge and 
indifference, argument and negative capability. 19  Philosophy and art alternate in 
Coleridge’s repertoire of responses to the challenges posed to modern spirituality. 
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 See Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 98. 
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 Hamilton, op. cit., 46. 
19
 Tim Milnes, Knowledge and Indifference in English Romantic Prose (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 1. 
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One way of understanding Coleridge’s importance to Hill is to emphasise the 
former’s intention to preserve the Kantian insight that a language is required which 
articulates the concept of freedom using a wider diction and vocabulary than ‘the technical, 
obscure, academic jargon’ which Kant saw as a regrettable necessity at his stage of enquiry. 
Hamilton writes that: 
  
the languages of this integrated, characteristically human response employ the 
expressive resources of an entire culture, not the terminology of the schools. But 
they do so with philosophical knowingness, as a sign of the limitations of 
cerebration or formal reasoning. Ultimately this will involve both Schelling and 
Coleridge in the freighting of Reason with sense, imagination and affect.20 
 
It is in this wider understanding of philosophical work – labour shared between 
contemporaries and bequeathed to successors – that Hill’s approach to nineteenth-century 
thought is to be seen. Like Coleridge, whose prose work has been described as 
‘composition by mosaic organization’, Hill’s understanding of philosophical thought is to a 
large degree articulated in the collocation and comparison of philosophical language.21 In 
fact, the claim might be made that Hill’s understanding of the relationship between 
language and society is to a large degree informed, via Coleridge, by this ‘freighting of 
Reason’ (of the procedures, assumptions and methods of critical reflections on texts and 
societies) with ‘sense, imagination and affect’. In other words, Hill’s critical method is 
supervised by an aesthetic sensibility in which ‘sense’ – the perceptual faculty enriched 
with sensuous (aural and visual) detail – and ‘imagination’ – the means by which sensuous 
details are arrayed or organised according to a unifying or dissolving principle – governs 
the construction and critical grammar of his prose style. 
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 Hamilton, op. cit., 81. 
21
 Thomas McFarland, Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 27. 
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 This goes some way towards explaining the weight of quotation, and the obliquity 
of comment upon that quotation, for which Hill’s essays are notorious. For much of the 
critical thinking performed in the essays, including ‘Redeeming the Time’, occurs thanks to 
the imaginative, aesthetic, organisation of Hill’s materials. Relations between quoted 
passages are established according to a formal principle which operates at a different level 
from usual critical discourse. Though Hill has often been compared with T.S. Eliot, his 
prose style bears little resemblance to that of Eliot. Hill’s prose doesn’t abide by the 
traditional discursive canon whereby assumptions are stated, an argument is developed and 
a conclusion reached – a canon in which the writer’s mastery is the determining factor in 
the perceptions that are made available by the discourse (one need only compare Hill’s 
approach to cultural analysis in ‘Redeeming the Time’, to Eliot’s in Notes Towards a 
Definition of Culture). A more formal, constructive approach works to minimise the degree 
to which the object of critique is obscured. Hence, in Hill’s criticism, commentary upon 
quotation is less likely to focus upon elucidating a putative intention, clarifying with 
paraphrase, or establishing a contextual narrative, than to bring to the reader’s attention a 
particular word or phrase and its sensuous aspects (syntactic articulation, tonic overtones, 
or rhythmic associations). This will be juxtaposed with another  word, sentence or longer 
passage, the aural and affective tones of which now resonate with that of the preceding 
material, resulting in a perception of the language use of the period under discussion which 
would not be legible (or audible) under the conditions of more conventional critical writing. 
 Quoting page-length passages from Hill’s essays would be the best way to do 
justice to the cumulative effect produced by the construction of the web of syntactic and 
acoustic correspondences that underlies his prose. But to confine ourselves to paraphrase, 
we have seen how, in ‘Redeeming the Time’, lines from Richard Oastler’s oratory echo, or 
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discordantly clash with, those of the United Committee of Framework-Knitters; other 
examples of instructive discordance occur within different passages from the same authors 
(George Eliot, Matthew Arnold), or across decades (where, for example, the word 
‘polished’ undergoes a change from the mid-eighteenth century of Samuel Johnson to the 
early-nineteenth century of the Framework-Knitters). Echoes can sound even across several 
pages, so that an active acoustic memory is helpful to keep track of the essay’s implicit 
argument. If there were any doubt that Hill’s critical methodology – which for many might 
appear as a mere extension of New Critical, or Eliotic, ex cathedra prose – is in fact 
attempting a more radical, aesthetically motivated construction of materials, there is plenty 
of evidence in Hill’s statements scattered throughout his critical works. Most significant are 
the occasional references to mimesis, a foundational aesthetic category, and one not 
conventionally associated with critical objectivity.22  Moreover, as if to corroborate the 
impact a constructivist approach to aesthetic thought can make, in ‘Redeeming the Time’ 
Hill speaks of ‘vital ... structures’ as those which deploy formal principles to organise 
sensuous materials which implicitly expose social materials to criticism (his example is the 
stanza break in Wordsworth’s ‘Ode’) (CCW 91). Aesthetic reflection, then, is a forceful 
presence even in Hill’s critical prose, which subordinates the usual acts of critical thinking 
– stating presuppositions, making definitions and inferences, and elaborating conclusions –  
in favour of a constructive patterning of historical materials. 
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 ‘I am attempting to convey ... my belief that a debate of this nature is committed to a form of mimesis’, 
CCW 4; ‘it may sometimes be necessary to mimic a dilemma’, ‘“The Conscious Mind’s Intelligible 
Structure”: A Debate’, Agenda, 9/4 – 10/1 (Autumn – Winter 1971-72), 14-23, at 21. 
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3. Living Powers 
 
Jerome McGann writes that ‘Coleridge’s views were to enjoy a truly remarkable triumph in 
England and America for one hundred and fifty years, particularly in those petit bourgeois 
enclaves which Coleridge called “the clerisy”, that body of culture-guardians whose center 
today is in the academies’.23 Hill’s response to Coleridge recalls McGann’s description of 
Hartman’s ‘pure’ response to romanticism: a response consisting fundamentally of ‘exact 
translations’ of those issues which concerned the romantics.24 The corollary to this is that 
Hill’s reception of Coleridge’s idealist thought is as diffuse as the Victorian period’s 
reception of the same thought. It is as futile to attempt to abstract a unified philosophical 
creed from the knot of religious, literary and philosophical ideas of Hill’s own writings as it 
is from that of the nineteenth-century inheritors of Coleridge’s thought. The controversies 
and confusions surrounding this thought are alive in Hill’s writing, rather than inert objects 
for Hill’s examination. These include the important social and religious motivations behind 
Coleridge’s writing. 
If the dramatic, intersubjective way of understanding Coleridge’s interactions with 
German Idealism informs his prose and acts as an important precedent for Hill’s own 
critical methodology, it also has some relevance for Hill’s understanding of the massive 
influence Coleridge is thought to have wielded over nineteenth-century thought. As Tim 
Fulford notes, ‘Talk was the basis of Coleridge’s elevation to the Johnsonian position of 
moralist and sage’: marooned in Highgate, conversation with visitors  was the first source 
of Coleridge’s influence. If, as Fulford goes on to point out, Coleridge’s conversations were 
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more often monologues than dialogues, ‘prone to ignore objections to his arguments’, the 
objections and other responses occur later, in a much wider sphere of nineteenth-century 
thought.25 It is some measure of the success of Coleridge’s ambitions for his thought to 
have a final resting place in ‘common sense’ – or at least in the minds of certain 
community-forming figures – that its influence was to affect such eminent Victorians as 
Newman, Arnold, Emerson and Disraeli.26 Hill has traced the fortunes of what he sees as 
Coleridge’s antiphonal style in the work of (among others) Newman (see CCW 96 and 
‘“The Conscious Mind’s Intelligible Structure”, passim), Emerson (see CCW 493-505), and 
T.H. Green (see my next chapter). Coleridge’s thought ultimately reached so wide an 
audience at least partially because it supplied a complex, insecure religious culture with a 
philosophical ground. As one critic writes, ‘the regulative principle of all Coleridge’s 
philosophical activity was to make his Idealist thought a secure base for Christianity, for 
contemporary Christianity’. 27  It’s an important factor in our understanding of Hill’s 
approach to articulating universality that Christianity was, for Coleridge, the motivating 
force behind his later philosophical writings.  
Community in The Triumph of Love is often a national, Christian community. Hill 
writes, for example (in a manner that might disturb those readers who don’t share his sense 
of loss with regards to religious and national paradigms) of ‘that all-gathering general 
English light, / in which each separate bead / of drizzle at its own thorn-tip stands / as 
revelation’ (TL 27): the general and the particular reconciled in the divine nature of 
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England. Nature as divine revelation informs a great deal of Hill’s poetry, particularly such 
later volumes as The Orchards of Syon where, for example, Hill writes of ‘A methylated 
cold / glow in the northern heavens that spells God the Creator’ (OS 50). Often a pervasive 
nebulosity – the ‘general … light’ and ‘methylated … glow’ – mollifies the anxieties of 
objective thought.  
In this, too, Hill follows Coleridge’s example. Returning to ‘Redeeming the Time’, 
we find a phrase which reverberates through Hill’s work:28 
 
For if words are not THINGS, they are LIVING POWERS, by which the things of most 
importance to mankind are actuated, combined, and humanized. 
(Quoted in CCW 95) 
 
This falls some way short of clarity. Any sense in which words could be described in the 
post-romantic era as ‘living powers’ is obscure, yet Hill clearly attaches great importance to 
the notion. The image of words trailing a numinal glow locates Coleridge’s dictum beyond 
the circumference of modern and postmodern theories of the constitutive properties of 
language. But the glow is sustained all the way through to Hill’s Tanner lecture ‘Poetry and 
Value’, where again he quotes Coleridge’s ‘sudden blaze of a sentence’, and asserts that in 
this dictum Coleridge is describing ‘a kind of neutral, or indifferent, or disinterested force 
in the nature of language itself’ (CCW 488). This takes place in a meditation on the role of 
language in ‘reflection’, by which Hill means objective judgement – ‘the faculty or activity 
that draws the naturally interested sensibility in the direction of disinterestedness’ (CCW 
484).29 Its importance for Hill’s conception of the ‘craft of vision’ is obvious. 
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The influence of this idea over Hill is palpable elsewhere: his essays and poetry 
repeatedly have recourse to explanations of language use that reveal intellective and 
affective experience buried in the etymologies of words. We can see this, for instance, in 
the scattered, admiring references to the philologist and archbishop Richard Chevenix 
Trench. In ‘Perplexed Persistence’, Hill writes that ‘It was Trench who learned from 
Coleridge, via Emerson, “how deep an insight into the failings of the human heart lies at the 
root of many words”’ (CCW 118).30 A later essay alludes to ‘Trench’s spiritual mentors 
Coleridge (“For if words are not THINGS, they are LIVING POWERS…”) and Emerson’ (CCW 
270).  
 Coleridge’s dictum rests on a mystery: the semblance character of language with 
respect to the created world. Its mysteriousness defeated Coleridge, who petitioned others 
to elucidate the import of this sentence (in 1800 Coleridge wrote a series of suggestions to 
Godwin encouraging him to ‘philosophize Horn Tooke’s System’). But we can at least note 
that this semblance character, as embodied in Coleridge’s notion of ‘living powers’, is 
invested by Hill with the power of objective judgement. I would suggest that there are two 
possible explanations, which derive from origins in Coleridge’s thought so intertwined that 
it is impossible to choose between them. As the connotations of being blinded or dazzled in 
Hill’s description of the notion as a ‘blaze’ would suggest, one way of conceiving this 
would be as a principle which cannot be analysed into further principles. It’s the boundary 
at which philosophy stops, the unknown upon which Coleridge’s version of German 
Idealism finally rests. On the other hand, the sense of being dazzled or blinded suggests the 
metaphors of blindness and blankness I will explore in section three, the ‘blank in one’s 
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thinking’, as Hill puts it in ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’, where human thought reflects upon 
the inhuman world without the guidance of pre-existing conceptuality. Language is 
removed from the realm of objectified thought – etymology or semiology – and given an 
active, performative place in the world.31 In the activity of semblance posited by Coleridge 
(and repeated by Hill in Scenes from Comus: ‘Weight of the world, weight of the word, is’ 
[SC 15]) a relationship is suggested between reality and language which is susceptible 
neither to empirical verification nor to rational categorisation. It is notable that light – the 
humanizing aura of words as ‘living powers’ – also figures in Hill’s redefinition of the 
imagination (‘a light that ought to light every person coming into the world’). 
It is constitutive of the dissatisfactions with modernity articulated by the thinkers so 
far in this thesis that Enlightenment rationality is viewed as incomplete, as riven by 
contradictions between the cognitive and the ethical. I have argued that these fissures 
emerged, and were subsequently tackled, in succeeding moments of the German Idealist 
tradition. Kant’s differentiation of the fields of cognition through his Critiques both 
recognised and, in the eyes of his successors, perpetuated the problem. Schelling 
(Coleridge’s model for much of the first part of the Biographia) and others criticised Kant’s 
positing of a world of noumenal things-in-themselves about which we could have no 
knowledge, and posited the aesthetic as a possible solution. But as we know, Coleridge did 
not pursue the Schellingian thesis into the second part of Biographia. As some critics have 
argued, this decision represents an ambivalent attitude towards the nature of truth. Contrary 
to some of the dominant notions of truth in the romantic era (notions which abandon the 
idea of an epistemology grounded in data given externally in favour of truth as something 
created by the subject), Coleridge’s Christianity would not let him relinquish the concept of 
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a pre-existing reality ordaining experience. The imagination, then, retained something of 
the mediating power it had in Kant (whose realm of things-in-themselves left a reassuringly 
unknowable variable in his system), rather than the absolute diagnostic power it appears to 
have in Schelling. 
Unlike Schelling, Coleridge didn’t endow art with the reconciliatory power 
demanded by the fact/value separation, preferring to remain with a Kantian foundationalism 
(the idea that knowledge of the world has to bottom at some final justificatory level – 
whether it’s sense data, the cogito, or the transcendental categories). In some sense, a 
grounding objectivity was presupposed. As one critic puts it, ‘While Coleridge’s 
voluntarism drew him closer to Schelling’s later view of philosophy as a symptom of 
fact/value alienation, his foundationalism continued to see grounded knowledge as 
salvation from this alienation’.32 In later years Coleridge came to locate this grounding 
objectivity in religion, and his later works (the second edition of The Friend and Aids to 
Reflection) are attempts to find common ground between philosophy and religion. That so 
many of Hill’s citations from Coleridge are from these later works helps us to understand 
the Coleridgean background to Hill’s many poetic devices deploying light imagery in 
religious contexts. It is as if, for Hill as for Coleridge, light blazes into vision at the 
moments when thought fails to cognise history and therefore seeks the more encompassing 
consolations of faith. 
For an example of a moment in which being and expression seek reconciliation in 
nature as revealed religion, let’s turn to a passage from The Triumph of Love: 
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the snow 
 half-thawed now hardens over again, 
 glassen-ridged, or pashed 
 like fish-ice: refracted light 
 red against copper. The hedged sun 
 draws into itself for its self-quenching. 
 If one is so minded, these modalities 
 stoop to re-enter the subterrane of faith – 
 faith, that is, in real Being; 
 the real being God, or, more comprehensively, Christ –  
 as a sanctuary lamp treadles its low flame 
 (TL 19-20) 
 
Prosody in this stanza is sometimes reduced to a supervisory role, separating certain words 
the better to accentuate them (‘pashed / like fish-ice’); but its achievement is to allow 
images of logopoeic ingenuity, such as the ‘hedged sun’, to resonate through successive 
lines. The echoes of this phrase permeate the stanza, refracted in the image of the low 
candle-flame, in the figure of Christ (a ‘son’ hedged with suffering and with thorns), and in 
the ‘stooping’ (the humbling or kenosis with which the poem as a whole is occupied) 
required by Christian faith; while this knitting-together of ideal and real is enacted in the 
enjambed repetitions (‘faith – / faith’; ‘real Being; / the real being’). Echoes of Coleridge 
construct this stanza, and not only in the generalised trope of illuminated nature as revealed 
religion compensating for the deficiencies of Enlightenment rationality. More explicit 
connections can be traced in the onomatopoeia and hyphenated digressions, which 
forcefully recall one of Coleridge’s notebook entries:  
 
Now this is my case – & a grievous fault it is / my illustrations swallow up my 
thesis – I feel too intensely the omnipresence of all in each, platonically speaking – 
or psychologically my brain fibres, or the spiritual Light which abides in thate brain 
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marrow as visible Light appears to do in sundry rotten mackerel & other smashy 
matters, is of too general an affinity with all things33 
 
The debt to Coleridge owed by the stanza quoted above appears in the way Coleridge’s 
comparison of ‘spiritual Light’ glowing in a mind to ‘smashy matters’ (like fish-flesh) is 
mirrored in Hill’s comparison of revelatory light to the saturation of ice (‘pashed / like fish-
ice’) with light from the setting sun. Moreover, the rhetoric of natural revelation repeats 
Coleridge’s own conviction that nature is a text to be interpreted for signs of divine 
immanence.34 Light fringes Hill’s writing whenever thought is deemed unable to proceed 
beyond certain limits: as emissary of a consoling power, it speaks also of an elegiacal and 
despairing attitude towards aesthetic reflection and community sense evident throughout 
the thought of Coleridge and Hill. 
 
4. Sensus communis: a ‘decaying sense’ 
 
Recall this passage from The Triumph of Love: 
 
Though certain 
 neologisms – Coleridge’s ‘tautegorical’ 
 for example – clown out along the edge 
 (TL 67) 
 
What is ‘Coleridge’s “tautegorical”’, and why does it ‘clown out along the edge’? A 
multitude of references in his poetry show that Hill stands in a peculiar relationship to 
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clowns, particularly in his later work. In this later work, the clown suggests comedic timing 
and pratfall more than the rustic simplicity that was still an important connotation in ‘An 
Apology’ (‘And who is this clown / doffing his mask at the masked threshold’ [CP 153]). 
Earlier in the poem Hill complains ‘Well as I hear I hear you but as I / hear you you are in a 
dumb-show’ (TL 55), and section CXXV as a whole is a kind of dumb-show where much 
of the real meaning is got across in the impetuous line-breaks and stammered rhythms, 
rather than the intellectual content of its allusions.35 Clowning activity has been associated 
with philosophy elsewhere by Hill. In ‘Discourse: For Stanley Rosen’, Hill writes ‘You’re 
magisterial in your own conviction. / And a clown with it, and a judge of clowns’.36 Hill’s 
judgement that tautegory ‘clown[s] out along the edge’, then, doesn’t ask to be received as 
criticism from on high, but as a sympathetic comment upon the jittery, self-correcting 
propulsion of thought anxious to obtain objective validation in the world.  
 ‘Tautegory’ is a term coined by Coleridge after having read Schelling’s Die 
Gottheiten von Samothrake, which received approbation by Schelling himself after he read 
Coleridge’s lecture ‘On the Prometheus of Aeschylus’ (1825). The OED defines 
‘tautegorical’ by reference to Coleridge’s use of it in Aids to Reflection (1825): 
 
The base of Symbols and symbolical expressions; the nature of which as always 
tautegorical (i.e. expressing the same subject but with a difference) in contra-
distinction from metaphors and similitudes, that are always allegorical (i.e. 
expressing a different subject but with a resemblance) 
(OED) 
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However, there is an earlier usage: Coleridge had already defined the tautegorical, in The 
Statesman’s Manual (1816), as that which is ‘characterized by the translucence of the 
Special in the Individual or of the General in the Especial’.37 It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to give the analysis of the nature of the romantic symbol that would be required to 
explicate Coleridge’s word. For the purpose of my argument it’s enough to note that 
tautegory – which Coleridge often uses synonymously with symbol – is the objective 
actualisation of conceptuality in aesthetic form. As opposed to allegory, where the aesthetic 
realisation has a distinct being from its root concept, in tautegory the meaning and its 
representation define each other: there is no meaning without its representation, and vice 
versa. Coleridge’s example in his 1825 lecture is Aeschylus’s figure of Prometheus: he 
writes that ‘Prometheus is a philosopheme and tautegorikon’, which, as one critic explains, 
means he is ‘an embodiment of a protophilosophical thought that could not have been 
expressed otherwise, least of all discursively’.38 Not only does the tautegorical stand for the 
romantic, post-Kantian conception of the aesthetic’s power of critical reflection and 
recognition, so that, like Coleridge’s ‘living powers’, it actuates or gives objective 
definition to ideas. It also is the figure for an expressive rival to philosophical discourse, 
‘an embodiment of a protophilosophical thought’: its peripheral location (‘along the edge’) 
in Hill’s stanza of philosophical discourse makes it central to his attitude to such discourse. 
 Politically, tautegory looks in two directions. In its Coleridgean, conservative guise 
it stands for the persistence of certain immutable truths through historical change. The class 
that was to bring these truths to fruition was the clerisy, the group that formed the 
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foundation for Coleridge’s conception of society in The Constitution of the Church and 
State. If the idealism (in a non-philosophical sense) inherent to this notion is subjected to 
critique in ‘An Apology for the Revival of Christian Architecture in England’, the idealism 
of The Triumph of Love reveals the limits of this critique. Politics suffuse The Triumph, but 
they are politics of the past: it can often appear that for Hill, political injustice stops at the 
end of WWII, though vague, oblique references to contemporary events do occur once or 
twice. However, since, as Hamilton points out, tautegory encourages the reflection that 
ideas are nothing without their expression in aesthetic construction, whether this is 
language or some other art form, the basis for critique is put in place.39 In refocusing 
attention upon the materials of expression, on the objectivity of language, poetry is granted 
a reflective, critical agency. But it would be difficult to demonstrate many moments in The 
Triumph of Love where poetry’s especial medium of aesthetic construction – prosody –
achieves this combination of sensuous, material objectivity and abstract conceptuality. 
True, Hill is very adept at the intellectually evocative compaction of meanings in a single 
word, where the carnal and conceptual are superimposed in a productive cognitive 
dissonance. But too often, brilliantly inventive verbal music remains chained to an 
empirical mandate: 
 
                   some years before that armoured 
 city suddenly went down, guns 
 firing, beneath the horizon; huge silent whumphs  
 of flame-shadow bronzing the nocturnal 
 cloud-base of her now legendary dust. 
 (TL 3) 
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yes, look! the Kenyan runners, look, there they go! 
 stippled with silver, shaking off the light 
 garlands of sweat –    
 (TL 44)  
 
In the first example, a kind of aural chiaroscuro is in play: a broad, vague background noise 
is put in place with ‘huge silent whumphs’, where the final syllable ‘umphs’ is a kind of 
static obliterating the preceding vowel sounds. Following this comes a more complex 
syntactical after-shock as hyphenated nouns and the genitive construction of the last line 
create a sense of rumbling detail expressive of flickering highlights against the broad gloom 
of debris cast into the sky. Enjambement, in the second example, maps with inspired 
fidelity the progress of Kenyan athletes: the pause exactly timed to slow the vision to a 
crawl in order to observe the sweat flung from their bodies. But in both cases, though the 
prosody reacts sensitively to the object under regard, more of the compunction felt by 
Coleridge and Hill with regard to philosophical speculation would help to dislodge an 
absorbed gaze too secure in its mastery of description. 
Similarly, as we have seen, the barrenness of objectified thought is ironised in the 
passages of scholastic disputation – the ‘hortus siccus’ that Coleridge sought to avoid in 
parenthetical writing – but with few signs of a compensating prosody that might ‘present 
the thought growing’. Hill’s model for art’s critical function is laus et vituperatio, a genre 
Hill complains is ‘the worst / remembered, least understood, of the modes’ (TL 12). There 
is enough vituperatio in The Triumph of Love to cover a broad swathe of calculative, 
substitutive thought, but finally those moments of laus – the expertly delineated 
observations of the natural world in which the historical is supposed to shimmer – strike 
me, thanks to their obedience to a pre-existing objective world, as almost as deathly as the 
parodied objectified thought. In this respect, despite the many claims for Hill’s modernism, 
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his poetry has not learnt the lessons of abstraction modernist art developed so variously. 
Charles Altieri, for example, notes how the modernists were similarly animated by a 
dissatisfaction with Enlightenment principles, and sought a form of constructivism that 
would escape the mimetic mandates of earlier, representational art which were only able to 
perpetuate these principles. This modernist poetry was characterised by 
 
a sense of how easily benedictions become epitaphs, unless they manage to 
construct an imaginative life not reducible to the specific ideological structures and 
the play of local interests out of which they are generated.40 
 
To my mind, Hill’s epiphanies, which often mirror the empirical world with a thrilling 
virtuosity, nonetheless have something of the epitaph about them.   
Ultimately I believe this is because Hill and Coleridge share an understanding of the 
imagination as private retreat rather than public intervention. The Triumph of Love knows 
that the separation of mind and soul is a worldly given, but too often assumes it as final. 
‘[W]hat are poems for?’ Hill asks at the end of the volume. ‘They are to console us / with 
their own gift, which is like perfect pitch. … What ought a poem to be? Answer, a sad / 
and angry consolation’ (TL 82). If the task of art, as the younger Coleridge saw it, is to 
represent ‘the purpose and progress of the Absolute, the creative power to dissipate the hard 
form of “separated” consciousness, revealing the factitious nature of reality seemingly 
“fixed and dead”’, this is only half-performed by Hill.41 Noting the evolution of Coleridge’s 
concept of the imagination throughout his life, Nigel Leask writes of the ‘tension evident in 
Coleridge’s writing between a theory of Imagination as an integrative agency dissolving 
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and dissipating social divisions and hierarchies, and as an otherworldly consolation which 
removed the practice of virtue from a public to a private sphere’.42 Rather than take up the 
implications of Coleridge’s youthful conception of imagination, it becomes in the later 
Coleridge, as in Hill, a mere alternative to social practice, as politics becomes spiritualised 
and the sensus communis – in Coleridge the property of an elite clerisy – becomes, as Hill 
writes of it elegiacally in Scenes from Comus, a ‘decaying sense’ (SC 5). When what is 
most positive in Coleridge’s contribution to Hill’s aesthetics – its importation of an German 
Idealist model of aesthetic cognition – is understood in the light of this shift in how the 
imagination is perceived, the ambiguity of certain key ideas in Hill’s Coleridgean canon is 
better grasped. Estranged from the public sphere, the idea of the ‘drama of reason’ can 
become that stage-managed pantomime of moral evaluation that Peter Robinson describes. 
And the ‘moral copula’ probably grips with less legislative force if the agency through 
which Hill sees it operate – language – is a ‘living power’ blazing with so much light it 
occludes not just science’s fatalism and history’s accidentality but science and history 
themselves.  
But unlike the later Coleridge, who, while recognising (in the second edition of The 
Friend, for example) the difficulties of establishing principles for judgement, nevertheless 
proved time and again that he was never in doubt of his possession of those principles, 
Hill’s most valuable resource in his poetry is his doubt. The moments in his poetry where 
judgement is inflamed to moral imprecation are tempered by the admissions of deafness, 
incompetence, and exhaustion. A lyric retreat into the subject is not accompanied by an 
enthronement of the subject as judge. Hence the closest Hill comes to objectivity is the 
sharpening of memory, as the first line of the poem – ‘Sun-blazed, over Romsley, a livid 
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rain-scarp’, is given an extra grain of definition in the final line: ‘Sun-blazed, over 
Romsley, the livid rain-scarp’ (TL 1, 82). 
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SECTION II: VICTORIAN IDEALISM AND OBJECTIVITY 
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CHAPTER 3: ART OF JUDGEMENT 
 
As we have seen, Coleridge’s writing often guides Hill’s thinking about the aesthetic 
apprehension of the social in contradictory directions. I concluded the previous chapter 
outlining the shift in Coleridge’s conception of the imagination from a cognitive power able 
to dissolve and reconfigure seemingly fixed determinants in history, to a source of 
consolation detached from the public sphere.  Reverberations from this shift account for 
some of the contradictions in Hill’s attitude to art’s diagnostic and transformative power, an 
attitude which is coloured by the contrast between imagination-as-solvent and imagination-
as-retreat. A transverse layer of confusion is added when Hill’s own stance appreciably 
changes – as I will argue in this chapter it does – from an impersonal to a subjectively-
motivated poetics. But despite this shift in Hill’s thinking, Coleridge’s main contribution – 
the reconfiguring of conceptuality in aesthetic terms – is sustained in Hill’s subsequent 
encounters with two later figures in the Anglophone Idealist tradition: T.H. Green and F.H. 
Bradley. 
Hill’s late essays on F.H. Bradley implicitly make the argument for a philosophical 
poetics. Hill’s work on Bradley confirms his belief that poetry can cognise certain problems 
about our relation to reality, not through the incorporation of polemical or thematic 
argumentation such as one might find in a work of philosophy, but through the resources 
offered by syntax and prosody. In order to clarify exactly what I mean by this, I will begin 
by reading a poem of Hill’s which embodies both these avenues of investigation – the 
thematic and the prosodic. ‘De Anima’ was published in the same year as the essay which 
first dealt with Bradley, ‘Dividing Legacies’ (1996): 
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Salutation: it is as though  
effortlessly – to reprise –  
               the unsung spirit  
gestures of no account  
become accountable  
                                such matters arising  
whatever it is that is sought  
 
                               through metaphysics  
research into angelic song  
ending as praise itself  
the absolute yet again  
atoned with the contingent –  
                                               typology  
incarnate – Bethlehem the open field –  
 
still to conceive no otherwise: an  
aphasia of staring wisdom  
the souls images glassily exposed  
                              fading to silverpoint  
still to be at the last  
ourselves and masters of all  
                                            humility –  
 (C 5) 
  
I choose this poem for two reasons: first, its proximity to ‘Dividing Legacies’ (which 
contains a significant passage on Eliot’s ‘Bradleian’ poem ‘Marina’) suggests useful 
parallels with Hill’s idea of a philosophical poem; second, it thematises the topic I will be 
discussing in this chapter: the relative roles of subjectivity and totality in the task of 
judgement. 
Certain textual details warrant a philosophical reading of the poem. ‘De Anima’ is 
one of a series of poems in Canaan that bear ostensibly theological or philosophical titles, 
many derived from Aristotelian treatises. Several words in ‘De Anima’ – ‘metaphysics’, 
‘absolute’, ‘contingent’ – loudly invite (no doubt to reject) explanations in an idealist vein. 
But I am more concerned in this thesis with the possibility of a syntax or a prosody being 
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philosophical. Hill thought Eliot’s poem ‘Marina’ achieved this: specifically that its 
prosody exhibited a method of apprehension (derived from Bradley’s syntax) able to 
cognise the wavering grasp of human thought upon objective truth: its lapses into solipsism 
and surges into clarity. Many of the poems in Canaan are like ‘Marina’ in the mimesis of 
this wavering quality of judgement enabled by their sparse punctuation and ambiguously 
determinative enjambement.   
  In ‘De Anima’ Hill’s verse enacts the way ‘unsung spirit / gestures of no account’ 
might ‘become accountable’ – the way purely private gestures can become universalized, 
accountable to a community – in its syntactic ambiguity: indentation, deferred verb parts, 
and ambiguous connectives make of the task of objectified thought a diffident, exploratory 
adventure. Near the start of the first stanza, ‘unsung spirit’ stands stoutly on its own at the 
margin of the poem, a flag hoisted for the expressive subject. But the ensuing enjambement 
robs it of its autonomy, linking it adjectivally to ‘gestures of no account’: ‘the unsung spirit 
gestures of no account’. However these ‘gestures’, the forgotten, private contingencies of 
human existence, are abruptly said to ‘become accountable’: a promise of justice that 
contains the threat of possible punishment for crimes. It would seem that, according to this 
view, the possibility of wholeness is purchased at the cost of threatened domination. This is 
a philosophical problem, dealt with through prosody. Subjective agency is by turns granted 
its full amplitude, effaced in the name of totality, and left finally with a dubious claim to 
truth. 
 That metaphysics is conceived of as a complacent leveller of particularity is also 
suggested by the phrases redolent of disputational fluency  –  ‘Salutation’, ‘ – to reprise –’, 
‘such matters arising’ – that occupy so much of the metrical plot. As we have seen, a view 
of metaphysical speculation as a theorised wholeness that threatens domination is certainly 
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one side of the story for Hill. But an appreciation of metaphysics’s aesthetics of 
incremental appearance and disappearance is manifest too, for example in the imagined 
‘souls images glassily exposed / fading to silverpoint’ (incidentally recalling Marina’s 
‘What images return’). In the line ‘whatever it is that is sought // through metaphysics’, the 
almost dismissive insouciance of ‘whatever’ suggests a vagueness which however has its 
place in certain idealist systems (including Bradley’s, as we shall see). It’s an indeterminate 
glance at the stanza leap which, stretched by the indentation of ‘through metaphysics’, 
yawns in mimesis of the gap between subject and object, the bond between thought and 
being which is conjectured at in the following lines: ‘the absolute yet again / atoned with 
the contingent’. But questions remain. What has happened to the earlier suspicion regarding 
metaphysical universals? Where does this ‘atone[ment]’ take place? Coleridge’s legacy is 
indirectly visible in this poem’s contradictions.  
 This section will pursue two ways of thinking about the nature of judgement in 
Hill’s work. First, I will attempt to elucidate Hill’s treatment of two philosophers in the 
British Idealist tradition. One of these philosophers (Bradley) is of the highest importance 
for Hill’s understanding of judgement; the other (Green) is a useful forerunner, both in 
terms of his relationship to Bradley, and in that Hill’s essay on Green demonstrates a much 
earlier interest in the question of philosophy and judgement than the Bradley essays 
suggest. The other opportunity for thinking about Hill and judgement will be found in his 
poetry, and my claim is that there is legible in the willingness of Hill’s post-Canaan verse 
to deploy the first-person singular a shift in his thinking about the constitutive nature of the 
self. This will provide the connecting matter between his critical work on Green and 
Bradley and his poetry: in both cases the degree to which the judging self is constituted by 
its context and that to which it is free to make claims about this context is at stake. In the 
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prose Hill first (with Green) traces the ways in which philosophy exploits poetry to 
facilitate its judgements, and second (with Bradley) examines the debt of Eliot’s poetry to 
philosophical articulation. In the poetry Hill moves from a conception of verse (in Canaan) 
which downplays the constitutive role of the subject (preferring a poetics of impersonality) 
to one which (in Speech! Speech!) portrays judgement as a more variegated enterprise in 
which self-expression is subjected to various cognitive frustrations and achievements.  
 
1. The role of legislative metaphors in philosophical and poetic judgement 
 
Hill’s critical prose frequently reiterates the maxim that grammar and syntax are more than 
convenient moulds for the communication of pre-existing thoughts: they are the schemata 
by which our understanding of the world, and hence the modes of behaviour by which we 
can transform the world, are formed. This is especially the case in the earlier prose. In 
‘“Perplexed Persistence”: The Exemplary Failure of T.H. Green’, for example, Hill cites 
the philosopher R.L. Nettleship on the qualitative effect wrought by the articulation of an 
idea upon the mind that articulates it:  
 
the consciousness which we express when we have found the ‘right word’ is not the 
same as our consciousness before we found it, so that it is not strictly correct to call 
the word the expression of what we meant before we found it. 
(CCW 123) 
 
As a rejoinder to Pope’s ‘What oft was Thought, but ne’er so well Exprest’, Hill’s approval 
of this analysis brings him well within the embrace of post ‘linguistic turn’ theory: it 
transfers the weight of expressive responsibility away from the speaker onto the words 
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themselves, and conceives of them as exerting a constitutive effect upon the subject.1 In the 
transition from the empty concept to concrete experience, word order, the distribution of 
clauses, the usage of pronouns, subjunctives, copulas and prepositions, have the force of 
arbitration. This is apparent in the suspicion with which the first-person singular is 
deployed in Hill’s earlier poetry. But what marks his more recent works (post-Canaan) is a 
turn to poems in which the expressive function of the ‘I’ is viewed with less suspicion than 
is often cautioned by such theories. Syntax (the channel through which, for Hill, the freight 
of social and historical determination of the self weighs in) is seen both to constitute and 
obstruct the subject’s expressive potential, which is now allowed a glimmer of autonomy in 
the first person pronoun. Syntax’s status as a priori condition is questioned in the later 
poems, in which an originary expression is seen to battle with its mode of articulation.  
According to Hill’s earlier conception of objectified thought, objective judgement 
stands or falls on grammar, which is why, in the seventies, he saw as evidence of Simone 
Weil’s ‘greatness as an ethical writer’ her proposal that ‘“anybody, no matter who, 
discovering an avoidable error in a printed text or radio broadcast, would be entitled to 
bring an action before [special] courts” empowered to condemn a convicted offender to 
prison or hard labour’ (CCW 9-10). As a criterion for ratifying the legitimacy of subject 
positions – concrete political, ethical, and artistic sets of judgements – the notion of justice 
propounded here is almost unbearably austere. Syntax overshadows and subsumes 
spontaneous expression, since before thought can achieve objective utterance it must 
undergo the painstaking self-adjustments of its own legalistic invention. 
                                                 
1
 Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, in The Poems of Alexander Pope, Volume 1: Pastoral Poetry and 
An Essay on Criticism, ed. E. Audra and Aubrey Williams (London: Methuen and New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1961), 273. 
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 Another kind of court is evoked at the beginning of Gillian Rose’s study of 
philosophy and law, Dialectic of Nihilism: 
 
Today things will be slightly different. You are on trial. Or, rather, you are to be 
invited to inspect a court-room in which you have been judge, witness, and clerk for 
so long that you have ceased to notice its strange ambiance.2 
 
Rose is describing a particular discipline of thought – Kant’s critical philosophy, which she 
portrays as ‘a maze of litigation and inquisition during the course of which [the subject’s] 
status and the nature of the proceedings shift continuously and almost imperceptibly’. 
Rose’s artful depiction of the founding trope of modern philosophy resonates suggestively 
with Hill’s recent poetry: metaphors of legal form, witness and judgement are major 
constituents of Hill’s poetic inquiries into the possibility of objective judgement and 
visionary utterance, including the two volumes under consideration in this chapter, Canaan 
and Speech! Speech! Howard Caygill brings us even closer to the reflexivity of Hill’s 
juridical tropes. Taking up Rose’s account of Kant’s legalistic inquiry into reason, Caygill 
writes of Kant’s critical project that in it ‘Judgement can come to self-knowledge through 
instituting a tribunal to judge – according to its own law – its heritage of disputes and 
quarrels’. But, he goes on to ask, ‘how can judgement so legislate without contributing 
another knot to an already tangled history?’3  
The problem Caygill cites is central to modern concepts of self-determination: how 
can a ground be disclosed upon which to base judgement which does not rob the judge of 
                                                 
2
 Gillian Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 11. 
3
 Howard Caygill, Art of Judgement (Oxford, Blackwell, 1989), 1. This is another way of putting the problem 
of subject and object that occupies post-Kantian philosophy: how, in Adorno’s words, can we speak of subject 
and object when the ‘determination of their meanings requires reflection on the very thing the act of defining 
truncates for the sake of conceptual manageability’. Theodor Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and 
Catchwords, tr. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 246. 
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his or her claim to self-grounding? This paradox comes into play in the poems contained in 
Canaan and Speech! Speech! Special attention will be paid in this chapter to the elements 
in these poems, especially Speech! Speech!, that evoke the tribunal. True, these elements 
are determined to a great extent by Hill’s study of Elizabethan and Jacobean recusancy and 
martyrdom, and the evolution of the concept of ‘confession’ from ecclesiastical doctrine, 
via the torture chamber, to recent lyric poetry. Yet, as vital and rich as these informing 
sources are for Hill’s volume, the tendentious shifts of position in the poetic voice require 
an explanation which can best be supplied by the Kantian paradoxes of philosophical self-
arraignment. Variously litigant, witness and judge, the voice of the poem enacts a trial in 
which the heritage of judgement itself, and of those concepts with which it is brought into 
contact – freedom, duty, beauty, and violence – is investigated. So while it would be 
fanciful to suggest Hill had Kant’s juridical metaphors in mind during the composition of 
Speech! Speech!, or, even more egregiously, that the poem somehow presents a poetic 
dramatisation of Kant’s philosophical system, it will be seen that the paradoxes of 
judgement delineated by Rose and Caygill above, and which would have been familiar 
issues to Coleridge in his attempt to synthesise German Idealism and Christianity in 
nineteenth-century Britain, are part of the fabric of the poem’s construction.  
 We have seen that judgement – which for transcendental idealism means the 
bringing together of particulars under universals, or the subsumption of intuitions under 
concepts – is paradoxically both the power under scrutiny in Kant’s critical philosophy, and 
the power under whose auspices this scrutiny is to be performed. Coleridge called Kant’s 
first Critique ‘that critique of the human intellect, which, previously to the weighing or 
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measuring this or that, begins by assaying the weights, measures, and scales themselves’.4 
Coleridge was not alone in connecting judgement with measure – Caygill shows how this is 
one of the forms taken by the paradoxes of judgement in a tradition stretching back to the 
renaissance. In this broader sense, judgement means discrimination or evaluation, and 
implies a standard in relation to which distinctions are to be made. The source of this 
standard may vary – it may be immanent or transcendent, derived from reason, experience, 
or revelation, and will affect the aptitude of our judging faculties in making 
discriminations.5 How can the limits of man’s power to act upon the world be measured 
when man has been given the freedom to define the terms of measurement itself? 
 Hill’s poem-sequence ‘Psalms of Assize’, in Canaan, bears a title that echoes this 
preoccupation with questions of measurement and judgement. The sequence explores 
judgement’s achievements and errors, with particular reference to Neoplatonist philosophy. 
‘Assize’ is another of Hill’s abundantly overdetermined words. The OED records that it is 
‘a session of a … legislative body’ and the resultant ordinances; ‘a statute regulating 
weights and measures’; both ‘[t]he standard of quantity, measure, or price’ for material 
goods like bread and ale, and the ‘[m]easure, extent (of things immaterial)’; ‘a judicial 
inquest’, and, by extension, ‘The Last Judgement’. Finally, Hill has said that the poem is 
about ‘cadence’,6 permitting us to read it as both about ‘measure’ and a ‘mode of falling’ 
(OED), and to connect judgement with prosody. These concepts are played out in the 
subsequent sections of the poem.  
                                                 
4
 Quoted in G.N.G. Orsini, Coleridge and German Idealism: A Study in the History of Philosophy with 
Unpublished Materials from Coleridge’s Manuscripts (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1969), 73. 
5
 See David Summers, The Judgment of Sense: Renaissance Naturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 21-25. 
6
 Geoffrey Hill speaking at ‘Poets Reading Philosophy, Philosophers Reading Poetry’, University of 
Warwick, 28 October 2007. 
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 Bearing in mind the intersubjective dimension to philosophical argument as 
understood by Coleridge, it’s worth mentioning the notational device that inspires ‘Psalms 
of Assize’. Each of the seven poems in the sequence bears an epigraph taken from John 
Colet’s annotations to Marsilio Ficino’s Epistolae. Dialogic production of knowledge is a 
common thread between this and the earlier poems in the volume. Just as these Aristotelian 
metaphysical poems imply dialogue (Green noted that Aristotle’s texts follow the spirit, if 
not the letter, of Platonic dialogue: ‘the philosopher pours out a string of detached 
propositions representing various points of view, without any express notice of their 
agreement or discrepancy’)7, so dialogue is implied in Colet’s annotative arguments with 
Ficino. It’s one solution to the problem of objective judgement: intersubjectivity broadens 
the bases of judgement, sharing the burden of objectivity and permitting the ‘standard’ of 
measurement to be identified with consensus or compromise. However this compromise 
cannot be merely posited, as Hill recognises. He is more concerned with the fake 
universalism acquired by imposed consensus, and with the disagreements and errors that 
are encountered along the way. 
 See, for example, the end of the first poem in ‘Psalms of Assize’: 
 
 let us pray 
Gabriel descend 
as a mood almost 
                 a monody 
of chloroform 
or florists roses 
consensual angel spinning his words 
                   thread 
he descends 
                                                 
7
 T.H. Green, The Works of Thomas Hill Green, ed. R.L. Nettleship, 3 vols. (London: Longmans, Green & 
Co, 1906), iii, 46-7. 
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        and light 
sensitive darkness 
      follows him down 
(C 60) 
 
Coming after the imperious tones of the first half of the poem, ‘let us pray’ sounds glib and 
almost coercive, and ushers in ‘a mood’ and ‘a monody / of chloroform’. Gabriel’s ‘mood’ 
has a vagueness suggestive of something less productive than metaphysical indeterminacy: 
inertia, or abulia, seems more to the point. It suggests the ‘tone’ (rather that ‘pitch’) that 
Hill deplores in Eliot’s later work, while ‘monody’ suggests the monological, easy path of 
Rose’s ‘euporia’.8 As a song for ‘a single voice’ (OED), the monody cannot possess Hill’s 
cardinal virtue: to ‘get within the judgement the condition of the judgement’ (CCW 561, 
quoting F.H. Bradley). Gabriel, in this poem, is the ‘consensual angel’ descending: but 
consensus is a word redolent of tyranny for Hill.  In ‘Eros in F.H. Bradley and T.S. Eliot’, 
Hill writes:  
 
Work of eternal intensity is outside the consensus. If the question is put, ‘actual or 
alleged consensus?’, the response must be that the alleged consensus is the actual 
consensus, through the imposition of force majeure. The merely beautiful and the 
merely charming are creatures of the consensus, of force majeure. 
(CCW 558) 
 
Endowed with the irresistible force of consensus, the angel ‘descends’. He sheds, one might 
assume, the ‘light’ of Colet’s epigraph, but the end of this section casts doubt on the 
                                                 
8
 For ‘tone’ and ‘pitch’ in Eliot’s poetry, see CCW 377-9, and Peter Robinson, ‘Toiling in a Pitch’, 
Cambridge Quarterly 26/3 (1997), 263-9. For ‘euporia’ see Gillian Rose, Love’s Work (London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1995), 116. 
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efficacy of such an undiluted concept.9 The cadence of the lines permits a moment of grace, 
of brief intensification, in the syllables ‘and light’, but the enjambement dulls this flare with 
a metaphor of mechanical reaction: ‘and light / sensitive darkness / follows him down’. 
 Sometimes Hill’s comments suggest that his faith in measure is unshakeable: ‘We 
are hereby committed to the critical view that shades of distinction – in sensibility, 
imagination, and ethical position – can be semantically “placed” and assessed’ (CCW 400). 
Yet, as his phrase ‘semantically “placed”’ suggests, this assessment proceeds not by means 
of a monological discourse – the projection of subjective categories onto the ‘position[s]’ 
under evaluation – but by the juxtaposition of these positions. As ‘Psalms of Assize’ 
proceeds, the gaps that disarticulate its craft or techne are simultaneously constituent 
elements of the poem’s prosody, creating spaces in which to stage the work of ‘diaporia’, 
the exploration of routes between clauses whose unsignposted conjunctions are suggested 
only by an arrangement of hesitations.10 Unwilling imperiously to project a transcendent 
subjectivity onto the world (‘too soon the fanfare / of visions’), and yet equally unwilling to 
accept the dominance of objectivity, Hill circles around the possibility of atonement – 
which in our discussion so far has meant the bonding of thought and being, but which in the 
context of this poem must carry with it its theological sense of the reconciliation of God 
with nature. A further meaning, though, is the meshing of subjective judgements about the 
world (judgements which yet have to retain some degree of objectivity or universality for 
them to have meaning for others) with already existing objectivity – the institutions and 
                                                 
9
 The epigraph reads ‘Hinc vagantur in tenebris misere, quia non credunt veritati ipsi … Querunt lumen 
confisi ipsis et non inveniunt’, translated by Sears Jayne as ‘Hence they wander wretchedly in darkness 
because they do not believe in the truth itself ... They seek the light, trusting in themselves, but do not find it’. 
Sears Jayne, John Colet and Marsilio Ficino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 118-19. 
10
 For ‘diaporia’ see Rose, Love’s Work, 115-6: ‘being at a loss yet exploring various routes, different ways 
towards the good enough justice, which recognises the intrinsic and the contingent limitations in its exercise’. 
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concepts that form the dominant receptive arena for these judgements in the popular 
imagination. 
 
2. What is Popular Philosophy? 
 
Speech! Speech! opens with a lugubrious sennet – ‘Erudition. Pain. Light’ – which as a 
digest of the cognitive preconditions of poetic thought comes across as a deliberately 
grandiose rescension of Frank O’Hara’s ‘Light   clarity   avocado salad in the morning’:11 
 
Erudition. Pain. Light. Imagine it great 
unavoidable work; although: heroic 
verse a non-starter, says PEOPLE. 
(SS 1) 
 
If the ‘great / unavoidable work’ the poem is shaping up to be takes this shape only in the 
imagination (‘Imagine it’), this imagination nonetheless forms one limit of poetic 
judgement. The other limit is the cynical judgement of Hill’s hypostasised ‘PEOPLE’, for 
whom such a project is doomed to failure (‘heroic / verse a non-starter’). Between these 
two poles presumably is to occur what Hill calls the ‘negotium’ or the ‘somehow’, Rose the 
‘diaporia’, of subjective bonding with the world.12 Avoidance of Poundian over-reaching 
(of the kind Hill diagnosed in ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’) and of kitchen-sink empiricism 
(the committed poetry Hill disparages in the form of Czeław Miłosz) – in other words of an 
                                                 
11
 Frank O’Hara, ‘Poem’. The Collected Poems of Frank O’Hara, ed. Donald Allen (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1995), 350. 
12
 For negotium, see ‘Unhappy Circumstances’, CCW 176-191. 
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inflationary or deflationary poetics – summons what in the same inaugural stanza of 
Speech! Speech! is the first mandate to judge: ‘Judge the distance’.13  
But what is the ‘PEOPLE’, and what is to be made of the inflation (the capitalised 
typography) that has set it aside from and above the other objects named in this poem? By 
what legislative judgement has this limit-case been designated? In attempting to set the 
terms that frame his study of disorder and order, of the propriety and accuracy of 
judgement, has Hill not also tied another knot in the tangled history of judgement? Some 
suggestive answers to this question are to be found in Hill’s treatment, in his essays on 
Bradley, of Eliot’s response to the demands placed upon him by his role as national poet 
during the Second World War. But before turning to that, it’s worth considering a more 
philosophical understanding of this false totality as it’s unfolded in the much earlier essay, 
‘“Perplexed Persistence”: the Exemplary Failure of T.H. Green’. 
Hill’s starting point in ‘Perplexed Persistence’ is Green’s essay ‘Popular Philosophy 
in its Relation to Life’.14 Popular philosophy, for Green, means those forms of thought 
which are current in a given society and which have acquired a sheen of natural 
inevitability that prevents any analysis of their presuppositions. Thought becomes 
objectified in what Green calls ‘rhetoric’, preserving forms of understanding which may 
have since been superseded in scholarly circles, but which continue to exert a hold over the 
popular imagination. Green gives as an example the ethical theories of the Sophists, which 
remained popular despite the efforts of Plato and Aristotle. He argues that his contemporary 
situation parallels the ancient one. The ‘doctrines of the Aufklärung’ – the mechanistic and 
psychologistic theories of Locke, Butler, Hume and Rousseau – ‘are not to be supposed 
                                                 
13
 See the final section for a discussion of Hill’s analysis of Pound and Miłosz. 
14
 T.H. Green, Works, iii, 92-125. 
115 
 
 
 
dead and done with, because Kant outgrew them nearly a hundred years ago’.15 Just as the 
mechanistic theories of Democritus gave rise to the pragmatism of the Sophists, Green 
argues, so the psychologism of Locke and Hume lies behind the hedonistic theories of 
Bentham and his successors. 
Green defines popular philosophy in terms which recall Coleridge’s description of 
instrumental thought as a ‘mere Hortus siccus’. For Green, popular philosophy 
 
fixes in coarse lineaments the antithetical ideas, which genuine speculation leaves 
fluid and elastic, and on the strength of them gives a positive answer, Yes or No, to 
questions as to the world of thought, which, because asked in terms of sense, true 
philosophy must either leave unanswered or answer by both Yes and No. It abhors 
the analysis of knowledge. It takes certain formal conceptions ready-made, without 
criticism of their origin or validity.16 
 
Popular philosophy confidently takes in hand the thought of significant preceding 
philosophers, without pausing to consider the problems which gave rise to this thought and 
which persist in its contradictions and aporiae. The question that occupies Green in 
‘Popular Philosophy’ – and Hill in ‘Perplexed Persistence’ – is how to objectify thought 
(how to give thought objective reality in language) without lapsing into the rhetoric of 
ossified contemporary wisdom, while simultaneously granting it a degree of universality 
(without which it yields to subjective arbitrariness). 
 The central concern of Hill’s essay on Green is the difficulty of articulating thought 
in a way that does justice both to thinking and to its reception by the thinker’s 
contemporaries. Just one extended quotation will have to show how Hill situates this 
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 Ibid., 93. 
16
 Ibid., 92. 
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problem in the context of the discussion of knowledge and ethics contained in Green’s 
essay: 
 
[Green] criticized Butler for being ‘content to leave the moral nature a cross of 
unreconciled principles’ while, as a corollary, he argued that ‘Man reads back into 
himself, so to speak, the distinctions which have issued from him, and which he 
finds in language’ and that, in this ‘retranslation’, he ‘changes the fluidity which 
belongs to them in language, where they represent ever-shifting attitudes of thought 
and perpetually cross each other, for the fixedness of separate things’. Green shares 
here a prevalent ethical emphasis of his time, the recognition that while we are 
‘unconditionally bound’, ‘necessarily belonging to such a world’, being so bound is 
not necessarily the same as being in a fix and is most certainly not the same as being 
a fixer. In his dual application of the word ‘cross’, once as noun and once as verb, in 
two consecutive paragraphs, Green finds words for an essentially Kantian crux. The 
nature of the world is such as we are constrained to recognize, the ineluctable fact, 
but to be content with the rich discrepancies which this offers is nonetheless 
dangerous and is sometimes treacherous. 
(CCW 110) 
 
The ‘Kantian crux’ has to do with the transition between Kant’s first two critiques. If the 
Critique of Pure Reason was concerned with establishing the subjective grounds for an 
objective law of necessity – for the notion that certain metaphysical doctrines such as cause 
and effect have universal applicability – the Critique of Practical Reason sought to 
demonstrate the grounds for human freedom, to prove ‘the claim that normal adults’, 
despite this sublunary determinism, ‘are capable of being fully self-governing in moral 
matters’.17 It is the moral law which ‘elevates the human being above himself (as a part of 
the world of sense)’ and which gives him ‘freedom and independence from the mechanism 
of all nature’.18 The space opened up between the two critiques is a troubling one which has 
                                                 
17
 J.B. Schneewind, ‘Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue: An Overview of Kant’s Moral Philosophy’, in Paul 
Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 309-341, 
at 309. 
18
 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, tr. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 
2002), 111. 
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led, as we saw in the last chapter, to controversies concerning the objective character of 
subjective judgement, and which gives rise not only to Kant’s aesthetic theory but to the 
claims made for the aesthetic power of judgement by Coleridge and the German post-
Kantians.  
 In the above passage, Hill argues that the ‘corollary’ of Butler’s mechanistic moral 
philosophy, in which essence and existence are forcibly separate, is the modern mind’s 
propensity to misrecognise the spiritual nature of the world as a separate, alienated object. 
One outcome of this philosophy is the apprehension of the world as a kind of alienated 
intelligence, exerting its own coercive pressure on the subject. But it also entails that this 
intelligence, as rediscovered in the medium of language, offers the subject opportunities for 
expression in the teeth of this cognitive pressure, as Green’s equivocal uses of the word 
‘cross’ indicate. Being ‘unconditionally bound’ (an endnote points us to Henry Sidgwick’s 
Outlines of the History of Ethics) to what Sidgwick calls the ‘“categorical imperative” of 
reason’ does not proscribe the possibility of negotiating the grounds of objective 
judgement: rather, it prescribes this possibility. When an objectivity exists which unites 
thought and feeling, in which – in a move that Green borrows from Hegel and which is 
unacknowledged in Hill’s essay – the true and the good are posited as one and the same, we 
are left with a lower order, ephemeral objectivity, the historically conditioned 
manifestations of this unity in our language and political institutions.  
Hill’s discussion of ‘the strained relations between intention and reception’ (CCW 
109) is predicated on a recognition of these two forms of objectivity. It is worth noting that 
Hill resorts to Coleridge to explain the ways in which Green’s writing falls foul of these 
‘strained relations’. Coleridge notes how, in one of Donne’s sermons, the poet’s mind 
struggles ‘to preserve its inborn fealty to the Reason under the servitude to an accepted 
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article of Belief’. Hill observes that Green’s writing, too, oscillates between ‘fealty’ to 
thought and ‘servitude’ to the prevalent doctrines of his day. Green is not seen to be a 
special case here: this oscillation is inherent to thought itself, and Green merely embodies it 
(this is why his failure is ‘exemplary’) (CCW 110).  
Hill demonstrates how popular thinking negatively affects Green’s language: certain 
of Green’s phrases, as Hill wrote in his original lecture, refer to hypostasised concepts 
which, apparently possessed of social existence, absolve us of any responsibility to rethink 
them.19 Hill cites phrases uttered by Green and Sidgwick which point to what Hill sees as 
an ‘illicit bridging of “the chasm which the Kantian analysis of judgment left between 
subject and object”’ (CCW 111). They include Green’s opinion that Hume’s Treatise of 
Human Nature and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason ‘form the real bridge between the old 
world of philosophy and the new’, and Sidgwick’s remark in a letter: ‘Oh, how I 
sympathise with Kant! with his passionate yearning for synthesis and condemned by his 
reason to criticism’ (CCW 111, 113). Hill’s objection to language like this is its misplaced 
faith in the synoptic power of urgently-expressed opinion. In singling out ‘real bridge’ as a 
phrase which ‘pre-empts its own verification’, Hill is making an essentially philosophical 
objection – that the connection between two phenomena is presupposed as primary data, as 
an empirical given, rather than as a relation that must be elaborated by reference to the 
phenomena it is connecting. In making this presupposition, Green (Hill implies) is acting 
against his most characteristic intuitions (‘Abstract the many relations from the one thing, 
and there is nothing’).20 Similarly, Sidgwick’s remark is an impassioned but incautious 
articulation of identity. Such phrases, Hill writes, ‘soften Kant’s rigour’ but still 
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 ‘THOMAS HILL GREEN’ (15th October 1973). Leeds University Library, Brotherton Collection MS 20c 
Hill/5/1/75 – T.H. Green, 20. 
20
 Quoted in CCW 109. 
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‘accommodate his rigorous tone’. The difference (Hill writes) is that for Kant, the 
transcendent ‘is a logical, formal presupposition; for the [Victorian Idealists] it is “a pious 
wish”’ (CCW 113). 
Victorian diction on occasion does strike such gluey chords, and traces of a certain 
Schwärmerei are recognisable in these citations.21 But Hill’s selection of these phrases as 
evidence of their authors’ lack of ‘Kant[ian] rigour’ points more to his severe scepticism 
regarding the possibilities offered by language for objective judgement and for the 
intersubjective communication of thought than to any defect in their prose style. When 
syntax is held to such a rigorous standard, thought itself dare barely move for fear of 
censure. That such comparatively inoffensive sentences incur Hill’s disapproval raises the 
ante considerably for poetry’s own form of objectified thought. If it is venal to succumb to 
hyperbole (‘the real bridge’) when impassioned by thought, how may poetry as partisan as 
Hill’s, not to speak of more explicitly political poetry, express its mind without dustily 
enumerating every counter-argument? The moments of atonement which Hill cherishes in 
literary production stand in an uneasy relation to this forbidding stance too. If atonement in 
language-use is attainable, if the moments of abject subjectivity such as Sidgwick’s are to 
be banned, why would any other use of language be considered: a text would need to be an 
unbroken string of such atonements, rendering the very concept meaningless. And if, 
instead, they are distributed serendipitously through the poem, is the rest of the text so 
                                                 
21
 Schwärmerei is usually translated as ‘fanaticism’ in English editions of Kant’s works: ‘[F]anaticism in the 
most general meaning is an overstepping of the bounds of human reason undertaken according to principles’, 
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 110. Coleridge elucidates the word etymologically: ‘Cold and phlegmatic 
in their own nature, like damp hay, they heat and  inflame by co-acervation; or like bees they become restless 
and irritable through the increased temperature of collected multitudes. Hence the German word for 
fanaticism (such at least was its original import) is derived from the swarming of bees, namely, Schwärmen, 
Schwärmerey’. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, or Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life 
and Opinions, ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate, 2 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), i, 
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much lead to set off the glimmering epiphanies? Indeed, though this essay antedates 
Speech! Speech! by decades, it is only in the later poem that the full implications of the 
frustration entailed by Hill’s stance riddle its pages. 
 
3. Popular philosophy as impediment to poetic thought 
 
Frustration engendered by repeated encounters with ‘popular philosophy’ (in the teeth of 
which Hill attempts to preside over his own confession) is partly responsible for the 
profusion of typographical devices in Speech! Speech! Late in Speech! Speech! the 
capitalised phrases are glossed as ‘FORMS OF SUBPOENA’: judgement, then, is central to 
presence of these figures in the text. In its capitalised phrases are often to be found concepts 
inflated and hardened to an objectivity which obstructs the ‘craft of vision’ even as it 
remains this craft’s object. As we have seen, the ‘PEOPLE’ is one such inflated assessor: 
 
 Imagine it great 
unavoidable work; although: heroic 
verse a non-starter, says PEOPLE. 
(SS 1) 
 
On the one hand, the ‘PEOPLE’ are they whose attitudes, feelings and behaviour are 
determined by what Green called ‘popular philosophy’, the reigning conceptuality of the 
day. Insofar as this is true it might be possible to come to an agreement over the lower-limit 
of the receptive arena Hill postulates for his verse: perhaps not in the detail of what this 
‘popular philosophy’ might contain, but at least in rough terms supplied by what we know 
of Hill’s aversions and admirations. Daumier’s sketch ‘On dit que les Parisiens…’ (which 
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is reproduced on the cover of Speech! Speech!) is mentioned in the poem, where Hill 
describes the artist ‘fixing on these faces / torpor, avidity’ (SS 50). Hill has had occasion to 
use Wordsworth’s phrase ‘savage torpor’ more than once, imbuing it with more malice than 
perhaps Wordsworth intended. 22  Indeed, Speech! Speech! makes much of a conceit 
whereby first-person poetic production, often described as ‘confessional’, is reconceived as 
a submission – a confession – to a tribunal with the power to inflict pain. (Hill employs the 
term ‘savage torpor’ in his essay on the martyrdom of the Elizabethan Jesuit and poet 
Robert Southwell.) So on this account the ‘PEOPLE’ is a cultivated middle-class which feels 
itself entitled to certain artistic pleasures. 
Other candidates for Hill’s inflated assessor present themselves. As several passages 
in Speech! Speech! reveal, capitalised words and sentences frequently mimic the inflated 
shock-tactics of newspaper headlines. The ‘PEOPLE’, in this instance, is an abstract entity 
determined by editorial prejudices in turn determined by the analysis of market 
demographics. Or the ‘PEOPLE’ is a character in the drama staged in Hill’s poem, which 
owes much of its allegorical method and some of its dramatis personae to Bunyan’s The 
Pilgrim’s Progress (1678). But can any more detail be provided as to the constitution of 
this abstract group: are they the ‘ordinary men and women’ who are able to invest huge 
quantities of emotional energy into ‘clichés’ in times of national stress, as Hill describes the 
British populace during the Second World War (CCW 537)? Where do they stand on Hill’s 
Whitmanian spectrum between ‘the mean flat average’ and the ‘grand, common stock’ 
(CCW 524)?  
Hill’s essays and lectures on Bradley and Eliot – ‘Dividing Legacies’ (1996), ‘Word 
Value in F.H. Bradley and T.S. Eliot’ (2001) and ‘Eros in F.H. Bradley and T.S. Eliot’ 
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 See, e.g., CCW 24 and TL 27. 
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(2005) – offer a way into thinking about the role of the ‘PEOPLE’ – and of the other 
capitalised phrases – in Speech! Speech! The reference to ‘great / unavoidable work’ in the 
stanza quoted above calls to mind the ‘Work of National Importance’, a category into 
which Hill, in his first lecture on Bradley, says Eliot’s wartime writings were intended to 
fall. If Green’s ‘exemplary’ failure was to allow his language to express the sway of 
‘popular philosophy’, in the Bradley lectures the exemplary failure is T.S. Eliot’s, and the 
role of popular philosophy is usurped by the literary and national climate of the pre-war and 
wartime years.  
Hill’s criticism of Eliot’s literary style begins to be elaborated in an essay of 1996, 
‘Dividing Legacies’.23 This is a review of Eliot’s Clark Lectures and Turnbull Lectures, 
which were published in 1993 as The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry. As with ‘“Envoi 
(1919)”’, Hill’s essay on Pound, Eliot’s literary production is compared with the prevailing 
fashions in the professional literary world, though Pound comes out of the comparison 
much better than does Eliot. Hill arraigns Eliot for adopting, in his Clark and Turnbull 
lectures, a ‘mechanical … mode of discourse exemplified by, if not imitated from, 
Saintsbury, to whom Homage to John Dryden (1924) is dedicated, or Charles Whibley, to 
whose memory The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (1933) is inscribed’ (CCW 
369). Eliot’s position determines his literary style, in spite of his stated prejudices: 
 
I mean by this that Eliot, who, in the correspondence pages of The Athenaeum (27 
February 1920), attacked the ‘apathy’ of ‘the so-called cultivated and civilized 
class’, was to some extent a practitioner of its modes and to a further extent their 
beneficiary. 
(CCW 369) 
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 ‘Dividing Legacies’ was first published in Agenda 34.2 (Summer 1996), 9-28, and subsequently reprinted 
in Style and Faith and CCW. 
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The notion of the public as a class typified by apathy, torpor, and a greed for ‘cultivated’ 
arts is definitional of the poetics of Speech! Speech! The corrosive effect is not the 
privileged property of the reading public, however. Eliot’s contact with professional men of 
letters like Saintsbury and Whibley is subjected to similar treatment in the Bradley lectures. 
Hill writes that a 1928 review of Benda’s La Trahison des clercs betrays ‘the style of a 
clever and ambitious Harvard senior. In June 1928 Eliot was three months short of his 
fortieth birthday’ (CCW 545). Writing of Eliot’s literary journalism, Hill notes (referring to 
Eliot’s description of Bradley’s ‘great gift of style’): ‘For the TLS, around 1927, having a 
great gift of style meant writing like Charles Whibley’ (CCW 551), and writes of Eliot’s 
piece, in the TLS, on Bradley: ‘Saintsbury or Whibley would not have disowned the piece’ 
(CCW 553). As long as he was within range of these writers’ influence, Hill contends, 
Eliot’s judgement suffered. Hence in Hill’s opinion even Eliot’s assessment of Bradley in 
his essay ‘F.H. Bradley’ fails to supply an accurate definition of its subject. For example, 
Eliot writes of Bradley’s ‘scrupulous respect for words, that their meaning should be 
neither vague nor exaggerated’, yet fails to recognise the occasional strategic vagueness of 
Bradley’s prose. As Hill writes, ‘There is a stratum of Bradley’s style, which makes it 
particularly what it is, and in which Eliot shows no sign of interest, which indeed he 
misrepresents in his carefully chosen words of praise’ (CCW 549, 550). Eliot’s judgement 
is in error even when it comes to his most cherished arbiter of judgement, Hill concludes, 
because the expectations of the readers of the TLS extort from him a syntax too ready to 
accommodate the apparent virtues of fluency and expertise. 
 According to this account, the ‘material’ to which the poet must be faithful is, for 
Eliot,  
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no longer primarily language; it is Christian Thought; or the People as he 
understands them. And how he understands people is still very much how he 
understood them in the pub scene of The Waste Land, only now, instead of saying 
“Well, if Albert won’t leave you alone, there it is, I said”, they say “that is how I 
should talk if I could talk poetry”. This is not enhancement but impoverishment, and 
the language of Four Quartets also is language that has suffered impoverishment. 
(CCW 547) 
 
‘Christian Thought’ is the ‘popular philosophy’ to which Eliot was writing: his audience 
was the ‘People’ rather than ‘people’, a fake universal opportunistically swallowing the 
particulars of real lives, and speaking in correspondingly empty phrases. In this essay, the 
target of Hill’s frustration is eloquently delineated; in Speech! Speech!, however, the 
frustration is more exorbitant, more wide-ranging. Obeisance to an idea of the people 
uniformly flattened out by their interpellation as the trial-hardened populace of the Second 
World War is clearly damaging; but how much less so is obeisance to an idea of the people 
as possessed by ‘savage torpor’? 
Despite Hill’s diagnostic accuracy in his criticism, then, it is difficult to get a grip 
on the exact intention behind the capitalised phrases in Speech! Speech! Concepts sublimed 
to the status of immovable objects are sometimes viewed with evident distrust. There is 
some doubt, for example, whether Hill thinks that Christopher Okigbo’s renunciation of 
poetry for ‘POLITICS, ESPIONAGE, AND TRAVEL’ was a commendable action (SS 44). 
Allegory, an art-form in which such hypostasised figures often stand for moral qualities in 
immediately graspable form, would on this account be a severely compromised activity. By 
a similar process to that in which, as Simon Jarvis recounts, allegory turns the pagan gods 
‘into indifferent and arbitrary material which can be made to bear any significance elected 
by the allegorist’, leading to ‘the emergence of a forlorn anti-cosmos whose very substance 
is supposed to be made up of indifference and arbitrariness’, the inflated figures of Speech! 
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Speech! stand, in a universe viewed as complacently arbitrary through Hill’s lens, for 
whatever notion the strongest voice can project: ‘Anomie is as good a word as any; / so 
pick any; who on earth will protest?’ (SS 2).24 Hill, in his lecture on Green, explicitly links 
such hypostasised notions to Green’s critique of popular philosophy. The fluid concepts 
which ‘Man reads back into himself’, and which he encounters in the world as objects with 
‘the fixedness of separate things’ are linked, in the early lecture, with ‘hypostatical entities’ 
which ‘exert a compulsive force’. Misrecognition of the difference between these fixed 
entities and fluid thought leads to ethical disaster: 
 
It is the difference between empirically recognizing, in innumerable concrete 
experiences, that we are to a greater or less extent free; and able, or not able to make 
progress in this or that direction AND fancifully supposing that Freedom + Progress 
are palpable hypostatical entities. This improper crystallization leads to 
aggressiveness and irrationality.25 
 
So Hill’s description of his capitalised figures as ‘FORMS OF SUBPOENA’ enlists popular 
thought in a juridical drama in which this misrecognition is voiced with unmistakable 
bitterness. Each ‘crystallization’ in Speech! Speech! is met, not by an unequivocal nostalgia 
for moral concepts as unchanging entities temporarily forgotten by modernity, nor by a 
nominalist debunking of such universalised forms of comportment, but by the whims of a 
frustrated consciousness for whom such concepts retain their fluidity only with difficulty 
and are all too easily convertible to generalized platitudes: 
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 Simon Jarvis, ‘Mock as Screen and Optic’, Critical Quarterly 46/3 (2004), 1-19, at 9. 
25
 ‘THOMAS HILL GREEN’, 20. 
126 
 
 
 
  Só hate to be caught in mid- 
 gesture, you knów thát, noble CARITAS, 
 proud AMOR – pledge your uncommon thoughts.  
(SS 29) 
 
‘Where charity and love are, there is God’ (‘Ubi caritas et amor, Deus ibi est’) – the 
wholeness invoked by these words of  Christian community (‘Christ’s love has gathered us 
into one’) is caught off-guard, ‘mid- / gesture’ by a principle of form that is intent on 
requiring hallowed figures to ‘pledge [their] uncommon thoughts’ and interrupting this 
work of trust mid-flow.26  Charity and love, inflated to CARITAS and AMOR, have been 
subjected to Hill’s debunking before. In ‘The Mystery of the Charity of Charles Péguy’, 
Hill writes of 
 
 every heroic commonplace, ‘Amor’, 
 ‘Fidelitas’, polished like old armour, 
 stamped forever into the featureless mud.  
(CP 193) 
 
While in ‘Funeral Music’, he asks 
 
 For whom do we scrape our tribute of pain – 
 For none but the ritual King? We meditate 
  A rueful mystery; we are dying 
 To satisfy fat Caritas, those 
 Wiped jaws of stone. 
(CP 71) 
 
Amor and caritas preside over landscapes of warfare, sponsoring the deaths of a populace 
whose philosophy prizes these concepts as spotless trophies in a cabinet. Given Hill’s 
joking reference to Speech! Speech! as a version of Augustine’s City of God, though, we 
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 See Joseph Connelly, Hymns of the Roman Liturgy (London: Longmans, 1957), 88. 
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might expect the references to the varieties of love to be implicated in a more searching 
examination of the possibilities of human and religious love in modernity. It is true that 
‘noble CARITAS, / proud AMOR’ are addressed with less cynicism than in the earlier poems, 
where the historical setting established a context within which these ideas carried a more 
popular weight, and were hence a currency more easily counterfeited, than is the case in 
modernity. And yet their involvement in this history of bloodshed is part of their 
genealogy, and Hill would not be able to rehearse them sincerely without opening himself 
to accusations of the very ‘polishing’ he lambasts in ‘Péguy’. Hence the element of farce in 
the stanza as a whole: 
 
 Shów you something. Shakespeare’s elliptical 
 late syntax renders clear the occlusions, 
 cálls us to account. For what is abundance 
 understand redemption. Whó – where – are our 
 clowns | WET ’N’ DRY: will the photographs 
 reveal all? Só hate to be caught in mid- 
 gesture, you knów thát, noble CARITAS, 
 proud AMOR – pledge your uncommon thoughts. 
 (SS 29) 
 
In the context of the rest of the stanza, caritas and amor – figures of carnal and divine love 
– are twins of the clowns wet’n’dry, snapped by paparazzi mid-performance. The kind of 
Shakespearean atonement noted in ‘Psalms of Assize’ applies here: ‘the entire complex 
dance / of simple atonement / as in a far fetched / comedy / making of sleep and time / 
timeless healers’ (C 63). In Pericles, the ‘far fetched’ plot concludes with Pericles waking 
from sleep to be rejoined with his daughter Marina. This ‘complex dance’ is of a piece with 
the blend of comedic misrecognition and dalliance suggested by Hill’s clowns. This is eros, 
the creative act – the self-interrupting, incomplete circling around judgement, what Hill 
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calls ‘the power that can be felt in language when a word or half-finished phrase awaits its 
consummation’ (CCW 548) – as opposed to eros, the unapproachable completion of AMOR.  
Speech! Speech! thus abandons the clarity of definition we saw in Hill’s essays. If 
thinking must involve the employment of hypostatised concepts, these capitalised phrases 
seem to say, then these concepts must be hedged with enough difficulties to prevent their 
instrumentalisation. Not just characters or phenomena belauded by Hill or otherwise 
esteemed as worthy opponents; not just empty abstractions diverting our attention from the 
real sites of suffering and injustice; the hypostatised words and phrases are markers which 
signify to us the difficulty of judgement as such: they are the necessary but traducing forms 
of representation, forcing us to recognise that in attempting to obtain a purchase upon the 
world, thought necessarily leaves traces of its presuppositions and conceptuality.  
 
*** 
 
For Green, Platonism after Plato solidified to a religion whose conception of the deity was 
transcendent, ec-static; this conception, he wrote, has passed down to ‘those of our own 
day, who, from a metaphysical misapprehension, would efface all definite predicates from 
the language of religion, and reduce it to a prolonged monotonous sigh’.27  Efface the 
predicates and you are left with the monotony of the prayer in the first poem of ‘Psalms of 
Assize’, petitioning ‘a monody / of chloroform’, or with the apotheosis of judgement itself, 
the Advent of the final poem in the sequence: 
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The great O of advent 
        cum sibylla 
 O that nothing may touch 
 this unapproachable 
 levity of the creator 
 (C 66) 
 
The ‘O’ is the eternal, the prophetic, sibylline mouthpiece, and the ground zero of the 
apocalypse. But it is also, as the third line illustrates, the vocative ‘O’ of lament or desire: 
the ‘pious wish’ that reaches too quickly for transcendent purchase upon the whole, but also 
(if we hear the more subjective ‘oh’ in ‘O’) the sigh of the poet who falls into solipsistic 
rumination, the unavoidable condition of thought as such, but also a Coleridgean cul-de-sac 
if one makes the mistake of identifying it with the imagination. The interruption of thought, 
its co-option by previously existing repertoires of mood, preoccupation, or fantasy, and the 
effort to overcome these through ever-newly-begun trials of cognition, is the subject of the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: ‘THE STRIFE OF PHRASE’ 
 
1. Wavering thought 
 
Besides its theological meaning, ‘atonement’ most often has an aesthetic and ethical 
meaning for Hill, and is usually associated with moments at which writing’s range of 
historical, acoustic and communicative aspects resonate with one another. Hill has never 
offered a definition though, and it might help to redefine atonement as the possibility that 
thought might maintain its freedom – its ability to make judgements about the world which 
appear binding and subjective, without losing purchase on its objective situation, without, 
that is, forgetting that there are others to whom this thought must be communicated if the 
thinker isn’t to subside into solipsism. Poetic thought might want to grip its object with the 
tools of autonomous art (the plasticity of form that obeys only its own laws and obtains its 
purchase on the world through the minutest changes, as Hill allows himself at the end of 
The Triumph of Love) but if, as Hill would have it be, it is to be a public art, there are forms 
it must observe, and these forms in turn set a limit to the distance Hill’s writing can put 
between its products and ‘popular philosophy’. In ‘Perplexed Persistence’ these two 
refusals – the refusal of the yearning ‘pious wish’ for transcendence, and the refusal of 
hermetic aestheticism – are given voice in Wordsworth’s poem ‘Resolution and 
Independence’.  
Wordsworth is a significant figure in this debate because of his importance to 
Green’s conception of popular philosophy and how it might be transcended. Towards the 
end of Green’s account of the development of moral thought in England, he surprisingly 
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writes that it is in the work not of a philosopher, but of a poet, that he sees the fulfilment of 
his moral philosophy. ‘In England,’ Green writes, ‘it was specially Wordsworth who 
delivered literature from bondage to the philosophy that had naturalised man’: poetry, 
specifically Wordsworth’s poetry, is seen to be able to provide solutions beyond the reach 
of philosophy.1 Green writes that the ‘practical reconstruction of moral ideas in England’ 
emerged, not from ‘a sounder philosophy’ than those already described in his essay, but 
from three sources: evangelicism, Rousseau’s writings, and ‘the deeper views of life which 
the contemplative poets originated’. Wordsworth in particular, Green thought, was able to 
refute the model according to which humanity stood in a passive, mechanical relationship 
to the world. In Wordsworth’s poetry the subjective bond with the world is reciprocal: 
nature is invested with human thought, is indeed created by this thought, and in its turn 
shapes the growth of human reason. Wordsworth therefore fulfils Green’s conception of 
being in the world, which is predicated upon a transcendent consciousness unifying 
individual consciousness.  
Hill takes the title of his essay on Green from an essay on Wordsworth by A.C. 
Bradley (F.H. Bradley’s brother), in Oxford Lectures on Poetry (1909). Discussing the 
section of ‘Resolution and Independence’ which contains the speaker’s reiterated question 
as to the leech-gatherer’s mode of existence, A.C. Bradley writes of the poem’s ‘perplexed 
persistence, and that helpless reiteration of a question’ (quoted CCW 114). For Bradley, this 
repetitious perplexity risks becoming ‘ludicrous’, a descent from those moments in 
Wordsworth which contain ‘intimation[s] of boundlessness’; but Hill sees in it the very 
movement of thought attempting to establish one kind of objectivity while being bound by 
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 T.H. Green, The Works of Thomas Hill Green, ed. R.L. Nettleship, 3 vols. (London: Longmans, Green & 
Co, 1906), iii, 118. 
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the horizon of another. Every repetition of the question fights against the drag of the mood 
of solipsistic umbrage that accompanies the poem’s evocations of already existing poetic 
thought: ‘We Poets in our youth begin in gladness; / But thereof come in the end 
despondency and madness’.2 The language of yearning, of ‘inspiration’, as Hill terms it, is 
refused, while what might be seen as its remedy (the grounding conversation of the leech-
gatherer) struggles with poetic autonomy (conceived of as a gloomy solipsism) for the 
poet’s attention. 
Hill notes that A.C. Bradley misrecognises Wordsworth’s ‘perplexed persistence’ as 
a weakness and that Bradley compares it unfavourably with the vague oceanic feeling he 
sees elsewhere in Wordsworth’s work. Green too, Hill argues, is prone accurately to 
pinpoint the domain of poetry’s critical force only to be distracted by the language of 
inspiration which it was Wordsworth’s intention to debunk in the early stanzas of 
‘Resolution and Independence’. But Green’s value for Hill inheres in his own repetitious 
perplexity. Melvin Richter defines Wordsworth’s influence upon Green as a transmission of 
the ideology of sentiment, but Hill thinks it rather inheres in a ‘perception of the dual nature 
of self-realisation, the dual nature of communication, that gets into the fibre of Green’s 
work as I think it got into the fibre of Wordsworth’s’.3  What Benjamin Jowett called 
Green’s ‘fuliginous jargon’ stood in contrast to the polished but rote-learned productions of 
Balliol’s students. 4 But as Hill wrote in his unpublished lecture on Green, ‘[w]hen Green is 
                                                 
2
 William Wordsworth, ‘Resolution and Independence’, in The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth, ed. E. 
de Selincourt, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 236. 
3
 ‘THOMAS HILL GREEN’ (15th October 1973). Leeds University Library, Brotherton Collection MS 20c 
Hill/5/1/75 – T.H. Green, 18. 
4
 Quoted in Melvin Richter, The Politics of Conscience: T.H. Green and his Age (London: Weidenfeld, 1964), 
153. 
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dull there is, I think, a “self-denying” intent’.5 The refusal to accommodate the strictures of 
fluent articulation required by examination boards is brought across as metaphor for poetic 
thought in Speech! Speech!, in which the poet is unable to focus on any single thesis: 
 
If I could focus once – Rimbaud’s career, 
Nigerian careerists – on a single factor, 
self-centre of anomie, I might present 
to the examiners in whose shadow I am, 
a plainly disordered thesis which they 
must receive to reject. 
(SS 44) 
 
The ‘examiners’ are now the art-consuming classes, and Hill is fond of quoting the passage 
in Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical Ballads which complains of people who ‘converse with 
us as gravely about a taste for Poetry, as they express it, as if it were a thing as indifferent 
as a taste for rope-dancing, or Frontiniac or Sherry’. 6  Poetic speech that courts the 
accusation of dullness, then, refuses to pander to this taste.  
A lecture by Hill from 1971, headed ‘Romantic Poetry – COLERIDGE’, fills in 
some of the background to his constellation of Wordsworth, Coleridge and Green. Though 
Green isn’t mentioned in this lecture, certain prosodic and syntactic analyses are 
established here which eventually feed into Hill’s work on the philosopher.7 Hill begins 
with a discussion of ‘She Dwelt Among th’Untrodden Ways’ and ‘Old Man Travelling’. 
The latter in particular has a kind of determinate hesitancy: 
 
                                                 
5
 ‘THOMAS HILL GREEN’, 14. 
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 See, e.g., ibid., 6; CCW 99; and see William Wordsworth, ‘Preface’ (1802 version), in Lyrical Ballads, ed. 
R.L. Brett and A.R. Jones (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 301. 
7
  ‘Romantic Poetry – COLERIDGE’. Leeds University Library, Brotherton Collection MS 20c Hill/5/1/49 – 
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  The little hedge-row birds, 
 That peck along the road, regard him not. 
 He travels on, and in his face, his step, 
 His gait, is one expression; every limb, 
 His look and bending figure, all bespeak 
 A man who does not move with pain, but moves 
 With thought8 
 
On the face of it this poem has little in common with the frustrated syntax of Speech! 
Speech! Nothing could less bespeak ‘A man who does not move with pain’ than the 
rhythms of Hill’s poem. In ‘Old Man Travelling’, a steadiness of gaze isolates between 
commas the traveller’s physical features, in lines which synthesise these brief syntactic 
monads in a unifying rhythm – the passage is an epitome of balance. Its vocabulary is 
almost parched where Hill’s is eclectic. Yet the movement of thought that accompanies the 
description of the traveller has certain characteristics in common with the baffled thought 
Hill attributes to Green and by extension to the enterprise of objective judgement in 
general. Writing of this poem, Hill notes that its blank verse has ‘an apparent nullity’, but 
that this is to be attributed to the contrast presented by the eighteenth-century heroic 
couplet: 
 
 even a brief acquaintance reveals that detail + movement have been selected and 
directed with an acute ear for the deliberate hiatus. The power of this poem rests in 
what is not said; in conclusions that are not drawn; but the slow build up to the 
conclusion final statement, though muted to an ear attuned to the electric bristle of 
the C18th couplet is, in fact, managed with a fine rhetorical skill. The bleakness of 
the language is an epitome of the bleakness of the world’s indifference. Old Man 
Travelling inhabits the borderline where pity meets the pitiless and is almost denied 
by it9 
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 William Wordsworth, ‘Old Man Travelling’, in Lyrical Ballads, 150. 
9
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Couched in a prosody that is, Hill argues, deliberately constructed to appear muted to an ear 
accustomed to the heroic couplet, the poem invites the pitiless response which is the 
presupposition of its composition. The ‘deliberate hiatus’ is both fidelity to the observed 
absence of grandiloquence in the old man’s bearing and a refusal on the poet’s part to 
ascend to the pre-prepared fluency of prevailing poetic idiom. Again, two kinds of 
objectivity are in play here: that of the world, a world of war and its effects upon families, 
and that of language, where choices in vocabulary, rhythm and diction are given moral 
weight and come into conflict with already existing moral categories likewise conceived in 
aesthetic terms. The comparison with Green’s ‘Popular Philosophy’ is instructive: pre-
existing modes of thought are seen as counter-productive to actual thought (to the man who 
‘moves / with thought’); preferable are the moods of Wordsworthian ‘obstinate 
questioning’ which refuse confident fluency and court inarticulacy in the service of critical, 
innovative reflection.  
If poetry is the ‘impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all Science’, 
Hill’s later essays on F.H. Bradley invert the relationship: in these it is philosophy offering 
its expressive power to poetry, Bradley’s prose syntax shaping Eliot’s versification.10 Both 
of Hill’s lectures on Bradley and Eliot take as their starting point the occurrence of the 
word ‘somehow’ in the philosopher’s texts. Hill cites Eliot on the ‘purity and concentration 
of purpose’ in Bradley’s prose style. Why, Hill asks, would a word like ‘somehow’, usually 
associated with evasion, vagueness, prevarication and yearning, be a ‘key-term’ in a style 
as pure and concentrated as Eliot took it to be (CCW 533)? As with Hill’s essay on Green, 
the argument here tends towards a conception of literary objectivity that requires any 
purchase on the world to be obtained at the cost of a perceived naivety or vagueness. And 
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 Wordsworth, ‘Preface’, 302. 
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as we shall see, this precondition for literary knowledge is dependent on a philosophical 
tradition, since Bradley’s persistent use of ‘somehow’ is only explicable with reference to 
his idea of the Absolute. In other words, the valorisation of the repetitive or 
unsophisticated, to which Hill attributes so much value for his understanding of poetry, is 
incontestably wedded to an idealist philosophy.  
Bradley’s metaphysics incorporates Hegel’s critique of the Kantian separation 
between truth and nature, or thought and being, a separation which establishes the 
mysterious nature of judgement: how do we bridge the divide between the universal (the 
concept, the subject, thought, logic) and the particular (the sensual, the object, nature)?11 
This is not to say, however, that Bradley conceived of the transition between existence and 
essence as a fait accompli, that nature was a product of reason, or that sensuous particulars 
were identical with the thinking subject. Rather Bradley postulated, as the sole condition 
for the intelligibility of existence (that without which we could have no meaningful 
experience whatsoever), a totality or an Absolute the scope of which renders it unknowable 
by us, but of which we are constituent elements. As far as we are aware of this totality, we 
are able to make judgements, or to form binding experiences with objects. However these 
judgements are never completely successful – there always remains something unknown, a 
gap between subject and object, and Hegel’s absolute knowledge remains elusive.  
Again and again in Bradley’s philosophy the reader encounters partial truths, 
objects only incompletely identified. Yet there is also an ideality in which this identification 
is complete. For example, the ‘how’ or ‘why’ of things ‘holds only so far as a thing is not 
                                                 
11
 In fact Bradley’s view of Hegel echoed that of many nineteenth-century commentators, who viewed Hegel 
as a Neoplatonic panlogicist for whom nature was derivable from thought; Bradley thus distanced himself 
from Hegel on a number of occasions. But according to some current accounts, Bradley was closer to Hegel’s 
thought than he realised. See Robert Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
133-4. 
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complete in itself, and is therefore, on our view, ideally beyond itself. The demand for the 
making good of such imperfection, not as real but as ideal, the completion of the thing in 
idea so as to satisfy us theoretically, is what we mean by the search for a “why” and 
“how”’.12 All judgements are conditional for Bradley: a subject and a predicate cannot be 
connected by fiat, but only through the mediation of some unknown condition: ‘we really 
have asserted subject to, and at the mercy of, the unknown. And hence our judgment, 
always but to a varying extent, must in the end be called conditional’. 13  This is the 
condition, the x which was sought by Kant as the unifying condition of all judgement. In 
the Critique of Pure Reason Kant (dogmatically, in the opinion of his critics) located the 
unifying x in the subject: in the schemata which, Kant admitted, must remain a mystery to 
human understanding. Against this ‘subjective’ idealism, Bradley’s is ‘objective’: 
judgements are resolved not through individual spontaneity but due to an immanent shared 
being of all objects in the world. Though Hill doesn’t make it explicit, it is this x which is 
the ‘somehow’ that Hill enshrines in his essays on Bradley. Bradley writes: ‘When I think 
of contraries I first take them as being somehow separated and yet conjoined. The special 
nature of this “somehow”, this known or unknown condition, will vary in different cases, 
but it here is irrelevant’.14 
When Hill writes of the Bradleian ‘somehow’, then, he is implicitly invoking a 
metaphysical elucidation of the problem of judgement. Hill calls it the ‘somehow of 
realization’ (CCW 534). This, arguably, inflates Bradley’s conception of judgement beyond 
the boundaries sanctioned by his arguments. ‘Realization’ suggests the successful 
                                                 
12
 F.H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 312. 
13
 F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1893), 320. 
14
 Essays on Truth and Reality, 271. 
138 
 
 
 
completion of the act of predication: the moment of identification between subject and 
object. For Hill, this is exemplified in the writer’s discovery of the mot juste:  
 
an author – a poet, say – seeks the precise word: for minutes, hours, days, it fails to 
deliver itself; its absence is a felt presence. Suddenly it is here. How? Somehow it 
has come to be. Somehow is whatever protracted or split second activity of the mind 
makes real the presence of the right word. 
(CCW 533-4) 
 
At first glance it might appear that Hill has changed his mind in the matter of syntactic 
arbitration: whereas before, in the essay on Green, he could endorse Nettleship’s 
description of a consciousness altering in its articulation of an idea, this description of the 
creative process presupposes the existence of an articulation that is waiting to be found. 
The difference, though, depends upon the philosophical position one takes with regard to 
Bradley’s Absolute. If one takes it to be (as mid-twentieth century critics of the British 
Idealists did) ‘some Absolute Experience within which the objects of our ordinary human 
experience would be unbelievably fused and transformed’ – i.e. an a priori resolution of all 
differences, then the somehow is rendered somewhat nugatory, and the ‘right word’ is as 
inevitable and pre-existing as my reading above takes it to be.15 If, on the other hand, the 
somehow is given its proper status as the moment of non-identity in the process of 
identification, of judgement, then Hill’s description of the creative act carries with it an 
implicit recognition that the subject is altered in the discovery and identification of the 
object.  
 By a slender margin, then, Bradley’s metaphysics saves Hill’s conception of the mot 
juste from the dogmatism that converted Pound’s turn of the century aestheticism into a 
                                                 
15
 J.N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination, quoted in Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics, 120. 
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conviction that correct denotation was not only possible but an imperative for good 
government. It does this because, as we have seen, it emphasises the unknown condition of 
all possible judgements, the somehow which precludes the possibility of complete 
identification. Against the promised land of absolute knowledge, Bradley opposes a 
humanistic scepticism. At the end of Principles of Logic occurs a famous passage that 
concludes with a figurative flourish: 
 
I must venture to doubt ... whether truth, if that stands for the work of the intellect, 
is ever precisely identical with fact, or claims in the end to possess such identity. ... 
It may come from a failure in my metaphysics, or from a weakness of flesh which 
continues to bind me, but the notion that existence could be the same as 
understanding strikes as cold and ghost-like as the dreariest materialism. ... Our 
principles may be true, but they are not reality. They no more make that Whole 
which commands our devotion, than some shredded dissection of human tatters is 
that warm and breathing beauty of flesh which our hearts found delightful.16 
 
It’s easy to imagine Hill assenting to this passage, as to others in Bradley’s texts which 
affirm that Bradley has no interest in constructing a systematic metaphysics, and to those 
where he happily admits the limits of human reason with respect to knowledge of the 
Absolute. 17  Here philosophy’s countenance wears an impassioned expression, but it’s 
something more than the reaching after poetic figures or the ‘pious wish’ of Green or 
Sidgwick.  
 
 
                                                 
16
 Bradley, Principles of Logic, quoted in Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics, 133. 
17
 For systematic metaphysics, see Appearance and Reality, p. vii. For the limits of our knowledge, see Essays 
on Truth and Reality, 246, and passim. 
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2. What is a Bradleian poem? 
 
We have seen the failures of which Eliot is accused when he succumbs to the influence of 
the ‘PEOPLE’. But Hill argues that when Eliot writes under the influence of Bradley’s 
philosophy, the philosopher’s syntax donates a metaphysics to the poet’s words which 
mitigates the populism. In Hill’s opinion, Eliot’s poems can be herded into two categories 
definable in terms of Bradley’s philosophy. Hill cites a distinction drawn by Bradley 
between ‘the discursive intelligence and a way, or ways, of apprehension’ and maps it onto 
a ‘distinction in Eliot himself between two major modes of his poetic comprehension’. 
Discursive intelligence is, for Hill, a negative quality, which he associates with The Waste 
Land (before Pound got his hands on it), Four Quartets and Eliot’s plays. On the other 
hand, the ‘way of apprehension’, or what Hill also calls ‘the syntax of becoming’ (CCW 
534), is associated with Ash-Wednesday and ‘Marina’, and is taken to be a positive quality. 
So what exactly does Hill mean when he divides ‘poetic comprehension’ – a phrase which 
puts at stake the very possibility of poetry to obtain purchase on the world – between poetry 
of  ‘discursive intelligence’ and poetry of the ‘way of apprehension’? Since ‘Marina’ in 
particular is, I believe, a touchstone for much of Hill’s thinking about poetry and poetic 
knowledge around this time, I will focus on this poem to elucidate Hill’s terms.  
By ‘discursive intelligence’ I understand the reason as it relates to the common 
sense object world: the intelligence which understands the world as a congeries of discrete 
particulars to be opportunistically generalized according to the intelligence’s 
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presuppositions.18 It might fruitfully be thought of as analogous to Coleridge’s fancy – able 
to operate only upon the ‘fixities and definites’ of what already exists. Years earlier, in 
‘Dividing Legacies’, Hill had described the ‘voice’ of ‘Marina’ as possessing a 
consciousness that its description of Christian conversion runs counter to the orthodox 
vocabulary and discourse of Anglo-Catholic tradition, and he argued that the poem’s 
dallying with the ‘non-active’ (quoting from Bradley’s essay ‘Faith’) is its ‘achievement’ 
(CCW 371). So the ‘discursive intelligence’ whose mode of articulation is refused in 
‘Marina’ is doctrinal or conventionally confessional narrative. This is the very narrative 
that Hill accuses Eliot of opportunistically accommodating in his wartime work. In contrast 
to this work, ‘Marina’, which Hill calls ‘the most Bradleian of all Eliot’s poems’ (CCW 
552) retains a prosody of disorientation which Hill associates with Bradley’s ‘somehow’. 
Eliot’s poem (in a way, I would argue, that bears comparison to the oscillation, in 
‘Resolution and Independence’, between a poetic solipsism and an impassioned interest in 
the world) is described by Hill as oscillating between ‘apprehension as fear and 
apprehension as perception’ (CCW 535). 
Hill begs the question as to the precise textual pivots of this oscillation, and we are 
left to decide for ourselves what constitutes the Bradleian syntax of ‘Marina’. Some clues 
are to be found, though, in Christopher Ricks’s analysis of the poem in T.S. Eliot and 
Prejudice. This is a study Hill cites in ‘Dividing Legacies’, and it has clearly influenced his 
understanding of ‘Marina’. The poem begins: 
 
 
                                                 
18
 See also Jewel Spears Brooker, Mastery and Escape: T.S. Eliot and the Dialectic of Modernism (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1994), 102-3, where Brooker argues that ‘Gerontion’ is motivated by a 
critique of the discursive intelligence as ‘the main cause of the devastation of the early twentieth century’. 
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    What seas what shores what grey rocks and what islands 
What water lapping the bow 
And scent of pine and the woodthrush singing through the fog 
What images return 
O my daughter.19 
 
Quoting the opening line, Ricks demonstrates how syntactic ambiguity performs a 
qualitatively different task than explicitly posed questions. The line, Ricks writes, ‘neither 
asks … “What seas are these?”, nor exclaims “What seas these are!”, nor states, “What seas 
the sirens sang in, is a puzzling question”’.20 Ricks’s point, I think, is that Eliot is not 
chained to an empirical conception of particular seas, as might be suggested by a deictic 
‘these’: what is rather suggested is a very strong sense of being in the world but without 
any confidence as to how one came to be here, or how one came to have the language by 
which we can identify these things in the first place. We might add that the deferral, to the 
fourth line, of the sentence’s verb ‘return’, after the plethora of descriptive detail (‘seas’, 
‘shores’, ‘grey rocks’, ‘islands’, ‘water lapping the bow’, ‘scent of pine’, ‘woodthrush’) 
effectively duplicates the Bradleian ‘somehow’ – the deferral of judgement resting between 
‘What’ and ‘return’; and that the deletion of all punctuation from these lines, the lack of 
commas between the itemised phenomena and their interrogative adjectives, creates a 
continuum of objects set free, floating, one might say (alluding to Bradley’s essay on 
‘Floating Ideas and the Imaginary’) somewhere above actual lived experience, though not 
above reality.21 
                                                 
19
 T.S. Eliot, ‘Marina’, in Collected Poems 1909-1962 (London: Faber and Faber, 1974), 115. 
20
 Christopher Ricks, T.S. Eliot and Prejudice (London: Faber and Faber, 1988), 230. 
21
 See Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, 31: ‘Then there is my present actual world, and the ambiguous 
existence of what has been and is about to be’. In this essay Bradley argues that no such thing as floating 
ideas exist: that ideas are always tethered to some ‘ground ... of which they are adjectives’ (42) but that this 
ground is not necessarily the ‘felt whole’ of a single individual’s experience. 
143 
 
 
 
 Bradley’s refusal to admit the existence of mere floating ideas – ideas which do not 
have some connection with reality – constitutes a major element in Hill’s apology for 
poetry. In Bradley’s contention that no ‘idea’ is a mere idea, that it is ‘real somehow’, Hill 
reads a claim for the objectivity of poetry, its qualification of reality:  
 
Like an idea, or an action, or a person, the poem, coming into being, qualifies 
Reality, which is not to say that it necessarily gives value to Reality or gives real 
value. … In this factor stands our main justification for devoting time to the 
discussion of poetry. 
(CCW 552) 
 
If all ideas are ‘somehow’ adjectives of some reality (i.e. qualify reality though not 
necessarily a portion of reality accessible to we ‘finite centres’, to use Bradley’s phrase), 
then all such ideas, including all artefacts popularly assumed to be mere products of the 
imagination, like poems, can be said to have some arbitrative force.  
Of course the degree to which we accept such an assertion depends upon our 
acceptance of Bradley’s presupposition of an Absolute in which all such adjectival 
bondings are finally realised. This, in itself, cannot be demonstrated: as Bradley has 
written, it must be an act of faith.22 Bradley’s Absolute raises two poles between which we 
might think of Hill’s work as shuttling, each with its associated risk. One risk is that faith in 
Bradley’s transcendent unity is translated in aesthetic terms into a monochrome uniformity, 
every particular centred on and measured by an a priori standard; another is that reverence 
for this standard might invoke a nominalism unwilling to rise above appearance to look for 
                                                 
22
 Absolute Reality, Bradley writes, is not visible to us in detail, and ‘So far as the detail goes, we everywhere 
… may be said to rest upon faith’. Essays on Truth and Reality, 344. More generally, the given presupposition 
of philosophy per se is thought to be accepted upon faith: ‘Philosophy demands, and in the end it rests on, 
what may fairly be termed faith. It has, we may say, in a sense to presuppose its conclusion in order to prove 
it’. Essays on Truth and Reality, 15. 
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a possible universality. Again, as with Hill’s appropriation of Bradley’s concept of 
judgement, he risks inflating Bradley’s precepts beyond their warranted scope. So while 
Bradley explicitly forbids the conflation of the Absolute and God (see ‘On God and the 
Absolute’, Essays on Truth and Reality, 428-47), Hill comes close to making this 
conflation himself: ‘if one had not found him already, one might well come to God through 
reading Bradley’s Appearance and Reality’ (CCW 535). As with Coleridge’s blaze of light 
or Green’s ‘pious wish’ effacing a ‘Kant[ian] rigour’, Hill’s adherence to philosophy has its 
limits. 
 
3. Optional / obligatory music and its role in judgement 
  
Like many of the poems in Canaan, the prosody of ‘Psalms of Assize’ is characterised by a 
hesitancy and fluidity that bears comparison to what Hill calls, with reference to ‘Marina’, 
the ‘syntax of becoming’. We can see this in particular in the set of poems at the beginning 
of Canaan bearing titles, like ‘Of Coming into Being and Passing Away’, ‘De Anima’, 
‘Whether the Virtues are Emotions’, and ‘Whether Moral Virtue Comes by Habituation’, 
derived from metaphysical speculation. These poems make instrumental use of spacing and 
conjunctions wrought by a spareness of punctuation to produce a prosody that owes 
something to Charles Olson’s ‘open field’ (‘De Anima’ refers to ‘Bethlehem the open 
field’) but more to Eliot’s ambiguous versification in ‘Marina’. In ‘Of Coming into Being 
and Passing Away’, Hill writes of 
 
 visions of truth or dreams 
 as they arise –  
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   to terms of grace 
 where grace has surprised us 
 (C 4) 
 
recalling the ‘images’ that ‘return’ to the apprehension of the speaker in ‘Marina’, shade-
like through the fog, ‘By this grace dissolved in place’. Obedient to Coleridge’s ‘drama of 
reason’, these metaphysical poems attempt to preserve multiple perspectives: the white 
space exposed in lines which are pushed to the edge of the poem, and the absent 
punctuation that makes available multiple interpretations, are part of this. In a discussion of 
the poem ‘Of Coming into Being and Passing Away’ (the title translates Aristotle’s De 
Generatione et Corruptione), Peter McDonald writes that the gaps ‘present us with a series 
of turning-points, or pivots, where one way of reading, or hearing, the lyric measure 
changes into another way of so hearing or reading the lines.’23  In this final section I want 
to explore the relationship between Hill’s shifting attitude towards the constituted first-
person pronoun and the kinds of reading enjoined by the relatively open forms of Canaan 
and the stricter prosodic obbligato of Speech! Speech! 
The second poem in ‘Psalms of Assize’ carries an epigraph from Colet’s 
annotations to Ficino which translates as ‘No man can serve both masters [the intellect 
(pointing to the divine) / the senses (operating in corporeal nature)] and go up and down at 
the same time; you have either to go up or go down’.24 Hill’s reluctance to accept this stark 
choice is shown in the first line: ‘Ascend through declension’: 
 
Non potest quisquam utriusque servire, simulque ascendere et descendere;  
aut ascendas aut descendas oportet… 
                                                 
23
 Peter McDonald, Serious Poetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 192. 
24
 Sears Jayne, John Colet and Marsilio Ficino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 120. 
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Ascend through declension 
the mass the matter 
the gross refinement 
     gravitas 
everlasting obsession 
vanity by grace 
the starred 
       misattributed 
works of survival 
attributes even now 
hallowing consequence 
chants of the trace elements 
the Elohim 
       unearthly music 
given to the world 
message what message 
          doubtless 
the Lord knows 
when he will find us 
                    if ever 
we shall see him 
with the elect 
                      justified 
         to his right hand 
(C 61) 
 
Rather than ‘efface all definite predicates’ (as Green thought Neoplatonism was wont to 
do), this poem recognises the necessity to restore predicates, to ‘ascend’ to a universality 
through ‘declension’: through a submersion in particulars, but also through grammatical 
analysis. (Note the contrast to the consensus imposed by the descending Gabriel in the first 
poem of the sequence.) The first few lines mimic this movement between synoptic grasp 
and gravitational lapse: each line begins with a rise from an unstressed to a stressed syllable 
and ends with a fall from a stressed to an unstressed syllable, before sinking on the dactyl 
‘gravitas’. Perhaps suspecting that such radical commensurability of word with spirit is too 
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easy, Hill connects typography with theology in a weak joke at the poem’s conclusion. 
Meanwhile this neat commensurability is complicated in the intervening lines. They 
sidestep the conventional subordinating tools used in the construction of meaning, and 
produce a catalogue reminiscent of the disorientated breathlessness of the opening of 
‘Marina’, though with a cynical impatience added to it (‘seas what shores’ [‘Marina’]; 
‘message what message’ [‘Psalms of Assize’]).  
Within the carefully delimited cadential space of the poem’s short lines, however, 
impatience is subordinated to a measured syllabic music: in Speech! Speech!, by contrast, 
impatience forces the measure into exorbitant patterns. Within these exorbitant patterns, 
though, Hill reduces the scope for the reader’s interpretation by means of a series of 
typographical markers. Where, in Canaan, punctuation is conspicuously sparse and 
meaning is only discernible through the fog of white space subsuming the words on the 
page, Speech! Speech! insists on its meaning through the use of diacritical marks that 
hammer home every cadence with dogmatic urgency. Uncomfortable questions are raised 
by this change in comportment. Does it initiate a stentorian poetics that shouts down 
contingency and ambiguity in the name of clarity of expression? Does it push to the limits 
of credibility the reader’s trust in the poem’s voice on purpose, so that a realisation of the 
problems inherent to judgement can come to consciousness? Or does it simply represent the 
delivery of a sermon de haut en bas, to an audience that it is deemed cannot be trusted with 
more nuanced argument? 
Two kinds of diacritical marks affect the reading of the text: truncated vertical lines 
create caesurae or unexpected fissures within a line, and stress-marks prescribe the author’s 
preferred rhythm: 
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You want I should write. Write whát | I ask.  
(SS 9) 
 
Capitalised words, as we have seen, signify the abbreviated telegraphese of newspaper 
headlines, annunciations of important figures from history and mythology, or esteemed 
works: 
 
    Rate zero on RECENT PAST 
 AS DISTRESSED SUBTEXT. 
 (SS 9) 
 
                  or perhaps three-headed 
 PUBLIUS, who cannot now be released 
 from the FEDERALIST PAPERS 
 (SS 22) 
 
The diacritical marks are disturbing because it is difficult not to find in them, as David-
Antoine Williams does, a ‘tyrannical’ aspect, a dispiriting lack of trust in the reader and a 
consequent simplification of cadence.25 This approach is puzzling because everything in 
Hill’s contemporary critical work suggests that a creative fiat imposed highhandedly upon a 
poem’s content is an act of hubris resulting from ethical error. One would expect these 
accents, then, to be present in lines which are ambiguous and require explicit stress-marks 
to indicate the sense intended, or to indicate idiosyncratic stress-patterns where Hill intends 
to diverge from the expected sense, or to place particular emphasis. However, the frequency 
of cases conforming to the former principle is low, and where stress marks are present they 
usually conform to the pattern of intonation one would expect given the syntax. Where, for 
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 David-Antoine Williams, Defending Poetry: Art and Ethics in Joseph Brodsky, Seamus Heaney, and 
Geoffrey Hill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 209. 
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example, Hill writes: ‘Thís / is what we have cóme to: ash and shivered / glass’, the accents 
only bring awkwardly to the fore a stress pattern which is natural to the sense (SS 57).   
As we have seen, the confrontation of poetic thought with public reception is 
marked for Hill by a painful recognition that poetry must bear the traces of (what he sees 
as) objectified cognition’s torpor and greed in order even to be recognised as thought as 
such, while simultaneously attempting to preserve those elements of imaginative expression 
which are non-identical with that world. This is confirmed in Hill’s claims to see 
‘possibilities of strain’ in the fact that Green was bound to a ‘two-fold commitment’: first to 
exemplify his reiterative ethics of language to students too accustomed to fluency; second, 
‘As an educational reformer Green’s commitment was to the revelation of the freedom of 
the word for those who were, in Wordsworth’s sense, “shy and unpractised in the strife of 
phrase”’.26 Certainly Hill’s diacritics mimic a prosodic didacticism (or what I have called 
prosodic obbligato), but where Hopkins wrote that his diacritical accent was intended to 
signify metrically ‘doubtful cases’, Hill’s accents often merely reiterate expected phrasing; 
where they don’t, little is gained but a worked-for awkwardness.  
A better way of reading the diacritical marks in Speech! Speech! and Hill’s other 
recent work is as a limiting device in the face of the strain produced by the different kinds 
of objectivity public speech is involved with. As an initial point of contrast, consider what 
Giorgio Agamben, describing what he views as poetry’s unique identifying characteristics, 
the caesura and enjambment, writes about the restorative, expressive capacities of these 
hiatuses: 
 
                                                 
26
 ‘THOMAS HILL GREEN’, 19. 
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The only things that can be done in poetry and not in prose are the caesura and the 
enjambment ... The poet can counter a syntactic limit with an acoustic and metrical 
limit. This limit is not only a pause; it is a noncoincidence, a disjunction between 
sound and meaning. This is what Paul Valéry meant in his very beautiful definition 
of the poem: ‘the poem, a prolonged hesitation between sound and meaning’.27 
 
Hill’s diacritical marks, which are the thickened, rigidified caricatures of Valéry’s 
‘prolonged hesitation’, leave too deep an indentation in the poem’s surface, giving a 
stupefied appearance to poetic stress as the caesura is co-opted into Hill’s horrific object-
world, which then denies it of all but the most hoarse expressive power. Caesurae, in 
Speech! Speech!, are dislodged, thrown askew, and are often superannuated stand-ins for 
punctuation or line-breaks: 
 
                                     I have come 
 so far | anarchy must be in it: 
 flames ransacking the last scene   
(SS 35) 
 
 INORDINATE | wording of Common Prayer | 
 find here dilated.  
(SS 26) 
 
There is a sense that, if the caesurae place limits upon rigid forms of thought objectified in 
language, those forms are recognised by the author to be his own. In the first of the 
passages quoted above, the caesurae is a kind of fire-curtain blocking the dissemination of 
Hill’s sexual pun to the rest of the stanza: without the vertical line separating ‘so far’ from 
‘anarchy’, the reader’s uncertainty about whether ‘so far’ is to be applied to ‘anarchy must 
be in it’ allows ‘I have come’ to stand, at least for a moment, on its own. Rather than 
hesitating between sound and meaning, the caesura here reinforces their coincidence.  
                                                 
27
 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Difference and Repetition: On Guy Debord’s Films’, tr. Brian Holmes, in Tanya 
Leighton (ed.), Art and the Moving Image: A Critical Reader (London: Tate, 2008), 328-33, at 331-2. 
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 In the second quoted passage, the caesurae perform more complex activities, though 
their presence bespeaks a scepticism as to their efficacy. ‘Inordinate’, a word which, in the 
Book of Common Prayer, is predicated of immoral behaviour, corruption, and love of 
wealth, is rendered in resonant capitals. If we take ‘inordinate’, following Hill’s advice, as a 
‘STAGE DIRECTION’, that is, as a verb, the OED offers one example of its use, from 1646: 
‘To deprave the will, to inordinate the affections, to perturb the passions.’ This state of 
affective inordinacy – of the corruption or removal of limits or measures – we now ‘find 
here dilated’, where ‘dilated’ carries multiple meanings: on the point of parturition 
(consonant with Hill’s repeated complaints about modernity’s prolific abuse of measure); 
diffused throughout culture; or expanded upon as the theme of Hill’s poem. As if to 
compensate for, or to show the desperate lengths necessary to combat, the lack of measure, 
Hill’s vertical strokes box in ‘wording of Common Prayer’, which however still stands in a 
relation of ambiguity to the first word – is it the wording of the Book of Common Prayer 
which is inordinate, in that its strictures are incommensurable with modernity? 
While I believe that there is reason to despair when faced with the hoarse prosody 
of Speech! Speech!, in that the diacritics probably represent at least in part a momentary 
loss of faith in the possibility of a receptive reader, I will argue that by paying attention to 
some texts on prosody with which Hill was familiar, we can reconstruct a less pessimistic 
account of the poem. Poetic judgement comes into being as a category to be reflected on 
thanks to these diacritical marks: they call into question the sufficiency of verse’s formal 
resources (which until now has for the most part been free of this typographic exoskeleton) 
at the same time as they threaten to undermine and flatly deny the reader’s own role in 
interpretation (by stridently imposing their own rhythmic emphases). 
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Those searching for precedents for Hill’s diacritics naturally look to Gerard Manley 
Hopkins. (Hopkins, as Hill notes in ‘Perplexed Persistence’, was a pupil of T.H. Green’s.)28 
However, I want to argue that there exist, as well as Hopkins, two significant theories by 
two American poets, both of which Hill would have known, which bear directly upon the 
diacritical marks. 
Robert Frost is the author of the first theory. Hill’s first essay on Eliot and Bradley, 
‘Dividing Legacies’, was published in 1996, just a year before he started the composition of 
Speech! Speech!29 In it, as we have seen, Hill quotes Christopher Ricks’s study T.S. Eliot 
and Prejudice, specifically the subsection ‘The sound of sense’ in chapter five, ‘An English 
Accent’. The chapter begins with Robert Frost’s principle that there should be built into any 
literary utterance the exact acoustic ‘posture’ proper to its sense: ‘Never if you can help it 
write down a sentence in which the voice will not know how to posture specially’. This is 
what he calls ‘the sound of sense’, and it occupies a space between ‘sense without the 
sound of sense’ (mere communicative prose) and ‘the sound of sense without sense’ 
(nonsense verse and private languages): in other words, the very poles of objective and 
subjective utterance Hill seeks to steer between. Ricks cites an anecdote in which an actress 
asks Frost whether ‘he really believed there was only one way to read a good poem. Yes he 
did’. She counters that if that were the case it would be impossible for actors to interpret 
Shakespearean dialogue in different ways. Frost’s response was that ‘if such ambiguities 
occurred in any of Shakespeare’s plays, the fault must lie with Shakespeare as poet’.30 Even 
as unqualified an expression of writerly authority as this is not complete anathema to Hill. 
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 The first notebook for Speech! Speech! is labelled ‘17: Work in Progress 28-10-97 – 4-4-98. Drafts & 
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 Quoted in Ricks, T.S. Eliot and Prejudice, 154-5. 
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And yet, as Ricks goes on to recount, Eliot would have seen in Frost’s principle an 
insufficient attention to the twofold aspect of the dramatic in poetry: lyric, Eliot wrote, can 
either rely on the supplemental musicality of ‘the lute or other instrument’, or contain, as in 
Donne, ‘all its possible music’ in itself. 31  Continuing the analogy with drama, Ricks 
reformulates it thus: ‘the dramatic is animated either by building stage directions in or by 
positively building them out. The posture proper to the sentence is one kind, a tonal kind, of 
stage direction.’32 
Ricks then gives an example from Antony and Cleopatra (cited by Hill in ‘Dividing 
Legacies’), and quotes approvingly Eliot’s praise for Shakespeare’s addition of ‘Ah soldier’ 
to a line derived from Thomas North’s translation of Plutarch. As Ricks says of this line, ‘it 
is definitely and unmistakably indicated that here Shakespeare is not definitely and 
unmistakably indicating the posture proper to the cry, the expression on the face of the 
word’.33 The range of senses ‘Ah soldier’ can potentially constitute is left to the reader to 
decide among: responsibility is delegated away from the text.  
By contrast, the diacritics in Speech! Speech! retract that responsibility. As we have 
seen, Hill explicitly writes, in what must be an echo of Ricks’s discussion, ‘CAPITALS | 
STAGE DIRECTIONS’ (SS 59). If this is true of the capitalised words, then it is doubly so of 
the diacritics. No supplemental musicality is permitted by them. But if this is so, do these 
lines, as Eliot wrote, contain within themselves ‘all [their] possible music’, as he says 
Donne’s do? Surely not: musical variety is abjured in these lines, and the autonomy Eliot 
finds in Donne’s verse is cruelly caricatured in the countenance of inflexible insistence they 
present. In fact, just as for Ricks ‘[t]he fact that the tone is not definitely indicated, indeed 
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is definitely not, might be something dramatized within the character’, the hectoring voice 
these accents give rise to might equally be read as a dramatic effect.34 It appears to be a 
formal principle in Hill’s text that form interrupts its own apprehension of coherence in the 
despoliation of its most cherished repertoire of balanced cadences and rhetorical nuances. 
A second American precedent for this poem’s principle of form is arrived at by way 
of some lines on the final page of Speech! Speech!, where Hill identifies the model behind 
his stress-patterning: ‘English Limper | after the English Sapphic’ (SS 60). Peter McDonald 
observes the connection between the OED’s citation for ‘Limper’ – ‘Obadiah Walker in 
1673, on “Archilochus and Hipponax two very bad poets”’ and the multiple ways in which 
the broken rhythms ‘announce and enact Hill’s struggle, an encounter the consequence of 
which is to lame the lyric self’. 35  However there is a precise connection to another 
modernist long poem, William Carlos Williams’s Paterson, book one of which ends with a 
quote from John Addington Symonds: 
 
In order apparently to bring the meter still more within the sphere of prose and 
common speech, Hipponax ended his iambics with a spondee or a trochee instead of 
an iambus, doing thus the utmost violence to the rhythmical structure. These 
deformed and mutilated verses were called χωλίαµβοι or ίαµβοι σκάζοντες (lame or 
limping iambics). They communicated a curious crustiness to the style. The 
choliambi are in poetry what the dwarf or cripple is in human nature. Here again, by 
their acceptance of this halting meter, the Greeks displayed their acute aesthetic 
sense of propriety, recognizing the harmony which subsists between crabbed verses 
and the distorted subjects with which they dealt – the vices and perversions of 
humanity – as well as their agreement with the snarling spirit of the satirist. 
Deformed verse was suited to deformed morality.36 
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Hill would have been aware of this poem, as one blogger has pointed out, having 
supervised Margaret Glynne Lloyd’s PhD thesis on it in the seventies.37 Lloyd’s study cites 
a letter from Williams to John Holmes in 1952, in which he describes how the rational 
structures of classical prosody can be plundered and deployed only in fragmentary form, 
and how the resulting poem must show the marks of this process: 
 
What shall we say more of the verse that is to be left behind by the age we live in if 
it does not have some of the marks the age has made upon us, its poets? ... They 
should be horrible things, those poems. To the classic muse their bodies should 
appear to be covered with sores. They must be hunchbacked, limping. And yet our 
poems must show how we have struggled with them to measure and control them. 
And we must SUCCEED even while we succumb.38 
 
‘To the classic muse their bodies should appear to be covered with sores’:  the presence, in 
Hill’s late texts, of scattered stress-marks and truncated caesurae shows how literally he 
takes Williams’s injunction that modern poems ‘must show how we have struggled with 
them to measure and control them’. Rather than (or as well as being) patronising directives 
to a readership assumed in advance to be cloth-eared, Hill’s diacritics are more crucially 
indices of the extent to which he despairingly conceives of traditional prosody as 
incommensurable with modernity: 
 
 EQUITY, ELIGIBILITY, CULPABILITY, 
 heard through a cloud – acoustic din – the rage; 
 that THEATRE OF VOICES, nóble | if nót 
                                                 
37
 See Margaret Glynne Lloyd, William Carlos Williams’s Paterson: A Critical Reappraisal (Cranbury, NJ: 
Associated University Presses, Inc, 1980), 13: ‘I am deeply grateful to Mr. Geoffrey Hill for being such a 
conscientious and inspiring supervisor of my Ph.D. thesis on Paterson at the University of Leeds, England. 
This book has benefited immeasurably from his countless invaluable suggestions and rigorous standards’, and 
Name to Conjure, <http://nametoconjure.blogspot.com/2009/02/solved.html>, accessed 16/12/2010. 
38
 Margaret Glynne Lloyd, William Carlos Williams’s Paterson, 155. 
156 
 
 
 
 ridiculous.  
(SS 52) 
 
Ennobled by capitalisation, the ‘THEATRE OF VOICES’ is the vehicle for Hill’s moral 
categories, though a sense of resignation is made explicit in Hill’s ascription of the 
‘ridiculous’ to this choice of vehicle. (In keeping with Hill’s habit of referring to the 
production of late twentieth-century music, though, ‘THEATRE OF VOICES’ might also refer 
to the vocal ensemble founded in 1990 by Paul Hillier.) If ‘our word is our bond’, such 
sureties are made more difficult to legislate for in the presence of the ‘acoustic din’ which 
renders traditional prosody quaint, and which intrudes upon the balanced proportion of 
classical syntax, as we see in these lines. For the swiftly sketched nouns – ‘acoustic din’, 
‘the rage’ – are set down between hyphens as afterthoughts that amplify or qualify ‘a cloud’ 
(assuming, that is, that ‘EQUITY, ELIGIBILITY, CULPABILITY’ are what are heard, and are not 
the things doing the hearing). Following the semicolon, signalling further amplification, 
‘that THEATRE OF VOICES’ floats uncertainly above its referent – is it the trio of moral 
categories it refers to, or the ‘cloud – acoustic din – the rage’? Ending on the hunchbacked 
‘nóble  if nót’, with its doubly redundant caesura (both pushed to the edge of the line, and 
doing the work a comma could just as easily do), and doubly redundant ‘ó’, the line limps 
to a lank conclusion, only just tautened by the line-break connecting it to ‘ridiculous’. In 
effect, Hill seems to be saying that the drawing out from ‘acoustic din’ – from the 
articulated object world that extorts its own syntax from the poet who wants to obtain a 
purchase upon it – of moral categories with what Hill would term ‘intrinsic value’ is a 
noble and perhaps a ridiculous occupation. Noble, because Hill believes the duty of poetry 
is to delineate the terms of objective judgement and, on occasion, to produce the epiphanies 
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in which that judgement is made manifest: to render clear Frost’s ‘posture’ proper to the 
sense. Ridiculous, because this posture is not quite the poet’s own: in this case, equity, 
eligibility and culpability, though once concepts enshrined in religious, moral and legal 
maxims, now each carry less exalted connotations drawn, in the main, from the world of 
commerce. In burdening the obvious stresses with superfluous accents, there is a hint of the 
enforced simplification Hill saw in Green’s public lectures. Hill is risking the awkwardness 
and stupidity of these accents in order to point up the yawning gap between his text and its 
audience, which despite his poetic ambitions, and because of them, must be included in his 
act of judgement. 
 
4. Ephemeral thought 
 
In the previous chapter, I read the beginning of section 57 of Speech! Speech! as a poem 
which deflates its own earnest petitions to universalised notions like amor. 
 
Shów you something. Shakespeare’s elliptical 
 late syntax renders clear the occlusions, 
 cálls us to account. For what is abundance 
 understand redemption. Whó – where – are our 
 clowns | WET ’N’ DRY: will the photographs 
 reveal all? Só hate to be caught in mid- 
 gesture, you knów thát, noble CARITAS, 
 proud AMOR – pledge your uncommon thoughts. 
 (SS 29) 
 
However, if the poet’s request that amor ‘pledge [its] uncommon thoughts’ parodically 
carries with it the tone of a zealot endowed with undue confidence in the genius of his idol, 
we catch only half of this poem’s understanding of universals if we see its deployment of 
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them simply as ideology critique. Above and beyond this, Hill displays a real faith in the 
possibility of trust in the speech-act. Continuing his petition to love (‘proud AMOR – pledge 
your uncommon thoughts’), Hill writes: 
 
 See all as miracle, a natural graft, 
 as mistletoe ravelling the winter boughs 
 with nests that shine. And some recensions 
 better than thát I should hope. 
(SS 29) 
 
Requiring of amor a synoptic objectivity (‘See all’), Hill continues with a reminder that, as 
he curtly suggested in ‘Psalms of Assize’, such objectivity must ‘Ascend through 
declension’. Symbols of admixture and confusion (‘ravelling’, ‘graft’) combine to produce 
objects that ‘shine’ (reminiscent of the testimony of Green’s students cited in ‘Perplexed 
Persistence’). It’s in these passages of natural observation that the strident typography is 
mute, evidence of a certain trust in the performative efficacy of language. As this stanza 
moves to the next, Hill explores the possibility of this trust, having at the outset of the poem 
mooted the possibility that he might have to ‘persist without sureties’ (SS 2). The stanza 
begins with a line that appears to mock the hope of the kind of ‘recension’ he mentioned in 
the previous line: 
 
 Better  than that I should hópe, assign me 
 to bond with some other fatedness 
 coveted as free will. I can read 
 dry-eyed – C. Brontë cleared it with a word –  
 Olney’s own castaway en famille. Manic 
 depressive, wrote about hares. PERFORCE 
 hís word. Better than that I should hope: my 
 word is my bond, my surety, my entail.  
(SS 29) 
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The poem Hill reads ‘dry-eyed’ is William Cowper’s ‘The Castaway’, a poem written in 
Cowper’s final years, and which deploys an incident in George Anson’s narrative of global 
circumnavigation as an analogy of Cowper’s sense of abandonment by God. In Charlotte 
Brontë’s Shirley Caroline Helstone reads the poem out loud to her friend Shirley Keeldar, 
‘with a steady voice’ marvelled at by the auditor. Caroline replies that ‘no tear blistered the 
manuscript of “The Castaway”. I hear in it no sob of sorrow, only the cry of despair’.39 
Caroline’s demand of poetry is that it fulfil the kind of therapeutic role for the writer she 
believes ‘The Castaway’ performed for Cowper: ‘It seems to me, Shirley, that nobody 
should write poetry to exhibit intellect or attainment. Who cares for that sort of poetry? 
Who cares for learning – who cares for fine words in poetry?’40 Cowper’s poem, notable 
for its absence of poetic ornament, eschews a lachrymose attitude towards his fate in a way 
which might have been approved by the Coleridge whom Hill cites as writing, in Anima 
Poetae, ‘Poetry which excites us to artificial feelings makes us callous to real ones’.41 As 
one critic notes, ‘Wordsworth felt that Cowper and Burns were the two “great” authors who 
helped him to counteract the “mischievous” and extravagant manner of contemporary 
English and German writers’.42 ‘The Castaway’ is hence linked, for Hill, with the attack on 
the popular taste for certain kinds of poetry that occupied Wordsworth’s ‘Preface’, and with 
T.H. Green’s Wordsworthian critique of popular philosophy.  
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 ‘PERFORCE’, in Hill’s stanza, is capitalised, alerting us to its significance in the 
poem’s arrangement of  hypostatised judgement-concepts. It is taken from the fourth stanza 
of Cowper’s poem: 
 
 He shouted: nor his friends had fail’d  
     To check the vessel’s course, 
 But so the furious blast prevail’d, 
     That, pitiless perforce,  
 They left their outcast mate behind43 
 
‘Pitiless’ is the word Hill used in his description of Wordsworth’s poem ‘Old Man 
Travelling’: ‘The bleakness of the language is an epitome of the bleakness of the world’s 
indifference. Old Man Travelling inhabits the borderline where pity meets the pitiless and is 
almost denied by it’. It would appear that for Cowper at the time he composed ‘The 
Castaway’ (his last poem in English) amor and caritas could not be thought of as sureties in 
the implacable face of the doctrine of reprobation. Perhaps Hill could give assent to the 
sense of ineluctability with which others in the community are ‘pitiless perforce’ – are 
driven to act in a way contrary to community spirit by forces (whether they be religious, 
social, or economic) beyond their control. But for Cowper, ‘No voice divine the storm 
allay’d, / No light propitious shone’, whereas Hill’s repeated perceptions of gleaming, 
shining objects offer a rebuke to Cowper’s solipsistic darkness.  
Hence, perhaps, the note of repudiation sounded in Hill’s emphasis: ‘PERFORCE / hís 
word’: Cowper’s word, not Hill’s. In place of the despair of disappointed evangelism, Hill 
retains faith in language as a sphere of reconciliation: ‘Better than that I should hope: my / 
word is my bond, my surety, my entail’. In this, the third iteration of the clause ‘Better than 
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that I should hope’, the diacritics have dropped away (the first two read: ‘better than thát I 
should hope’ and ‘Better  than that I should hópe’). This final recension abjures the 
‘PERFORCE’ of Cowper’s despair in the face of objective obduracy, as well as Hill’s 
despairingly strident typography: the clause now vibrates with an alternating frequency 
between its two predecessors. Hill’s ‘surety’, that which allows for accuracy, trust, and, the 
word hints, a legal right to his position in the community, is language which, like this final 
recension, hums with the possibilities of alternative senses, intonations and emotions, and 
by retaining some freedom among the various ways the meaning could be sounded 
obtaining an objective standpoint vis-à-vis the world. 
As Hill’s allusion to the elliptical syntax of Shakespeare’s late works in the previous 
stanza suggests, his own contorted syntax in Speech! Speech! is a method of ‘render[ing] 
clear the occlusions’: of both bringing to light those elements in the world which block the 
free flow of thought, and of recognising them, of rendering them transparent (perhaps with 
a view to future new forms of conceptuality). What does Hill have in mind when he writes 
of ‘Shakespeare’s elliptical / late syntax’? An indication is provided by the strange 
repetition, in Speech! Speech!, of a fragment of German, variously broken across the line (I 
quote from section 79): ‘Mein Ariel, hast du, / der Luft, nur ist…?’ (SS 40). The words are 
those of Schlegel’s translation of The Tempest, perhaps (given the prevalence of musical 
motifs in Hill’s late works), taken from Frank Martin’s setting of the translation in the 
opera Der Sturm (1956).44 Schlegel’s words translate these lines, with Prospero addressing 
Ariel, who has returned from the captives and whose narration of their state is the incentive 
for Prospero to release them: 
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 Hast thou, which art but air, a touch, a feeling 
 Of their afflictions, and shall not myself, 
 (One of their kind, that relish all as sharply, 
 Passion as they) be kindlier moved than thou art?45 
 
There is a point of dispute among editors over the punctuation at ‘sharply’, specifically 
whether the comma present in the folio edition ought to be preserved: if it is, ‘Passion’ is a 
verb (‘To show, express, or be affected by passion or deep feeling’ [OED]), if not, 
‘Passion’ is what Prospero ‘relish[es]’ (feels) as much as the next man. Even without this 
controversy the syntax in these four lines is recognisably elliptical and estranging: the 
parcelled clauses in the first line sit between the hesitations created by commas, leaving 
units like ‘a touch’ and ‘a feeling’ hesitating between noun and verb, things on the verge of 
becoming actions. If they’re attached to the substantive verb ‘art’, then the insubstantial 
Ariel is but ‘a touch, a feeling’; if to ‘Hast’, Ariel is in possession of material experience – 
the nouns becoming verbal nouns – of human suffering. Similarly, the question Prospero 
then asks (‘shall not myself … ?’) needs to wait for several subordinate clauses to complete 
itself, the sentence expanding as he argues his own shared nature with those he had lost 
touch with.  
 But the words repeated as a leitmotif in Speech! Speech! leave most of this passage 
unspoken: ‘Mein Ariel, hast du, der Luft, nur ist…?’ – ‘My Ariel, hast thou, (which) art but 
air…?’ Hill’s highly selective quotation, which leaves in place the question mark, but 
deletes most of the question, significantly alters its emphasis. In place of the happy 
conclusion in which Prospero’s humanity is restored to him, we have the consternation of 
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self-proclaimed humanity shocked to discover the power of human judgement invested in 
the insubstantial, in a spirit or a shade. Resolve and thematic closure is replaced with an 
aporetic riddle: the philosophical signature by which matter is permitted to appear, filtered 
through the romantic notion of the fragment as practised in Coleridgean philosophy. Indeed 
in three of the four passages in which Hill repeats ‘Mein Ariel, hast du, der Luft, nur 
ist…?’, contemplation, vision, and fragmentary representation are all at issue. Take section 
65: 
 
 Fragments of short score: inspirational I 
 find them. Visionary insights also  
 as they are called. Clouds of dark discernment 
 part wrath, part thankfulness, the full spectrum 
 rekindling […] 
 It is not nature but nurture | brings  
 redemption to mind. Mein Ariel, 
 hast du, der Luft, nur ist…? 
 (SS 33) 
 
In this stanza Hill introduces a fragment of short score (a musical score inscribed with only 
a subset of the composition’s full instrumentation) – Frank Martin’s opera Der Sturm 
reduced to a fragment of its libretto. That something might be articulated in so 
unsubstantial a medium as music, as an air, constitutes Hill’s ‘inspiration’. But this 
inspiration itself comes from a text – The Tempest –  that is intimately connected with 
Bradley and his idealist ‘somehow’. For the poem of Eliot’s that, as we have seen, Hill 
considered to be the most Bradleian, though it is also one of his most Shakespearean, 
‘Marina’, contains lines which enact the dissolution of the material into something more 
conducive to visionary judgement. ‘Marina’’s instances of sublunary carnality, the poem 
notices, 
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     Are become unsubstantial, reduced by a wind, 
 A breath of pine, and the woodsong fog 
 By this grace dissolved in place46 
 
By ‘wind’, ‘breath’, and ‘song’, the substantial is dissolved: in its place the ‘simple 
atonement’ of ‘far fetched / comedy’ (C 63), and the discovery of humanity beyond oneself 
(‘This form, this face, this life, / Living to live in a world of time beyond me’).47 There are 
clear echoes here of the German Idealist notion of aesthetic reflection, in which something 
as unsubstantial as an aesthetic apprehension (a feeling, rather than a concept or a verifiable 
item of sense-data) can play a constitutive role in one’s conceptuality. 
Musical variations are played on this Shakespearean leitmotif in Speech! Speech!, 
these variations being triggered by the roaming incisions Hill’s line-breaks make in the 
German text. Section 79: 
 
    Mein Ariel, hast du, 
 der Luft, nur ist…? Captive | regain 
 immortality’s incarnate lease. Endure  
 vigil’s identity with entrapment. 
 There are worse obsessions. YOU HAVE MY LEAVE, 
 GO NOW | free spirit shaped by captivity, 
 forsaken in the telling, so to speak, 
 the end of contemplation: overnight 
 the first frail ice | edging across the pond, 
 self-making otherness by recognition –  
 even as I describe it. 
 (SS 40) 
 
Instantiation of the self by contingency is at stake here: the solution to the problems of 
interpellation and the definitional circulations of power (‘entrapment’) as theorised by so 
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many texts in Hill’s professional field (the New Historicism of Greenblatt and others) is 
found by Hill in a dialectic inspired by Green and Bradley. Like the pond-water solidifying 
into ice, where the marked caesura is the edge of this ‘self-making otherness’, the 
constrictions placed upon spirit’s expression by the objective world (syntax, the 
sedimentation of history in language) make that spirit something other. Hill describes this 
process using terms reminiscent of Green’s discussion of ‘Popular Philosophy’: in section 
79, Hill sees it as a process of ‘self-making otherness by recognition – / even as I describe 
it’. In the process of description, the ‘self-making otherness’ (a founding of the self by the 
recognition of alterity, and a constitution of objecthood through a recognition of one’s own 
reason in the world) enacts precisely Green’s idealist philosophy (‘That which he calls 
nature ... is traversed by the currents of his intellect, and where intellect has gone sentiment 
has followed’). 
 Evidence that the diacritical marks are not considered a necessary supplement to 
accurate judgement is provided in the fact that, at those moments where Hill seeks identity 
between subject and nature, in the descriptive epiphanies or objective correlatives in which 
the bond of judgement comes closest to completion, the diacritical marks, particularly the 
accents, are fewer. Section 81, for example, begins: 
 
 Again: the saltmarsh in winter. By dawn 
 drain-mouths grow yellow beards. Old man’s duty, 
 vigilance so engrained, shabby observance, 
 dirty habit, wavelets chinning the shore-line. 
 Rich in decrepit analogues | he sees: 
archipelagos, collops of sewage, 
 wormed ribs jutting through rime. Sun-glanced, 
 it is striking, vacant, a far consequence, 
 immaterial reflection beautifully 
 primed 
 (SS 81) 
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Bonds between the subject and the world, acts of judgement, are thematised in these 
passages: the contemplation which ends in the attempt to transfer observed particulars into 
language which reflects, in its syntax, rhythm and sound, the experience of contemplation 
and the object contemplated. We are reminded, in the drain-mouths’ ‘yellow beards’, of 
Ariel’s description of Gonzalo, whose ‘tears run down his beard, like winter’s drops / From 
eaves of reeds’, which in turn reminds us of the unsubstantiality of this Shakespearean 
spirit who was able to return Prospero to his humanity by a reminder of the humanity 
beyond him. 48  And we are thereby reminded of the possibility that mere form – of 
fragments of sound, cadences and structures of syntax – might constitute the apprehension 
of an object world beyond the self. A similar moment is expressed by the last words of 
another stanza engorged with descriptive syntax, section 16: ‘hard-come-by loss of self | 
self’s restitution’ (SS 8). These moments of description, then, are moments of atonement, of 
the bond between subject and world. As such, they partake of a mystery equal to the 
mystery of human judgement Kant discerned in the human soul. As Hill writes, ‘My / faux-
legalisms | are to be vouched for, / even if unwitnessed, ás are many things / I could 
indicate but not show’ (SS 55). 
 Again, this horizon is provided with a philosophical exegesis by Bradley, one to 
which Hill ascribes much significance in ‘Eros in F.H. Bradley and T.S. Eliot’. Hill is 
quoting a passage from Bradley’s ‘On Appearance, Error and Contradiction’: 
 
‘The “this” of feeling ... everywhere, I agree, is positive and unique. But when, 
passing beyond mere feeling, you have before you what you call “matter of fact” the 
case forthwith is altered. The uniqueness has now to be made “objective”. It has to 
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be contained within the judgement and has to qualify the context of your truth’. 
Correlatively – and this is characteristic of Bradley and, moreover, adds the 
essential complicating factor – there is failure and its consequences: ‘you have 
failed to get within the judgement the condition of the judgement. And the 
accomplishment of this (if it were possible) would involve the essential 
transformation of your judgement’ 
(CCW 561) 
 
For judgement to make the material of experience ‘objective’ means to universalise it: to 
see it as part of reality, as part of a whole, rather than (just) in its ‘uniqueness’ as a floating 
particular. Therefore the truer you want your judgement to be – the closer you want it to get 
to reality, the more of its material it must convert into reality: ‘The more conditions of your 
assertion are included in your assertion, so much the truer and less erroneous does your 
judgement become’.49 Hill seems to stray beyond the Bradleian boundary when he claims, 
in ‘A Postscript on Modernist Poetics’, that ‘the crucial step’ in writing a poem ‘requires 
getting within the judgement the condition of the judgement’ (CCW 566). This would be 
the answer to Caygill’s question about tying another knot in the tangled history of 
judgement. For Bradley asks: ‘But can the conditions of the judgement ever be made 
complete and comprised within the judgement? In my opinion this is impossible. And 
hence with every truth there still remains some truth, however little, in its opposite’.50 The 
overwhelming release of multiple connotations over the course of a series of pictorial 
sketches can be tremendously satisfying, as vectors within the development of a word’s 
history converge on the contours of a scene, typically one of natural beauty, that is thereby 
enlivened by a sense of the interaction of nature and culture. However, I would argue that 
in these passages, too few of the conditions of judgement are brought to bear upon the 
judgement. Speech! Speech! is best viewed telescopically, as an undulant landscape of 
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frustration. Too often, if viewed as a series of poems, or when Hill’s individual poems from 
other collections are read, the conditions brought within the scope of the judgement are 
selective. Consider, for example, the differences between these two passages from Hill’s 
collection Without Title (a collection that bears an epigraph from Bradley): 
 
 Profoundly silent January shows up 
 clamant with colour, greening in fine rain, 
 luminous malachite of twig-thicket and bole 
 brightest at sundown. 
 (‘Epiphany at Hurcott’) 
 
 No, put it this way: cancel, expunge, annul, 
 self-reference. Philosophy keeps up 
 embarrassment and expense. I’d quit us 
 of further scars had these now been incurred. 
 You’re magisterial in judgement’s gorge 
 (‘Discourse: For Stanley Rosen’)51 
 
Even allowing for the fitting of rhetoric to occasion, these passages bespeak two 
considerably diverging attitudes towards poetic judgement that are better considered as 
corollaries: the first lyrical, elegiacal (the glimmer before ‘sundown’) and empirical; the 
second discursive, despairing (‘cancel, expunge, annul’) and combative. Hill, in ‘A 
Postscript on Modernist Poetics’, goes on to say that, rather than moving towards that 
moment when judgement includes its conditions, ‘I find myself repeatedly urging, “how 
recalcitrant, how obstructive, this material is”’ (CCW 566). At what point, then, does he 
consider it appropriate to give himself leave to stop the process of self-interruption and to 
blaze out despairingly in epiphanic detail or adversarial banter? At these moments the 
endless bringing to light of new conditions, of new facets of the acoustic din, is silenced by 
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one morose yawn of the Absolute. By contrast Speech! Speech!, with its prosodic obbligato, 
voices an exorbitant sensibility that frustrates itself in the attempt to bring judgement to 
bear upon these two contradictory facets of Hill’s lived experience. In so doing the 
intensities of philosophical thought and the conceptuality of perceptual awareness are 
thrown effectively into relief.  
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SECTION III: WORDS AND THINGS  
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CHAPTER 5: PERFORMATIVE SPEECH 
 
In my first chapter I discussed the possibility that lyric poetry might be thought of as 
offering a kind of diagnosis. This would represent at least a partial vindication of the ‘craft 
of vision’: the pursuit of the conditions for recognising modernity’s contradictions and 
thereby giving expression to a dissatisfaction with Enlightenment reason. Throughout the 
thesis I have tried to show that such vision could not rely merely on the careful observation 
of particulars, but that a degree of abstraction or universality is required in order to cognise 
their relationships with one another, and hence to obtain an understanding which exceeds 
the boundaries imposed by already existing facts and concepts. I want briefly to look at the 
final section of Hill’s early poem ‘Doctor Faustus’, which incorporates several of the 
philosophical strategies that were brought to light in the discussion of abstraction and 
vision in my introduction: 
 
 The Innocents have not flown; 
 Too legendary, they laugh; 
 The lewd uproarious wolf 
 Brings their house down. 
 
 A beast is slain, a beast thrives. 
 Fat blood squeaks on the sand. 
 A blinded god believes  
 That he is not blind. 
 (CP 52-3) 
 
What is the meaning of the final cryptic lines ‘A blinded god believes / That he is not 
blind’? The repetition of ‘blinded ... blind’ associates these lines with the ‘beast ... beast’ of 
the first line of the stanza: this structural repetition would suggest that repetition as such has 
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some thematic significance for the poem. Something presumed missing or overturned is 
discovered to have been with us all along: ‘A beast is slain, a beast thrives’. Sacrifice of the 
bestial – the act of expulsion or expiation or propitiation of some numinous and frightening 
quality in nature – results merely in the reintroduction of fear – the beast thrives. This 
reintroduction of the terrifying quality of our relationship with nature is, however, achieved 
without our being conscious of it. This is suggested by the confidence of the ‘god’ who 
‘believes / That he is not blind’. He is blind to the terror surreptitiously reconfirmed in the 
act of subduing terror.1 
Parallels might be drawn between this perpetuation of myth in the act of self-
differentiation and the varying attitudes to a universalising reason in the name of objectivity 
as outlined so far in this thesis. Contra those philosophers who proclaimed the death of 
Enlightenment reason (‘A beast is slain’) in order to justify their claims to diagnostic 
accuracy (or ‘vision’), the writers I discussed in my introduction (including Bernstein, 
Caygill and Rose) found that reason was not so easily disposed of. In chapter 3 I discussed 
how hypostatised concepts (like amor and caritas) could not, for Hill, simply be 
extinguished in the name of ideology-critique. On the contrary, they formed part of the 
already-existing objectivity of thought without which new conceptuality, no matter how 
much it wanted to leave them behind, could not begin to be thought. Hence the first line 
above: ‘The Innocents have not flown’. Any thought that innocence might be a thing of the 
past, that we are living in an age which has disposed of such myths in the name of reason, 
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 As an aside, I associate the use of ‘god’ here with a comment made by Hill in ‘“Perplexed Persistence”: the 
Exemplary Failure of T.H. Green’: ‘As Blake said, the accuser is god of this world’. The ‘Accuser’ is Blake’s 
figure for dogmatic legal and religious judgement, and therefore stands for the person in possession of 
confidence in their judgements. ‘To the Accuser Who Is the God of This World’ is the title of the epilogue to 
Blake’s short emblem book For the Sexes: The Gates of Paradise. William Blake, The Complete Poems, ed. 
Alicia Ostriker (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), 863. 
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is premature: they are ‘Too legendary’. They are not simply ‘Too legendary’ in the sense 
that by virtue of their antiquity they oppose thought with an obtuseness too fixed to uproot: 
they are part of thought’s own preconditions.  
In this section I will explore Hill’s relationships to a poet and to a philosopher, each 
of whom is thought of by Hill as a ‘blinded god’ who ‘believes / That he is not blind’. Ezra 
Pound, for whom lyric diagnosis constitutes the ultimate abstract justification of poetry, 
and J.L. Austin, whose empiricism mocks abstraction in his pursuit of diagnostic veracity, 
are the subject of Hill’s essay ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’. Each is convinced of the diagnostic 
efficacy of language, and Hill recognises that he is indebted to their vision even as he 
attempts to find a perspective from which to critique their presuppositions. This attempt, I 
will argue, involves coming to an understanding of a different kind of blindness, one which 
will prove important in the next chapter. 
I begin with an outline of the ways Pound conceived of poetry’s relationship to the 
social (and the implications of these conceptions for a political poetry), before moving to 
consider in depth the philosophical aspects of ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’. In particular I wish 
to show that Hill looks to the support of idealist philosophy in his engagement with the 
problems arising from Austin’s empiricism. Images of blindness and blankness will be 
found to be shared between ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’ and the poem sequence The Mystery 
of the Charity of Charles Péguy.  
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1. The example of Ezra Pound 
 
In his study Ezra Pound: Poet as Sculptor, Donald Davie comments that ‘Pound has made 
it impossible for anyone any longer to exalt the poet into a seer’.2 Davie’s contention is that 
Pound provided official culture with the excuse it needed to relegate art, whose aspiration 
towards predictive or diagnostic social analysis is in Pound’s life and work exposed as 
pathologically eccentric, to a realm in which its evaluations have no intelligible relation to 
the real world. ‘[O]ut of the Bohemia he is condemned to,’ writes Davie, ‘the poet cannot 
truthfully see or investigate public life at all’.3 Pound’s increasingly irrational assessment, 
in the thirties and forties, of the economic causes of political injustice motivates not just the 
poetry written during that time, but the journalism and letters to friends and eminent 
politicians, in America and Italy, which form the far greater bulk of his written output in 
that period.4 In them we see chastening evidence of Pound’s quixotic belief that he could 
instigate policy reform by dint of energetic, if vague, reaffirmations of what he saw as 
fundamental economic facts, guaranteed not by anything so empirical as sociopolitical 
analysis, but by his status as poet. Pound’s valuation of this status derived from his long-
held belief that the poet’s task requires close attention to linguistic precision, and that this 
honing of verbal accuracy advances (here Pound’s turn to Confucius in the early thirties 
comes into play) the accurate categorisation of familial, social, and political values. In 
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 Donald Davie, Ezra Pound: Poet as Sculptor (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 243. 
3
 Ibid., 244. 
4
 See Leon Surette, Pound in Purgatory: From Economic Radicalism to Anti-Semitism (Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1999). 
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short, Pound was led by a misplaced faith in the diagnostic abilities of the poet to espouse 
his political beliefs with a strength of conviction that brooked no hesitation, doubt or 
disagreement, and which meant that, when his beliefs came into conflict with the more 
complex contingencies of real political situations, he could only respond with incoherent 
bombast. Extradited to Washington at the end of the war to be tried for treason, Pound (for 
reasons that have not been definitively established) was declared mentally unfit to stand 
trial, and was imprisoned in a ward for the criminally insane at St Elizabeth’s hospital, 
where he remained for twelve years. 
 Davie is no doubt correct in his judgement that Pound’s example has made it easier 
for the wardens of literary culture to dismiss as eccentric or unrealistic any subsequent 
incursions of the literary into politics. But it has also relieved poets of the responsibility to 
make such incursions. His conclusion that henceforth the poet can only speak truths ‘when 
they operate in the eschatological time-span of religion, or even in the millennia of the 
archaeologist and the geographer’ seems premature (as does his unquestioning acceptance 
of Pound’s ‘insanity’).5 Why should the example of the errors committed by one writer in 
his dealings with history provoke a hasty withdrawal to a pre- or post-historical sanctuary? 
Davie’s reasons are likely to be found in the post-war penumbra of disenchantment and 
frustration that characterised his and Olson’s reaction to Pound’s dogmatism. But he does 
strike a nerve in post-war poetic practice more generally. What is so unsettling about 
Pound’s life and work is that, despite its manifest blunders and controversies, it presents the 
writers and critics who follow him with an instance of unparalleled commitment. For all his 
astonishing bigotry, few writers of the twentieth century have matched his devotion of a life 
to a (wildly misguided) vision of justice. Davie rightly sees the need to denounce and 
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retreat from this monomania, but in the process he turns poetry into something akin to an 
intellectual pastime. 
 Theodor Adorno’s essay ‘Commitment’ is helpful in thinking about the options 
available to the poet who has diagnostic ambitions for his or her work. Adorno’s strategy 
here is to address the issue without reducing it to a choice between committed and 
autonomous art. This acute polarisation of alternatives is self-negating, Adorno writes, 
since committed art, in attempting to approximate reality, negates the identity of art as 
something detached from reality, while the ‘absolutization’ that is autonomous art’s telos 
precludes any contact with reality, despite the fact that this contact is ‘its polemical a priori’ 
– the foundation from which it launches its refusal.6 If it is true that the socioeconomic 
conditions of modernity enjoin the artist to forsake the approaches previously sanctioned by 
an individualistic, transcendental romanticism, the ‘opposite’ approach – an instrumental, 
materialist aesthetic that accentuates the communication of experience over the cultivation 
of musical, rhythmic or other formal qualities – is no more competent to cognise the social. 
(Adorno points out how the ‘desire to take Brecht out of the repertory [in West Germany]’ 
was ‘superficial’, because Brecht’s plays, with their committed aesthetic, do not present a 
strong challenge to established ways of thinking.)7 Rather, Adorno advocates a lyricism 
pushed to its negative limit, where form is divested of its essentialist, organising capacities 
almost to the point of disintegration, without however losing a fragmentary sensuousness. 
He writes that the most significant artistic responses to atrocity gain their ‘frightening 
power’ from those moments denounced as formalist, moments which more empathetic, 
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7
 Ibid., 79. 
177 
 
 
 
traditional elegies lack.8 No guidelines are proposed in Adorno’s essay for the ‘correct’ 
ratio of formal to conceptual constituents in art: any artwork runs the risk of aestheticising 
suffering in the production of sensuous artefacts which can all too easily become part of the 
repertoire of culture’s reflex-responses to suffering. Some works of art move too far from 
the intelligible and devolve to formulaic play, ‘decorative patterns’, ‘positivist formal 
arrangements, idle play with elements’. ‘There is no firm criterion,’ Adorno writes, ‘for 
distinguishing between the determinate negation of meaning and the mere positivity of a 
meaninglessness that diligently grinds along on its own accord’.9   
The two poles between which Adorno’s essay oscillates – committed poetry 
explicitly thematising empirical data from the contemporary world, and autonomous poetry 
that turns its back on this world to elaborate its formal structures – are evident in 
discussions about two of Ezra Pound’s early poems. Pound’s poem-sequence ‘Hugh 
Selwyn Mauberley’ is often read as a palinode to its predecessor ‘Homage to Sextus 
Propertius’: 10 where the latter poem prefers ‘a few pages brought down from the forked hill 
unsullied’ to a poetry dictated by political events, ‘Mauberley’ begins to register the 
complicity of the aesthetic and the socio-political: ‘We see τό καλόν / Decreed in the 
market place’.11 In the later poem, Pound is less quick to take refuge on Helicon; instead, 
he prolongs the encounter between an aestheticism now viewed with suspicion and the 
realities of war and mass culture. However, such readings ignore the possibility that the 
refusal offered by ‘Homage to Sextus Propertius’ is not directed at political poetry, but at 
the official culture to which the explicitly political propaganda of, say, Virgil, pays tribute. 
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 See Tim Redman, Ezra Pound and Italian Fascism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 28-30. 
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Its political content is in its distancing from the work of those British poets engaged in 
‘expound[ing] the distentions of Empire’. 12  Similarly, the section of ‘Hugh Selwyn 
Mauberley’ which has perhaps aroused the most critical attention is its least explicitly 
political. At the centre of the poem is ‘Envoi (1919)’, a brazen work of lyric sonority 
couched in archaic syntax and vocabulary. The decades of critical debate centering on 
‘Envoi (1919)’, and on the relationship of the personae that stand behind the two halves of 
the poem it separates, testify to the complexity with which Pound articulates the position of 
the poet in society, and the critical perspectives available to him. ‘Envoi (1919)’ is a test 
case for any defence of poetry and its strategies of public and private evaluation and 
renewal. 
 Hill’s essay ‘“Envoi (1919)”’ is predominantly an analysis of the social and literary 
factors that contributed to the contemporary reception of ‘Mauberley’. Hill’s analysis of the 
poem in its relation to the dominant literary trends of the time makes for fascinating 
reading, finely appraising the strategies by which Pound angles for a place in the literary 
world, balancing between the modernist mandate to renew already existing lyric forms and 
the danger of being welcomed by an audience of readers and editors all too ready to 
confuse rigorous assessment of tradition with picturesque archaism. Limits of space 
preclude a longer study of Hill’s literary historical investigation of the modernist publishing 
world in this chapter, but I’d like to draw attention to the way Hill defines the terms in 
which lyric vision might be conceived.  
 
The world’s obtuseness, imperviousness, its active or passive hostility to valour and 
vision, is not only the object of [Pound’s] denunciation; it is also the necessary 
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circumstance, the context in which and against which valour and vision define 
themselves: ‘In the gloom, the gold gathers the light against it’. 
(CCW 246) 
 
Exactly the moment the lyric appears most canorous, at which it proclaims its autonomy, is 
that at which the objective world it has seemingly retreated from exerts its pressure. A 
condition of poetic vision, on this account, is precisely the edifice of social relations from 
which this vision requires some distance.  
Hill recognises the twofold danger in seeking an individuation that is forbidden by 
modernity: that the writer sinks into either a belletristic antiquarianism, or a dogmatic 
insistence on the poet’s vatic authority. Both of these pitfalls, as Hill acknowledges, 
claimed Pound at one point or another in his writing career. But it’s worth noting that for 
Hill, Pound’s later political misdemeanours have not invalidated (as they have for Davie) 
what Hill sees as a vocational reality for poetry: the possibility of what he rather quaintly 
calls ‘valour and vision’, but which can be reformulated as the capacity for lyric poetry to 
grasp the social conditions of its inception in ways that permit the critique of the status quo 
and the imagining of the new. Hill makes the same point using very different language at 
the end of the essay: ‘The absolute is brought back to become a part of the relative and the 
conditional, the not quite it and the not quite not it; but, so circumstanced, is all the more 
fully and directly affirmed’ (CCW 258). A ‘full and direct’ affirmation of lyric 
individuation is only arrived at via a rejection of plenitude and immediacy. 
Indeed the change in tone, after the pages of close reading and documentary 
evidence, is striking. ‘The absolute is brought back to become a part of the relative and the 
conditional’ irresistibly recalls the diction of the British Idealists Hill had been reading in 
the preceding years. Admittedly, this vague resemblance is meagre evidence for the case 
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for Hill’s philosophical investigation of poetic subjectivity: idealism doesn’t have a 
monopoly on the vocabulary of the absolute, which has for decades been part of traditional 
literary critical terminology whenever the autonomy of lyric song has been at issue.13 But 
the self-correcting propulsion of Hill’s thought, in which ‘absolute’ song and ‘conditional’ 
background noise inflect one another, owes something, I would argue, to the collection of 
citations and meditations on language and philosophy assembled three years earlier in his 
essay ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’.14  
 
2. Speech-acts 
 
‘Our Word Is Our Bond’, first published in Agenda and subsequently reprinted in a 
collection of literary essays, is one of Hill’s most frequently cited essays, but its 
philosophical content has yet to receive attention. The density of allusion to philosophy in 
this essay allows us to pose the question as to the degree to which philosophy is an enabling 
discourse for Hill’s critical work, and the degree to which its performances complicate this 
work. It is not just Austin’s ideas that are subjected Hill’s analysis: it’s also their 
performative qualities, those tonal and expressive characteristics that betray themselves in 
the articulation of an intellectual project. At the same time, Hill is attempting to clarify his 
own position on the relationship between poetry and society, a position which shifts over 
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 See, for example, William Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995), 188, 
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the course of his career. (In the next chapter this shift will be read through the late lectures 
‘Rhetorics of Value’ and ‘Poetry and Value’.) Before going into Hill’s essay in detail, I will 
give a brief description of Austin’s philosophy. 
Austin’s philosophy is most famously elaborated in the William James Lectures, 
which he delivered at Harvard in 1955, and which were posthumously published as How to 
Do Things with Words. Its influence reached areas of inquiry far broader than ‘ordinary 
language philosophy’, to the fields of linguistics, jurisprudence, and literary theory. How to 
Do Things with Words begins by noting that certain problems in the tradition of philosophy 
in which Austin is working arise from an insufficient attention to the extra-grammatical 
characteristics of certain utterances. Previous philosophers, he argues, were too ready to 
divide language into verifiable statements and nonsense or special cases, with a grey area in 
between for sentences deploying technically-loaded language, ‘curious words like “good” 
or “all”, suspect auxiliaries like “ought” or “can”’. 15  However, he argues, there is a 
category of utterance into which certain sentences fall which are neither nonsense nor 
falsifiable statements of fact. These are sentences which form part of an action which is 
incomplete without their accompaniment. At the outset he supplies some examples of 
sentences which are also actions: saying ‘I do’ in a marriage ceremony, or ‘I give and 
bequeath my watch to my brother’ as written in a will. In the case of these ‘performatives’, 
Austin writes,  
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it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) 
is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to 
state that I am doing it: it is to do it.16 
 
For a performative to be effectual, it must be uttered in the ‘appropriate circumstances’: the 
person saying, ‘I do’, for example, must not already be married. This emphasis on a 
definable context is Austin’s contribution to a systematic theory of language. Rather than 
locate the meaning of an utterance in the speaker’s intention, which assumes a disembodied 
consciousness existing prior to expression, Austin ties meaning to convention and context. 
Any presumption of an inviolable inwardness leads, Austin implies, to moral chaos: 
‘Accuracy and morality alike are on the side of the plain saying that our word is our 
bond’.17 
 Because performative utterances are a kind of doing rather than describing, it is 
impossible to say of them that they are true or false. In other words, you can’t read them as 
a report on the state of the world and define their success in terms of parity or dissimilarity, 
because they are part of the world they describe. However, there are ways of estimating the 
validity of a performative. A performative utterance that fails might, for example, not be 
called false but unhappy; as Austin puts it in a sentence Hill thought important enough to 
use as an epigraph to The Lords of Limit: ‘we call the doctrine of the things that can be and 
go wrong on the occasion of such utterances, the doctrine of the Infelicities’.18 Austin goes 
on to formulate a schema of varying degrees of infelicity. As Jonathan Culler observes, 
Austin’s theory is, as a result, predicated on failure: ‘The possibility of failure is internal to 
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the performative and a point of departure for investigating it. Something cannot be a 
performative unless it can go wrong’.19 
 But having established the initial distinction between a constative statement subject 
to empirical judgment as to its truth or falsehood, and a performative utterance for which 
such claims are irrelevant, Austin goes on to undo this distinction. Through a series of 
ultimately abortive investigations into the possibility of a grammatically sound criterion for 
a ‘pure’ performative, Austin concludes that the two forms previously distinguished – 
constative and performative – are co-dependent. A performative utterance depends for its 
felicity on a series of contextual facts all of which can be judged to be true or false; 
similarly a constative utterance implies the very act of describing, an act which can be 
classified as felicitous or infelicitous.20 As a result Austin has recourse to a new set of terms 
to facilitate a more nuanced account of the performative nature of language. A ‘locutionary’ 
sentence is characterised by its reference to actual things or facts in the world. 
‘Illocutionary’ utterances are those with which the speaker or writer performs an act, for 
instance pronouncing a verdict of ‘guilty’ in a court of law. By contrast, ‘perlocutionary’ 
describes the subsequent effects produced by an utterance: the emotional effect of a guilty 
verdict on the defendant, for example. These terms do not necessarily describe different 
kinds of sentence, but are dimensions to which any particular utterance may be said to 
conform in varying degrees.  
In How to Do Things with Words and essays like ‘A Plea for Excuses’ and 
‘Pretending’, Austin evolves a system which, by contrast with positivist conceptions of 
language such as that espoused in A.J. Ayer’s philosophy, makes room for a wider 
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spectrum of verbal expression, and moreover postulates an empirical reciprocity between 
word and world. All the omens are good for a philosophical justification of critical poetic 
agency. Except that, in a discussion of the completeness of his model, Austin states that 
certain kinds of utterance are to be excluded from it for the sake of logical consistency:  
 
For example, if I say “Go and catch a falling star”, it may be quite clear what both 
the meaning and the force of my utterance is, but still wholly unresolved which of 
these other kinds of things I may be doing. There are aetiolations, parasitic uses, 
etc., various “not serious” and “not full normal” uses. The normal conditions of 
reference may be suspended, or no attempt made to make you do anything, as Walt 
Whitman does not seriously incite the eagle of liberty to soar.21 
 
It is this exclusion of poetry from Austin’s vindication of the expressive power of language 
that forms the focus of Hill’s essay. 
 
3. The diagnostic word in Hill, Pound, and Austin 
 
In order to understand why Hill chose to write about Austin, it might be helpful to consider 
the ways in which Hill’s encounter with the philosopher’s body of work might fit into his 
critical concerns. I showed in chapter 2 how Hill’s criticism itself employs a kind of 
empiricism in so far as it conceives of language partly as an index of certain social and 
political pressures exerted upon the practice of writing in any given period. Hill’s approval 
of Austin’s technique is evident in his description, in ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’, of Austin as 
a proponent of a ‘more formidable’ empiricism than that of ‘the early empiricists’ (by 
which he means philosophers like Hobbes and Locke) (CCW 147). Indeed the main tenets 
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of ordinary language philosophy, the movement of which Austin is the most celebrated 
proponent, bear comparison with Hill’s approach. ‘For every distinction of word and idiom 
that we find in common speech’, writes Stuart Hampshire, ‘there is a reason to be found, if 
we look far enough, to explain why this distinction exists’.22 Austin writes that ‘ordinary 
language’ ‘embodies … the inherited experience and acumen of many generations of 
men’. 23  Ordinary language philosophy conceives of language as a repository of the 
accumulated perceptions and judgements of its users. Hence certain moral and ethical 
problems ought first to be defined by appeal to their articulation in everyday language. 
While subsequent developments of speech act theory have concentrated on the linguistic 
side of Austin’s philosophy, its attention was originally trained on what it saw as the real 
world beyond language: in ordinary language philosophy, Cavell writes, ‘one can as 
appropriately or truly be said to be looking at the world as looking at language’.24 
Austin’s theory of performative language goes some way to contributing to such a 
view of the relation between language and the social. As we have seen, what Austin takes 
issue with at the start of How to Do Things with Words is the notion that the most 
philosophically useful part of language is the declarative sentence, which can be resolved 
into the logical category of truth or falsehood. As the lecture series progresses, Austin not 
only introduces a category of language to which this does not apply, but he removes the 
distinction between constative and performative altogether. All language use is a kind of 
act, characterisable by felicity or infelicity, as well as (in some circumstances) truth or 
falsehood. With this conclusion in place, the real goal of ordinary language philosophy – to 
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use language as a benchmark from which distinctions in the ‘real world’ can be deduced – 
is put on a stronger footing. One critic notes that ‘the subject of speech-act theory is the 
contribution that contextual factors make to the significance of a piece of discourse’;25 
while Richard Ohmann writes that, in contrast to the grammatical rules which determine the 
validity of a locutionary sentence, ‘the rules for illocutionary acts concern relationships 
among people’.26 Speech act theory is not only about language: its raison d’être is to 
illuminate and analyse the ways language makes certain social behaviours, habits and 
institutions available to us, and, by implication, how we can thereby criticise and modify 
them.  
This is precisely the connection at stake in the sentence of Pound’s which provides 
the provocation for ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’, though its priorities are reversed: ‘All values 
ultimately come from our judicial sentences’ (CCW 146). In context, Pound’s sentence is 
seen to be part of his conception of the poet as someone uniquely capable of making 
distinctions, and of making these distinctions appear:  
 
If the poets don’t make certain horrors appear horrible who will? All values 
ultimately come from our judicial sentences. (This arrogance is not mine but 
Shelley’s, and it is absolutely true. Humanity is malleable mud, and the arts set the 
moulds it is later cast into. Until the cells of humanity recognize certain things as 
excrement, they will stay in [the] human colon and poison it. …)27 
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 David Gorman, ‘The Use and Abuse of Speech-Act Theory in Criticism’, Poetics Today 20/1 (Spring 
1999), 93-119, at 94. 
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 Quoted in Peter J. Rabinowitz, ‘Speech Act Theory and Literary Studies’, in Raman Selden (ed.), The 
Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, Volume 8: From Formalism to Poststructuralism  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 347-74, at 349. 
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 Letter to Felix E. Schelling, 9 July 1922. The Letters of Ezra Pound 1907-1941, ed. D.D. Paige (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc, 1950), 181. 
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The principle that verbal distinction has an important role to play in political justice is close 
to the heart of Hill’s critical aesthetic. Elsewhere Hill approvingly quotes Coleridge on the 
‘close connection between veracity and habits of mental accuracy [and] the beneficial after-
effects of verbal precision in the preclusion of fanaticism’.28 And as one critic has noted, 
 
Pound’s insistence that “The mot juste is of public utility. … We are governed by 
words, the laws are graven in words, and literature is the sole means of keeping 
these words living and accurate” is a precept that has marked indelibly Hill’s essays 
and poems.29 
 
However, as Pound’s involvement in a political project founded on the authoritarian 
personality deepened, this insistence on the mot juste took on disturbing connotations. 
Note, for example, how the warning that ‘certain things … will stay in [the] human colon 
and poison it’, in the letter quoted above, contains a disconcerting adumbration of an anti-
Semitism which sees the Jews as bacilli in society.30 Later, Pound’s Guide to Kulchur, 
written at a time when his opinion of Mussolini as a political figurehead was at its highest, 
makes extensive use of Confucian philosophy in its attempts to bind verbal precision to 
authoritarian government. Quoting from his translation of the Confucian Analects, Ezra 
Pound established a rule of thumb by which to measure all public conduct: 
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 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, or Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and 
Opinions, ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate, 2 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), ii, 143. 
Quoted in CCW 95. 
29
 Avril Horner, ‘The “Intelligence at Bay”: Ezra Pound and Geoffrey Hill’, Paideuma 22/1 – 22/2 (1993), 
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Tseu-Lou asked: If the Prince of Mei appointed you head of the government, to 
what wd. you first set your mind? 
KUNG: To call people and things by their names, that is by the correct 
denominations, to see that the terminology was exact.31 
 
In ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’, Hill displays extraordinary critical intuition in pairing Austin 
and Pound together, a pairing no fully-accredited member of the Pound industry has yet 
thought to make. For Austin’s philosophy offers a way of thinking through the relations 
between institutional authority and language that maintains the axiomatic call for verbal 
precision without sacrificing, as Pound arguably did, political self-consciousness.  
‘Our Word Is Our Bond’ begins with an epigraph from Austin’s article 
‘Performative Utterances’ concerning the place of poetic utterance in speech act theory: if 
the speech-act occurs in a poem ‘it would not be seriously meant and we shall not be able to 
say that we seriously performed the act concerned’.32 Austin makes this point elsewhere, 
several times: see the passage quoted above, and this, from near the beginning of How to 
Do Things with Words: 
 
a performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if 
said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. … 
Language in such circumstances is in special ways – intelligibly – used not 
seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use – ways which fall under the 
doctrine of the etiolation of language. All this we are excluding from 
consideration.33 
 
The exclusion of certain forms of expressive speech from Austin’s system is at the centre of 
most literary-critical appropriations of speech-act theory, and formed the focal point of the 
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 Ezra Pound, Guide to Kulchur (New York: New Directions, 1970), 16. 
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 Austin, Philosophical Papers, 241. Quoted in CCW 147. 
33
 How to Do Things with Words, 22. 
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famous dispute over Austin between Jacques Derrida and John Searle in the late 
seventies.34 At issue, in the part of Derrida’s essay ‘Signature Event Context’ which deals 
with Austin’s theory, is the move by which philosophical systems present themselves as 
self-legitimating unified theories. While Austin’s philosophy is given credit for reinstating 
formerly excluded elements of speech (those which cannot be resolved into either of the 
categories true or false), Derrida claims that Austin simply repeats this exclusion with 
respect to what the latter calls the ‘non-serious’ – the fictional, poetic or citational. Further, 
in making use of this term ‘serious’, Austin is reinstating the notion of a prior intending 
consciousness which his theory had supposedly discarded.  
Hill has explored the exclusion of poetry from the domain of philosophical inquiry 
before: in his examination of T.H. Green’s writing, Hill devoted a significant portion of his 
argument to demonstrate the opportunistic ways poetry was deployed as an ancillary to 
Green’s philosophy. Viewing poetic texts as immaterial place-holders for abstract emotions 
was a symptom, Hill thought, of Green’s privileging his philosophic system over the 
language in which it was articulated – of his system’s grammar over the materiality of its 
articulation. As we shall see, Hill is of the opinion that, by contrast, Austin’s mode of 
philosophical writing is more aware of its expressive qualities; but this makes it all the 
more puzzling to encounter Austin’s rejection in toto of the expressive resources enabled 
by literary forms. One way of reading Hill’s essay is as a consideration of what happens 
when two writers, Austin and Pound, push to one side the poetic tact they most rely on in 
order to arrogate to themselves a consistent, coherent power of vision. 
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 See Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature Event Context’, Glyph 1 (1977), 172-197, John Searle, ‘Reiterating the 
Differences: A Reply to Derrida’, Glyph 2 (1977), 198-208, and Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc, tr. Samuel 
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No reference is made, in ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’, to the debate about Austin’s 
exclusion of the literary that had exercised Derrida, Searle, and their followers. It might be 
useful to note, however, some of the points of agreement and difference between Hill’s 
position and Derrida’s. Like Derrida, it is part of Hill’s object in ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’ 
to take issue with the exclusion of what is variously described as the fictional, the literary, 
poetry or citation. Michael North writes that ‘instead of arguing [as Derrida does] that all 
language is parasitical or etiolated in the sense Austin applies only to literary language, Hill 
argues that literary language can be held to a stricter version of Austin’s theory’.35 In fact, 
Hill’s argument is more in agreement with Derrida’s than this analysis suggests. It is not 
quite accurate to say that Derrida concludes that all language is parasitical ‘in the sense 
Austin applies only to literary language’. Derrida does not erase the distinction between 
fictional and real-world uses of language, rather he reverses their priorities, claiming that 
language which is in some way fictional, cited or performed is the basis for all other 
utterances.36 Hill argues that language used for ‘serious’ purposes is often found to be 
dependent on the fictional (note that he doesn’t go as far as Derrida, who claims that this is 
a universal phenomenon). At the outset Hill notes that ‘legal distinctions may themselves 
be classifiable as “fictions” or “peculiar paradoxes”’ (CCW 146). Furthermore, while 
North’s comment that Hill wants to widen the scope of Austin’s philosophy to extend to 
literature is true, this is also repeating a movement in ‘Signature Event Context’: for ‘a 
stricter version of Austin’s theory’, to use North’s words, would be one which refuses the 
easy option represented by the exclusion of a particular category of utterance, a refusal 
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 Michael North, ‘The Word as Bond: Money and Performative Language in Hill's Mercian Hymns’, ELH 
54/2 (Summer 1987), 463-81, at 463. 
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 Derrida, Limited Inc, 17. 
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made by Austin with respect to non-falsifiable utterances, but balked at in the face of the 
literary utterance – precisely the criticism Derrida levels at Austin’s philosophy. 
However, there are reasons to suggest that Hill’s reading of the exclusion of poetry 
in Austin’s philosophy is more sympathetic than Derrida’s. The most common defence of 
this exclusion is that Austin is only provisionally putting to one side a particularly 
problematic domain of language use in order to establish the foundations of his philosophy 
(which are, after all, only sketched out in a series of lectures and articles). John Searle 
writes: 
 
Austin’s idea is simply this: if we want to know what it is to make a promise or 
make a statement we had better not start our investigation with promises made by 
actors on stage in the course of a play or statements made in a novel by novelists 
about characters in the novel, because in a fairly obvious way such utterances are 
not standard cases of promises and statement.37 
 
Poetry is not seen as disposable; it is rather that certain kinds of language-use are beyond 
the scope of what is only a preparatory set of notes towards a new theory of language. As 
Peter Dews remarks,  
 
Austin is far from insensitive to the kinds of inexplicit, semi-conscious, and even 
unconscious “play-acting” which are essential to everyday speech … Thus, Austin’s 
exclusion of overtly fictional, jocular or ironic speech-acts amounts to no more than 
the claim that, for the purpose of analysing pragmatic features of language, cases in 
which some of those features are self-consciously suspended are of little use.38 
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It’s difficult to give unequivocal assent to this line of defence, if only because, as one critic 
has noted, Austin repeats his charge that poetry isn’t ‘serious’ (not that it isn’t standard or 
paradigmatic, but not serious) at least ten times in his writing on the subject.39 But it is 
clear that – when it comes to claiming social efficacy for literary texts – Hill is wary of 
taking poetry too seriously: Keats, Wallace Stevens and Pound are admonished by Hill for 
wanting to ‘thrust [poetry] back into the theatre of litigation’ (CCW 146). If Hill takes issue 
with Austin over the designation of poetry as ‘parasitic’ and ‘etiolated’, he stops short of 
claiming for it the kind of seriousness that these poets sought to affirm. Instead he seeks to 
preserve intact the separation from material life guaranteed by literature’s formalism, but 
not without claiming for the latter a degree of critical power. 
Hill’s defence of formalism does not follow the New Critical route that readers of 
Agenda, the journal in which his essay first appeared, might have been used to. Instead, it 
pursues a course in large part dictated by idealist philosophy, filtered (not without some 
loss of clarity) through Coleridge. Hill refuses the Derridean coup by which poetic (or 
fictional) discourse is given priority over the empiricist ‘substratum’ of quotidian reality. 
Instead, Philip Sidney’s opinion that the poet ‘nothing affirmeth, and therefore never lieth’ 
prompts Hill to reflect that ‘the fiction can be given its proper status precisely because it 
does not claim that it could be “seriously performed”’ (CCW 152).  
What does Hill mean by poetry’s ‘proper status’? The answer to this brings in a 
convoluted tangle of texts from the tradition of Anglophone Idealism. ‘Poetry’, Hill says, 
‘has no “phenomena” in Austin’s sense’ – Austin’s sense of ‘phenomena’ being the 
substratum to which language approximates its semantics. Rather, Hill says, poetry deals 
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with ‘noumena’. An endnote directs us to Coleridge’s marginal annotation to Richard 
Hooker’s Ecclesiastical Polity: ‘The law is Res noumenon; the Thing is Res phoenomenon’ 
(CCW 626). Given that the OED credits Kant for giving ‘noumenon’ to modern intellectual 
discourse, Hill takes a notably circuitous route around Kant to establish its credentials for 
his argument. As well as citing Coleridge on Hooker, the endnote points to the entry for 
‘Νοέω’ (from which derives ‘noumena’) in Liddell and Scott’s Greek English Lexicon.40 
Hill’s statement establishes a complex relationship between poetry and philosophy. Kant’s 
first Critique is predicated on the premise that no knowledge of things in themselves – 
noumena – is possible. This banishment of traditional metaphysical questions – questions 
about freedom, God, immortality – is, in Hill’s conception of the proper material for poetry, 
reversed. Poetry is banned from any active participation in Austinian phenomena, but is 
granted in recompense a formalist playground where law or conceptuality as such is open to 
cognition. In alluding to Kantian metaphysics for his defence of poetry, or rather in 
specifically alluding, via Hooker and Plato, to a pre-Kantian philosophy in which noumena 
are the proper object of thought, Hill opens the possibility that poetry might be able to 
cognize certain relationships beyond the realm of the social status quo.41 
How is this formalist knowledge articulated? In a reading of sonnet LXVIII of 
Spenser’s Amoretti, Hill defines it as ‘a form of troth-plight between denotation and 
connotation’: an utterance whose felicity derives from the management of the referential 
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and contingent aspects of language.42 If the noumenal is equated, in Coleridge’s definition, 
with law, poetic creation involves the establishing of laws which productively take up the 
historical noise sedimented in words (connotation) in order to produce new meanings 
(denotation). Spenser’s poem is ‘felicitous’ in its production, from a range of verbal tokens 
including the key words ‘deare’ and ‘loue’, of new conceptualisations of divine and worldly 
love, and spiritual and material value. But this felicity can last only up to a certain point. 
Hill writes that by the final couplet, beginning ‘So let vs loue, deare loue, lyke as we 
ought’, the poem is gesturing towards a physical relationship whose terms lie outside its 
boundaries: ‘The intelligence may be consummate but the consummation is elsewhere’ 
(CCW 152). The poem ‘knows its place’, and ‘respect[s] priority and status’. Hill thereby 
places strict limits on the possibility of poetry to embody knowledge of the legal and 
political operations that condition human society. Hill clearly isn’t saying that these forms 
of knowledge are unavailable to human psychology. Rather, the kind of knowledge made 
available by poetry’s autonomy isn’t, in his opinion, able to grasp the constitutive forms of 
real political and legal power that operate upon the writer.  
 
4. Blindness and stultification 
 
Hill’s discussion of poetry and knowledge leads to what Hill calls his essay’s ‘“ineluctable” 
problem’: the aporia between two ways of conceiving writing. One way views language use 
as a pragmatic social or epistemological tool: according to this view writing is like ‘bearing 
a part in the conversation’ (CCW 154, quoting Locke). The other, relativist view, 
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(etymologically identical to ‘troth’) between language as material and language as communicative channel. 
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emphasises that the multiplicity of a word’s semantic content will always contribute to 
create misunderstandings in this conversation. Sidney, in his Defence of Poetry, is Hill’s 
model as he tries to resist 
 
two possible defensive postures: one, that the coercive power of the ‘particular truth 
of things’ makes all ‘truth’ merely contingent and relative; the other, that the status 
of the ‘idea’ provides the poets with an Archimedean ec-stasis, ... a place of 
serenely measured hypotheses. 
(CCW 153) 
 
 
In its articulation of this resistance, Hill’s argument splinters into a dense collocation of 
philosophical positions. Each position is not presented as a specimen of a conceptual 
perspective which is then analysed and tabulated in relation to its competitors. Rather, in 
the disorientating concentration of citations Hill builds up a rich picture of conflicting 
perspectives on language use to show that no one position can account for what he seems to 
present as the metaphysical nature of language use, the fact that it is bound up with our 
subjective engagement with the world: ‘“rhetoric” is a part of the ontology of moral action’ 
(CCW 168). 
 Poetry’s place in this is equivocal: Hill has argued the scope of poetry’s practical 
knowledge is limited by worldly contingency, yet he goes on to argue for its centrality to 
the articulation of moral value. It can, he suggests, offer a bridge between the passivity of 
the relativist, at the mercy of the word’s materiality, and the instrumental approach of the 
utilitarian, wielding his sovereignty over language. This suggestion comes in the most 
philosophically-dense pages of the essay, and poetry’s solution to the aporia thrown up by 
relativist and pragmatic views of language is presented, again, in idealist terms. Hill begins 
again (his prose often gives the impression of a series of fresh starts, or of new attempts to 
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imagine the problem at hand) by quoting the British Idealist (and T.H. Green’s biographer) 
R.L. Nettleship, to the effect that, while there is a temptation to view words ‘as mysterious 
agencies, under whose power we are’, this should not lead us to abandon all hope of 
communication: ‘If we all tend to become the “victims of words”, the corollary is that we 
should mean something by our words, and know what we mean’. Nettleship floats the 
possibility of a communicative theory of language, but, Hill argues, he constructs his 
argument in such a way that the temptation Nettleship conjures only to refuse (the 
temptation to abdicate all responsibility for our language use) remains in play. ‘By working 
with the “we” and “if” clauses,’ Hill writes, ‘the critic chooses to remain “within the 
process”’ (CCW 158).  
Remaining ‘within the process’ is the key figure for Hill’s critical practice, and its 
significance as such has been recognised by those critics who cite the following passage 
without, however, dwelling on its provenance in British Idealist philosophy. Quoting T.H. 
Green, Hill writes that ‘to place ourselves “outside the process by which our knowledge is 
developed” is to conceive of an untenable “ecstasy”, whereas to recognize our being within 
the process is to accept our true condition’.43  So much in ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’ hangs 
on what Hill might mean by this ‘true condition’, and so frequent are the occasions upon 
which Hill’s critics have had recourse to the entire passage about ‘the process’, that, at the 
risk of ignoring his critical practice (wherein an examination of the historical specificity of 
the language deployed by philosophers takes precedence over any attempt to arrive at a 
definition which subsumes their objects of inquiry), an attempt at a definition of what ‘our 
true condition’ means to Hill might be useful.  
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The ontological overtones present in ‘our true condition’ resonate with Hill’s 
quotation, in ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’ and elsewhere, of John Crowe Ransom’s description 
of poetry as an ‘ontological manoeuvre’ (CCW 159), or a ‘desperate ontological … 
manoeuvre’ (CCW 128). If we want to seek the precise sense in which desperation might 
coincide with language, we could adduce the desperation Hill detects in a footnote of 
Austin’s which raises the haunting possibility that one’s awareness of the sedimentation of 
ideas in words, of their irredeemable complexity and self-contradiction, precludes their 
consistent application to ethical ideals. (Austin’s example is the ideal of the good life: ‘why 
must there be a conceivable amalgam, the Good Life for Man’, when the etymologies of 
‘good’, ‘life’, and ‘man’, derived from disparate historical experiences, impede the 
construction of an ethical synthesis?) 44  Austin’s tactic for derailing the potentially 
nominalist consequence of his approach is what Hill describes as Austin’s ‘poetic tact’: a 
use of language in which the connotative resonances of words are so organised as to 
produce felicitous meanings of their own.  
 Hill describes the sense of reciprocity between passivity in the face of objective 
necessity on the one hand, and an active subjectivity on the other, in idealist language. 
Modern poetics, he writes, display a palpable sense of desperation due to the difficulty of 
reconciling a subjective perspective with the objectively determined restrictions imposed by 
language. The most desirable approach, he says, would be Kenneth Burke’s conception of 
‘workmanship’ as ‘a trait in which the ethical and the esthetic are one’. Hill rearticulates 
this horizon by quoting a handbook on Kant’s moral philosophy, A.E. Teale’s Kantian 
Ethics, to elaborate the possibility that ‘a consummation of technique’ exists ‘which 
simultaneously “satisfies the desire of a moral agent” and, in so doing, resolves the “old 
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difficulty”, as it has been called, “of conceiving ... an activity with end attained”’ (CCW 
159). ‘[O]ur true condition’ must involve a sense of desperation occasioned by an 
overwhelming intuition of contingency in language, and a sense of activity, of creating or 
doing things with words. Poetry’s contribution to this sense of being is to offer a horizon of 
perfect reciprocity between these two definitional poles towards which our activity can be 
orientated, a horizon which Hill, as we have just seen, depends on idealist language to 
articulate.  
Austin, Hill observes, might object that the accent on the expressive needs of the 
individual is susceptible of leading to pretence, in the etymological sense of holding 
something in front of something else in order to conceal it. Hill believes Austin’s 
empiricism tends to downplay expressivity in favour of a more graspable objectivity. For 
example, Austin, Hill ventures, would dismiss Ransom’s assertion that ‘the density or 
connotativeness of poetic language reflects the world’s density’ as ‘metaphysical fantasy’. 
This ‘angle of vision’ would view Hopkins’s lines (‘O Deutschland, double a desperate 
name!’, ‘Double-naturèd name’)45  as ‘self-stultifying’, most likely because they invoke 
both particular objects and general concepts (‘Deutschland’: the ship and the nation; 
‘name’: Christ the historical figure and Christ the saviour of mankind). But Hill asserts that 
it is at these points of ‘stultification’ ‘that poetry encounters its own possibilities’. The 
material of poetry is the no-man’s-land created by the clash of these two perspectives. 
Precisely where definition becomes difficult is where poetry is able to realise its diagnostic 
ambitions. 
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 For Hill, this is a moment of ‘blindness’. Referring to Wordsworth’s ‘blind 
thoughts’ and ‘blind love’, he notes the ‘compounding of blankness and intuition’ in those 
phrases. The philosophical import of this assertion might only be teased out a page later, 
when Hill again uses idealist language to claim that being ‘within the process’ (Green) and 
‘in the plot’ (Donne) are part of our ‘thinking experience’ (CCW 160-2). Following Hill’s 
endnote, we find that ‘thinking experience’ is intellectual historian A.J.M. Milne’s 
description of Green’s conception of human experience in general:  
 
According to Green, the characteristic thing about human experience is that it is 
thinking experience. It is an error in his view to suppose that there is anything in 
human experience which is given ready-made without having been categorized and 
interpreted by thought. What we experience is always something already within a 
framework of thought.46 
 
Experience, on this model, is an active, discursive process, as Kant claimed in the first 
Critique. If we follow the Kantian implications of Green’s statement, then there is also a 
passive moment to experience in the reception of the intuitions themselves.47 The interest 
for Hill is in the philosophically-vexed question of the middle-ground between these two 
moments. The moment of thought Hill describes as ‘blind’ or ‘blank’ (‘[t]o encounter it … 
is like encountering a blank in one’s own thinking [CCW 161]) is the ‘aporia’ he mentions 
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earlier in the essay, the impasse where two epistemological perspectives overlap and create 
contradictions which need to be worked through. ‘It is within the process of such 
experience that we are not only active but passive too,’ Hill writes.  
 How does this aporetic moment relate to Hill’s poetics, and what role does speech 
act theory have to play in it? Hill observes that ‘Modern poetry … yearns for this sense of 
identity between saying and doing – “all values ultimately come from our judicial 
sentences”’ but that ‘it discovers itself to possess no equivalent for “hereby”’ – no 
institutional sanction for its ethical and political assertions (CCW 163). Its domain of 
operation resides, we have seen Hill argue, in the moments of ‘stultification’ which 
characterise the position of the experiencing agent. In Hill’s words, in the creative act we 
are ‘exhibiting the symptom at the very moment that we diagnose the condition’ (CCW 
162). In other words, the creative act registers a foundation, an a priori condition of modern 
experience. If poetry can be said to ‘do’ anything, then its doing must be self-reflexive: it is 
an act of foundational thinking performed by the thinker who springs from that foundation. 
This is a position which is ‘blind’ because it inhabits a region of epistemological anxiety: 
faced with conflicting accounts of the world, with data delimited by its rational and sensible 
faculties, and unable to establish a presuppositionless perspective on this data, it is forced to 
feel its way among the material which surrounds it. This is the passive component of 
poetry; the active component results from the fact that in feeling his way among the 
material, the writer constructs his relationship to this material, organising it, and giving it 
shape. Any existing conceptuality is inadequate to the task: it must, in the spirit of Kant’s 
aesthetic reflection, act as if it is governed by a concept which, however, is yet to come into 
existence. 
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 Hill’s example for this reciprocal act is Pound’s Homage to Sextus Propertius. As 
Hill notes, the line which Pound translates as ‘And now Propertius of Cynthia, taking his 
stand among these’ takes a passive construction from the Latin and produces the active 
‘taking his stand’. This active mood, Hill argues, registers not just Pound’s claim to poetic 
distinction, but in a negative sense the various circumstances (‘these’) against which this 
status defines itself. The careful regulation of semantic noise inherent to Hill’s conception 
of poetry at this stage of his career is behind his choice of Poundian material. His view of 
poetry does not accommodate the cut-and-paste aesthetic of the later cantos, for instance. 
This is not surprising, since in Pound’s poetry from the 40s onwards we see an attempt to 
wrestle with what Hill tells us is not the domain of poetry – the ‘phenomena’ of legal and 
political institutions. Pound’s place in Hill’s essay is, for the most part, as foil – the 
hubristic, defeated wartime Pound – to the more cautious Austin. In the case against Pound, 
‘Austin’s principles are vindicated’ (CCW 168). As Hill concludes, ‘Pound’s error was … 
to fancy that poets’ “judicial sentences” are, in mysterious actuality, legislative or executive 
acts. But poets are not legislators, unless they happen to be so employed, in government or 
law’ (CCW 169). Hill has elaborated a formalist theory of poetry in which its constructive 
potential opens up the possibility of a new conceptualisation of human experience. But the 
restrictions placed upon the content of this lyric practice close off certain areas of social 
experience and prevent any imaginative recreation of key sociopolitical institutions and 
facts.  
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5. Words and things 
 
The Mystery of the Charity of Charles Péguy (1983) ends with the words: ‘“in memory of 
those things these words were born”’ (CP 196). This adaptation, as Hill calls it, of a 
sentence from Marcel Raymond’s study From Baudelaire to Surrealism, takes liberties 
with the original that enable a surreptitious allusion to ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’. 
Raymond’s sentence reads ‘Ecoutons encore Péguy et le poème né du souvenir de ces 
journées’. Transforming ‘le poème’ to ‘words’ and ‘ces journées’ to ‘things’, Hill turns a 
comment about private, individual inspiration, via a reference to Austin’s lecture series, 
into a description of memory as the intermediary between language and the world.48 But 
Hill’s poem engages with ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’ only obliquely: more germane to its 
concerns are the themes of poetry and commitment that had sprung as by-products of the 
meditation on language and instrumentality provoked by his reading of Austin.  
 Questions about the degree to which poetry makes available a critical perspective on 
the sociopolitical, about the relative merits of lyric abstraction and thematic immediacy, are 
complicated in the case of Péguy by the complexity of his historical context. The values to 
which he adhered meet each other, in his life’s work, at various points in the development 
of their expression in political movements, parties, and individuals, which in turn have their 
own independent life-spans and undergo their own alterations. In his essay ‘Commitment in 
Poetry’, E.P. Thompson looks to the 1790s to observe how previously reigning 
sociopolitical concepts had begun to splinter into modified political positions which were 
by turns extreme, diluted, or straightforwardly contradictory versions of their ancestors. 
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Within this pot pourri of ideologies, Thompson argues, conventional place holders like 
‘Right’ and ‘Left’ lose their meaning; it is the duty of poets to create and organise values to 
fill up these positions once more.49  
Thompson’s view of poetry is not so far from Pound’s: it is the poet’s task to 
‘disclose the values lurking beneath abstract constructions, indicate the consonancy of 
clusters of value, and the incompatibility of one cluster with another’.50 The poet must be 
engaged in making distinctions, ‘enhancing our perception’, in the manner encouraged by 
Pound’s Confucius.51 Thompson stops short of saying that poets ought to be legislators 
(they ‘would not create the politics’) but his position is broadly consonant with the sentence 
of Pound’s with which Hill took issue in ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’: ‘All values ultimately 
come from our judicial sentences’. (Note, however, that these ‘judicial sentences’ would 
have a markedly different genesis for Pound, for whom they originate in individual poetic 
talent, than for Thompson, for whom they are contingent on certain necessary social 
relations of production.) 
 Péguy’s own political context is as full of contradictions as the eighteenth-century 
situation as described by Thompson, and Péguy’s life and work thus confront the various 
philosophical positions dramatised in ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’ with a troublingly complex 
case. The French writer’s politics are coordinated by a wide range of historical events and 
institutions. Committed to socialism but refusing to engage with the Socialist Party; a 
Catholic critical of the orthodox church; a Dreyfusard committed to a vision of ‘l’ancienne 
France’ which the anti-Dreyfusards equally revered. On top of these contradictions, the 
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shifts in allegiance and changes in ideological emphasis he witnessed in former comrades 
put him in a more entrenched position. The tenets of Dreyfusism, Socialism and 
Catholicism were all, in Péguy’s eyes, betrayed by their adherents. 
 Given this complex array of historical conditions, what chance does lyric poetry 
have of wielding the necessary cognitive grasp that would enable it to analyse and criticise 
the events of Péguy’s life, along with his own response to them? This seems to be the 
problem hidden in the questions which open The Mystery: ‘Who or what stares / through 
the café-window crêped in powder-smoke?’ The immediate answer is Jaurès’s assassin, but 
as Hill’s afterthought – ‘or what’ – indicates, this answer doesn’t go far enough. Political 
actions cannot be understood by isolating individuals from the bonds that tie them to their 
sociopolitical circumstances. How then could lyric, the formal expression of individuality 
par excellence, hope to comprehend events like the assassination of Jaurès? This difficulty 
is admitted at the start, the poem beginning with an Austinian confession of its inherent 
limitations: ‘Crack of a starting pistol’ (CP 183). As Knottenbelt notes, this ‘crack’ 
‘reduc[es] both the truth of an historical fact and the truth-telling capacity of art to the level 
of a joke’, and effectively acknowledges that the poem is constitutively unable to produce 
the answers to the questions it asks.52 A broader question – the relationship of lyric’s 
individualism to the social – takes their place: at once a sacrifice of ambition (for it reduces 
poetry’s grasp of social detail) it is also an expansion, potentially assigning to poetry some 
of the noumenal, universal qualities necessary to any project that wishes to envision the 
new. 
                                                 
52
 E.M. Knottenbelt, Passionate Intelligence: The Poetry of Geoffrey Hill (Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: 
Rodopi, 1990), 289. 
205 
 
 
 
Given the preponderance of metaphors of blindness and blankness in ‘Our Word Is 
Our Bond’, and considering the definitional role they play in Hill’s explanation of poetry’s 
unique capacity to negotiate the conceptual and the empirical, it is worth examining the 
recurrence of these metaphors in The Mystery. Furthermore, this examination will lead us to 
an encounter with a seminal moment in the history of lyric poetry’s engagement with 
momentous political events: Rimbaud’s ‘Lettres du voyant’.  
Where in the essay the blind and the blank are figures in a philosophical collage, 
figures productive of a form of thinking that escapes the opposing strictures of empiricism 
and rationalism, in Hill’s poem their associations are more dependent on their descriptive 
and moral contexts. The ‘mediocre’ statue of Péguy is in ‘blank-eyed bronze’, ‘Jaurès was 
killed blindly’, ‘blind Vigil’ is ‘helpless and obdurate’, and (from the poem’s companion 
piece Hymns to Our Lady of Chartres) ‘The seraphim … look blankly at us’ (CP 185, 187, 
192, 195, 179).53 Blindness carries connotations, here, with the objective, ‘obdurate’, world 
– the world ‘where things (and people) regularly “get done”’ (CCW 147), and, 
paradoxically, with the sightlessness of the statues in whose presence these ‘things’ take 
place. In both cases, it’s a figure in a recognisable narrative of moral action. These phrases’ 
descriptive force – their arresting concision and apparent fidelity to a narratable, empirical 
world – seem to place them at some distance from the abstract definitions associated with 
the blind and the blank in ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’.  
But by referring back to Hill’s essay, it’s possible to reconstitute a layer of 
philosophical explanation that brings these notions to bear upon the aesthetic problems 
centering on poetic form and political engagement. Section nine of The Mystery is one 
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place where we might look for this interplay of aesthetic subjectivity and conceptual 
blindness. In this section the dream-like atmosphere of ‘l’ancienne France’ – shorthand for 
the cluster of sociopolitical narratives which lie at the heart of Péguy’s political imagination 
– achieves its most intense expression: as Hill writes, ‘this is the heart / of the mystère’ (CP 
194). Among the furnishings of the natural and domestic landscape – ‘the peppery lilac’ 
and ‘Sombre heartwoods’ –  Hill inserts one of the most famous données of modernist 
literature:  
 
 ‘Je est un autre’, that fatal telegram, 
 
 floats past you in the darkness, unreceived. 
 Connoisseurs of obligation, history 
 stands, a blank instant, awaiting your reply 
 (CP 194) 
 
Rimbaud’s phrase occurs in one of a pair of his lettres du voyant or visionary letters to 
Georges Izambard, in May 1871. He was writing from Ardennes, at a time when the Paris 
Commune was reaching its violent climax. The phrase’s context is a discussion of poetry 
and commitment: 
 
‘One day, I hope … I shall make your principle stand for objective poetry … I shall 
be a committed worker: it is the idea that holds me back when wild anger pushes me 
toward the battle of Paris – where so many committed workers are dying even as I 
write! … At the present time, I steep myself in debauchery as thoroughly as I can. 
Why? I want to be a poet, and I am working toward becoming a seer; you will not 
understand me at all, and I am not sure I could quite explain. The point is to reach 
the unknown through the unsettling of all the senses. The suffering is terrible, but 
one must be strong; one must be born a poet, and I have recognized myself as being 
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a poet. It is not at all my fault. It is wrong to say, I think: one should say, someone 
else conceives me in his thoughts.54 
 
These letters have become prey to the claims of various interpretative perspectives, which 
have read what has become the celebrated slogan ‘JE est un autre’ as, variously, existential 
estrangement, rebellion against normative rules enshrined in grammar, and epistemological 
doubt. Something of this overdetermination is captured in Hill’s epithet ‘fatal’, but I would 
suggest in using this word Hill had in mind more the combination of mythical permanence 
and quotidian mortality inherent to prophetic thought, than any post-hoc construction of the 
phrase’s cultural significance. Knottenbelt confesses her confusion at Hill’s apparent 
inclusion of a ‘solecism’ in the context of Péguy’s notoriously punctilious editing practice, 
leading her to the vague conclusion that we are dealing with ‘a crisis of reference’.55 Henry 
Hart suggests that ‘For Hill the grammatical solecism is a sign of more serious social and 
political negligence’.56 But Rimbaud’s phrase, if we read the ‘JE’ as a noun rather than a 
pronoun, is perfectly grammatically correct, and to read it merely as a solecism erases the 
material significance other critics find in the phrase. Kristin Ross, for example, reads into it 
a recognition of the power of the collective: the ‘universal harmony’ that produces an  
 
agitation that sweeps through a crowd under the effect of a shared emotion … When 
this power rises up and expands, its effect is to make the self vacillate or to create a 
kind of “centrifugal” subjectivity … It is in this way, rather than according to any 
kind of intersubjective or identificatory structure, that we should understand the 
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famous slogan “Je est un autre”: something is happening that cannot be seized 
without letting go of the power to say “I”’.57 
 
So we find one of the central practitioners of symbolist poetry – traditionally the standard-
bearer of autonomous art – espouses a collectivity which implicitly links his practice with 
his political surroundings: in the words of his visionary letters, ‘on me pense’. Rimbaud’s 
sympathy for the cause of the workers in the Commune does not lead him to a committed 
poetry that takes the violent realities of the revolution as a guarantee of aesthetic 
authenticity. In seeking the autonomy of the visionary, Rimbaud emphasises the role of the 
disordering of the senses (which implies the extinguishing of traditional modes of sight) in 
the pursuit of the unknown, of the yet to be established conceptuality. He thereby 
establishes some of the central tenets of symbolist art. But this is an art in which the 
principle of lyric individuation – the ‘power to say “I”’ – is forced to an extent to renounce 
itself, as it registers the demands of a rebellious population. The kind of subjectivity thus 
produced is therefore not a synoptic, dominative ‘egotistical sublime’, but a porous, 
investigative intelligence capable of experiencing the social without immediately 
identifying with it.  
The ‘blank instant’ at which Péguy is writing is a blank moment in history because 
the political alternatives among which the writer could choose no longer reflect the values 
at play in the society he writes in and about: 
 
This is no old Beauce manoir that you keep 
but the rue de la Sorbonne, the cramped shop, 
its unsold Cahiers built like barricades, 
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its fierce disciples, disciplines and feuds, 
 
the camelot-cry of ‘sticks!’ As Tharaud says, 
‘all through your life the sound of broken glass.’ 
(CP 187) 
 
Equally, the blankness of the moment at which Rimbaud was writing is constituted by the 
conflicting alternatives available to him as a poet. To throw himself into the cause of the 
commune and write poetry explicitly articulating the workers’ point of view is one option; 
another would be to aim towards a lyric practice in which the foregrounding of abstracted 
affect and of rhythmic and spatial patterning creates autonomous texts whose hermeticism 
holds an implicit refusal to ratify the conceptual bases – and thereby the political facts – of 
the status quo. In this space, Hill suggests, the visionary and collective moments 
compressed in Rimbaud’s letters articulate the mystery of Péguy’s thinking life. Just as, as 
Thompson tells us, the alternatives of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ in the 1790s ceased to stand for 
any judgements applicable to the state of the society in which they operated, so those values 
to which Péguy obstinately clung devolved into the variously reactionary and progressive, 
but always disappointing, anxieties constitutive of the national, racial and religious 
controversies of his day. 
 We can project the various anxieties, political and aesthetic, of these proto-
modernists forwards to The Mystery. If, in Hill’s poem, these anxieties lack the urgency of 
those of a Rimbaud or a Péguy, concerned as they are not with the political structures 
shaping the present, but with the possibility of recognising the difficulties constitutive of 
historiography, they at least share a concern with the relationship between poetic form and 
its other, the social. Metre, in The Mystery, is the proxy for an investigative tact: its regular 
stanzaic form – rhymed quatrains of around ten syllables per line – is a response to the risk 
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(ethical and aesthetic) of too immediate an identification, a risk always at play in the 
imaginative reconstruction of other lives, even more so when we are concerned with a life 
with which the author is predisposed to identify. It’s almost as if the pull of the various 
disappointments, pains and failures in Péguy’s life (for there is no mention of what might 
be taken to be the tokens of a successful life, his poems and articles) is so attractive to Hill 
that, not trusting his own diagnostic accuracy, he devolves a large part of the task of 
judgement – of organising the facts and concepts that form the materials of his investigation 
– upon the determining resources of metre. The object of the poem’s focus is thereby 
distanced, in an apparent regression to pre-Poundian prosody: instead of composing ‘in the 
sequence of musical phrase’, that is, according to the contours and rhythms of subjective 
contemplation expressive of fidelity to the object, Hill returns to composition ‘in sequence 
of a metronome’.58  
 However, at the same time this very object is staring us in the face, because Hill’s 
chosen stanzaic form mirrors the quatrains of Péguy’s poems ‘Les Sept Contres Thèbes’, 
‘La Tapisserie de Sainte Geneviève et de Jeanne D’Arc’, ‘La Tapisserie de Notre Dame’, 
and ‘Ève’. Perhaps a point is being made, in Hill’s choice of form, about the freedom of the 
artist to represent or make available for knowledge historical events. Aping a reassuring 
proximity to the object of inquiry, this mimetic prosody also shows the cost incurred by 
fidelity to fact, and thereby paradoxically produces an inarticulable criticism of the attempts 
to memorialise Péguy, to assimilate him to official culture, attempts which receive caustic 
treatment in section two of the poem. Without abandoning the metre in which Péguy 
expressed his own convictions about, and reactions against, his contemporary culture, Hill’s 
prosody extends the available resources, making enjambement, half-rhyme and quotation 
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work towards developing the questions with which the poem might begin to discover the 
previously masked currents of human motivation and ideas which suffused Péguy’s 
intellectual life. If these questions (‘Who or what stares / through the café-window…?’, 
‘Did Péguy kill Jaurès? Did he incite / the assassin?’, ‘Would Péguy answer …?’) expect 
no response, what prevents the poem from lapsing into solipsism is its enactment of 
historical construction, the questions, descriptions, recreations of modes of apprehension, 
which, proceeding not from paraphrased accounts of Péguy’s ideological context, but from 
a multiplicity of disparate figures with no clearly determined relationship to one another, 
finally settle into a new relationship determined by the metre, creating a wholly new 
account of Péguy’s social context. 59   
 For example, while it is imitative of the stanzaic form of Péguy’s long poem Ève, 
Hill’s prosody unlaces the hypnotic regularity of Ève’s endstopped lines, and is quite 
different from the mixture of prose and free verse that constitutes The Mystery of the 
Charity of Jeanne D’Arc.60  It is as if the metre is fighting an urge to reproduce the 
incantatory repetitiveness of Péguy’s liturgical lines, in which rhapsodic adoration of their 
subject dictates their rhetoric and metre rather than a preordained prosody: 
 
 Yours is their dream of France, militant-pastoral: 
 musky red gillyvors, the wicker bark 
 of clematis braided across old brick 
 and the slow chain that cranks into the well 
 
 morning and evening. It is Domrémy 
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 restored; the mystic strategy of Foch 
 and Bergson with its time-scent, dour panache 
 deserving of martyrdom. It is an army 
 
 of poets, converts, vine-dressers, men skilled 
  in wood or metal, peasants from the Beauce, 
 terse teachers of Latin and those unschooled 
 in all but the hard rudiments of grace. 
 (CP 186) 
 
By contrast with the conceptual aptness of Ève’s rhymes (‘nature / stature’, ‘solennels / 
fraternels’), the dissonance in Hill’s rhymes leaves room for a conceptual critique of the 
ideals contained in Péguy’s ‘l’ancienne France’. 61  ‘Domrémy / restored’ is tied to an 
‘army’, not only the army led by Joan of Arc (whose birthplace Domrémy was), but to the 
‘jolly cartoon / armies of France’ slaughtered at Verdun. ‘[S]killed’ degrades to 
‘unschooled’, suggesting a gap between the socialist ideals refined by Péguy’s education, 
and his comparative ignorance of the real work carried out by trade unions.62 In both cases, 
the musicality rendered by enjambement and rhyme constitutes an act of criticism, and 
while similar criticisms might be articulated in a prose analysis, their embeddedness in a 
form borrowed from Péguy creates a kind of cross-pollination which reduces the distance 
between subject and object, and indeed suggests these criticisms in the first place.  
Rimbaud’s telegram finally receives no response from the legislators of the world: 
‘Connoisseurs of obligation, history / stands, a blank instant, awaiting your reply’. The 
‘Good governors and captains’ (CP 194) – the old Bourbons on which Péguy’s notion of 
‘l’ancienne France’ centred – are not affected by the literary act rendered on Péguy’s 
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behalf. Corroborating the conclusion offered by ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’ – that 
autonomous poetry is sealed off from the legislative institutions of the world – Hill’s 
juxtaposition of Rimbaud with an insensible old guard shows the extent to which modern 
poetry is, in Hill’s opinion, restricted to a noumenal formalism whose explanatory power 
does not extend to forcing its explanations (as Pound tried to do) upon the individuals and 
institutions of worldly power.  The devolution of critical responsibility upon the syntactic, 
rhythmic and sensuous elements of verse render inaudible to the legislative ear poetry’s 
diagnostic conclusions. Hill’s subsequent poetry, the subject of the next section, amounts to 
an extension of this modernist formalism, by weaving the voice of an empirical self into the 
familiar combination of sensuous and intellective parataxis. While retaining the belief that 
poetry’s reflective comprehension of the social will always be unheard on the level of 
conceptual communication, a new emphasis on the critical perspective offered by a 
confessional ‘I’ comes into play. 
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CHAPTER 6: POETRY AND VALUE 
 
In his Lady Margaret Lecture on ‘Milton as Muse’, Hill recanted on certain aspects of ‘Our 
Word Is Our Bond’, confessing that ‘I was trying to make sense of J.L. Austin at the time, 
and obviously conspicuously failing’. The essay’s crucial defect, Hill says in his 2008 
lecture, is its relegation of private utterance to the domain of the ineffectual: 
 
I said that poets are not legislators unless they happen to be so employed in 
government or law. … Well, that was thirty six years ago, and now I recognise how 
mean and impoverished my rebuke was. Where I failed to do justice to the matter 
was in overlooking a deeply-embedded sense of the right … of the private citizen to 
dispute in public matters – not merely that but the proper status of the private citizen 
within the utterances of the public domain.1 
 
That final clause places an emphasis on the contribution the ‘private citizen[’s]’ – or the 
poet’s – utterance with regards to the legal and political institutions of the state can make to 
aesthetic subjectivity. Hill’s ‘failing’ in ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’ was to annul this 
contribution, placing literary production in a noumenal sphere of its own. Judging by 
comments in his lecture ‘Rhetorics of Value and Intrinsic Value’ (2000) Hill’s sense of this 
relationship had become more firm in the intervening years: ‘My language is in me and is 
me; even as I, inescapably, am a miniscule part of the general semantics of the nation; and 
as the nature of the State has involved itself in the nature that is most intimately mine’ 
(CCW 477). Both this lecture and its companion-piece ‘Poetry and Value’ (2000) 
(collectively published as the Tanner lectures) extend the investigation of the subject’s 
capacity to reflect critically on society, to art’s own critical resources, and the polarisation 
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of their deployment into two opposing conceptions of artistic practice: committed and 
autonomous. Like ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’, these lectures depend to a great extent on 
idealist philosophy (again, often filtered through Coleridge, though now also projected 
forward to Gillian Rose) to propel their arguments. 
At the heart of these pieces is a prolonged examination of the meaning of ‘intrinsic 
value’. I will argue that this angle of approach allows for a less hermetically-sealed 
evaluation of formalism than was evident in ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’. Central to this 
change in Hill’s understanding of poetic autonomy is, I will show, a concomitant shift in 
his understanding of intrinsic value, from a Ruskinian adherence to intrinsic value as an 
assumed whole underlying social relations, to a conception of intrinsic value as a product of 
these relations. These lectures suggest that the philosophy of Gillian Rose was a factor in 
this shift, though other philosophers make an important contribution. After exploring this 
shift in Hill’s understanding of intrinsic value, I will consider its significance for Hill’s 
poetry, reading poems from A Treatise of Civil Power and concluding with his elegy ‘In 
Memoriam: Gillian Rose’. 
 
1. Intrinsic value 
 
Hill begins ‘Rhetorics of Value and Intrinsic Value’ by noting the existence, in 
philosophical discourse, of two forms of intrinsic value, the material, exemplified by the 
measurable criterion of coinage, and the symbolic, characteristic of moral philosophy, and 
less susceptible to qualitative judgement (CCW 465). There is, he writes, ‘a “gap”, 
somewhat in Gillian Rose’s sense of aporia’, between these two categories of value, and 
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failure to recognize this gap, he goes on to say, can have pernicious consequences. 
‘Aporia’, in Rose’s definition, ‘covers the difficulty of resolving, even of clarifying 
philosophical investigations, or even of deciding on the meaning of terms’.2 Discussions of 
value which, in Hill’s words, ‘claim continuity where none exists’, which ignore the 
anxieties that provoke these discussions and which produce unforeseen situations, condemn 
themselves to discursively reproduce the injustices they attempt to analyse. Following 
Rose’s argument, many political and aesthetic conceptualisations of power and society are 
polarised between two extremes: a pragmatic accommodation to the exigencies of 
institutionalised power, and the fantasised retreat to an ethics predicated on an enthroned 
conception of the ‘other’, an ethics which eschews any involvement with authority, now 
conceived as being irredeemably implicated with domination.3 These two points of view 
are unable to recognise the possibility that some form of mediation is required between the 
two, that the work of moral philosophy operates within the aporia where power and what 
Rose calls the ‘soul’ (but which might, for our purposes, be better conceived of as the 
expressive, intellective power of the subject) intersect. ‘This ethical witness,’ she writes, 
‘universal and aporetic, can only act with some dynamic and corrigible metaphysics of 
universal and singular, or archetype and type, or concept and intuition’.4 
 In claiming, in his introduction to the philosophical portion of his Tanner lectures, 
that Butler, Coleridge and Leibniz ‘exist as a triumvirate of moral assessors’ in his 
investigation of intrinsic value and poetry, Hill is locating this investigation within the 
‘corrigible metaphysics of universal and singular’ that Rose describes (CCW 479). His 
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particular interest occurs in the ways language is used to negotiate the aporia between 
forms of power and of subjective expression. We have already seen how poetry was 
conceived, in ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’, as an attempt to combine the singular with the 
universal – to give the expressive and experimental a kind of objectivity. This attempt 
opens up an area in the conception of language between the instrumental (which involves 
conceptions of language as a communicative, normalised instrument) and the material 
(viewing language as incorrigibly contingent, and producing a relativism which points 
towards nominalism). Poetry is thus able to reflect on the dominant concepts of society, to 
imagine the new and criticise the status quo, without (thanks to its objective content – to the 
fact that it must work in the medium of existing conceptuality as transmitted in human 
language) succumbing to the arbitrary, and hence potentially aimless, excesses of private 
expression.  
Hill’s exploration of the aporia he discerns in the heart of intrinsic value follows a 
similar procedure, and brings to light a subtle change of emphasis in his thinking about the 
integrity of form which shadows similar changes that were occurring in his poetry. For the 
purposes of this argument, the key moment occurs in a discussion of Butler, Coleridge and 
Leibniz, especially concerning the idea of disinterested reflection. As we saw in chapter 1, 
this is a Kantian concept. Characteristically, Hill does not mention Kant at all in this 
discussion, drawing instead on Butler and Coleridge: ‘Reflection – certainly as Butler and 
Coleridge would understand the term – is the faculty or activity that draws the naturally 
interested sensibility in the direction of disinterestedness’ (CCW 484). But any notion of an 
absolute universality – a complete disinterestedness – is evaded: 
 
218 
 
 
 
It is not necessary to suppose or suggest that some hypostatized condition of perfect 
disinterest is attainable within the usages ... of the English language. The particular 
quality of our humanity describable in terms of poetry and value is best revealed in 
and through the innumerable registrations of syntax and rhythm 
(CCW 484) 
 
Prosody, then, is again seen as a register of individual interactions with an object world; 
this is not so different from Hill’s elucidation of aesthetic reflection in ‘Redeeming the 
Time’ which we considered in chapter 1. The echoes of Kant’s disinterested aesthetic 
judgement are unmistakable.  
Coleridge is once more the catalyst for Hill’s metaphysical reflections in the Tanner 
lectures; this time his text is Coleridge’s philosophical notes on Leibniz. In his dispute with 
John Locke, Leibniz argued against Locke’s conception of the mind as a tabula rasa which 
accrued knowledge through the reception of sense impressions. In Leibniz’s view, Locke’s 
philosophy makes the soul the passive recipient of sensory data. ‘Does the soul have 
windows? Is it similar to writing-tablets, or like wax?’ Hill continues (in his translation): 
‘… that there is nothing in the soul which does not come from the senses … But the soul 
itself must be excepted and its affections … Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, 
excipe: nisi ipse intellectus’. In the mind, Coleridge writes, there are ‘certain inherent 
forms, that is, Modes of reflecting, not referable to the Objects reflected on, but pre-
determined by the Constitution and (as it were) mechanism of the Understanding itself’ 
(CCW 484). Familiar Kantian stuff, but its emphasis upon the constitutive power of the 
understanding (which is indeed Kant’s primary contribution to modern philosophy) brings 
into relief the element of what Hill calls the ‘attuning’ (again a term from Kant’s Critique 
of Judgement) of ‘conceptual hypotheses’ with ‘semantic perceptiveness’. 
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But where these two lectures go beyond Hill’s previous understanding of art’s 
capacities for reflection is in the palpable loss of confidence in the noumenal, the realm of 
pure form which ‘Our Word Is Our Bond’ saw as the proper domain of poetry’s operation. 
Ruskin’s notion of ‘intrinsic value’ is the focal point of Hill’s changing attitude towards 
poetry’s reflective capacities. As the critic C.D. Blanton describes it, ‘intrinsic value’, for 
Ruskin, ‘antedates exchange or even use, originating in the archaic power of substance 
itself, [and] binds the abstract mechanisms of political economy immediately to history and 
… art’.5 Its corollary is a conception of art that holds out the promise of a reconciliation of 
a deformed society, or rather an anamnesis of a society antedating its modern deformation. 
Blanton continues: ‘Art incorporates a hermeneutic function anterior to mere 
documentation, a quiet reminder of the originary power of an intrinsic value buried 
underneath even the purest forms of capital’.6  Hill confesses a predilection for Ruskin’s 
theory of value, but he now has doubts. ‘Until recently,’ Hill writes, ‘I was essentially an 
adherent of “intrinsic value” as delineated by Ruskin. I am now much less sure of my 
position’ (CCW 485-6).  
Hill’s new position is that it is precisely the extrinsic, the contingent and the 
material which is required for any meaningful theory of value. The element of Ruskin’s 
thought Hill would agree with holds that there are circumstances in which ‘intrinsic value’ 
bears upon financial and political relations, for example in the use of money for foreign 
trade. But the nature of ‘intrinsic value’ for Ruskin – founded as it is on a presocial 
conception of substance – comes to be elevated above the relations without which, Hill 
                                                 
5
 C. D. Blanton, ‘Nominal Devolutions: Poetic Substance and the Critique of Political Economy’, Yale 
Journal of Criticism, 13/1 (Spring 2000), 129-51, at 131. 
6
 Ibid., 132. 
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implies, it is difficult to assign any meaning to the phrase. Hill’s example is a passage from 
Ruskin’s Munera Pulveris:  
 
It does not in the least affect the intrinsic value of the wheat, the air, or the flowers, 
that men refuse or despise them. Used or not, their own power is in them, and that 
particular power is in nothing else. 
(Quoted in CCW 486) 
 
Hill writes that ‘The elegiac celebration of “intrinsic value” understands the value as being 
in some sense isolated from current degradation, and therefore as being inviolate, held 
securely within the sphere of the intransitive’. Locke, contra Ruskin, ‘would have said … 
that the intrinsic value of a bushel of wheat cannot be isolated from the value of the human 
labour that contributed to its growth and harvesting’ (CCW 487).  
 So in these lectures, Hill’s notion of ‘intrinsic value’ is as a mediated category: as 
he puts it in ‘Rhetorics of Value and Intrinsic Value’, ‘intrinsic value … bears the extrinsic 
at its heart’ (CCW 477). However the channels through which extrinsic categories of value 
– those which include labour, international relations, in short anything that inhabits the 
practical world of Austin’s philosophy – become accessible to language, and by extension 
to poetry, cannot be clearly delineated. Returning once more to Coleridge, Hill echoes the 
poet-philosopher’s ‘sense of language as mediator in the struggle toward a grasp of intrinsic 
natures’ (CCW 484-5) in viewing language as key to negotiating intrinsic and extrinsic 
value. The key, Hill writes, is to demonstrate that Coleridge, without succumbing to 
‘arbitrary analogy’, is able to provide a defence of an ethics of language, a sense of how  
 
‘the moral rule of action interwoven in [our] nature’, as Butler calls it, can without 
arbitrariness of analogy, be extended into the nature of human language itself, in 
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such a way that language becomes, not a simple adjunct or extension of ‘the moral 
rule of action’ but rather a faculty of reflective integration. 
(CCW 489) 
 
In other words, Coleridge is tasked with providing an explanation of language as something 
which is not mere communicative repetition of existing conceptuality (‘a simple adjunct’) 
but which is able to critically reflect upon it (‘[our] nature’). 
This quality of mediation which language is supposed to supply is not, to my mind, 
convincingly demonstrated. In Aids to Reflection, Coleridge espouses the necessity for 
precise verbal definition in the act of reflecting, where reflection involves a form of ‘energy 
conceived as a “co-instantaneous yet reciprocal action” of the individual will and an 
empowering law’ (CCW 488). A reflective use of language requires the study of the 
generations of material history recorded in language: the word binds the speaking 
individual to the society whose traces are deposited in his utterance. But finally Hill is not 
convincing on Coleridge’s success at demonstrating the bindingness of the analogy 
between the operations of the understanding in its attempts to know the world and the 
material and conceptual components of language itself. Hill refers, again, to what he 
describes as ‘the sudden blaze of a sentence at the beginning of Aids to Reflection: “For if 
words are not THINGS, they are LIVING POWERS”’ (CCW 488). Only if it is agreed that this 
metaphysical conception of language holds can Hill’s argument that language is ‘an integral 
part of the body of reflection’ succeed. But Coleridge’s bare assertion is left unsupported 
by argument in Hill’s essay, and a penumbra of mysticism (the familiar residue of 
Coleridge’s influence upon Hill’s thinking) is left hovering about the question of poetry’s 
capacity to cognise the relationship between individual and society. 
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So if there is a shift of emphasis in Hill’s thinking about intrinsic value (and hence 
about the role of poetry in the body politic), it is a slight one. A noumenal realm is still 
retained in the evocation of words as ‘living powers’, and Hill has anyway always thought 
of language as a combination of the conceptual and the sensible. But the foregrounding of 
the extrinsic in his departure from Ruskin’s theory of value does, I believe, license Hill to 
disregard the impersonal strictures of prosody just to the extent that the empirical self is 
permitted to enter into the text. If it is difficult to discern, in these later critical pieces, a 
successful philosophical justification for the departure from his earlier stance, my reading 
of Hill’s poetic trajectory in the next section of this chapter will hopefully demonstrate that 
he is able to think through the relevant issues with greater cogency in his poetry than in his 
prose. Hill sets the scene in ‘Poetry and Value’. Two instances of poetics which fail in ways 
analogous to the failures of the political alternatives Rose outlines are given in the 
theoretical statements of Czeław Miłosz and Ezra Pound. Miłosz’s conception of poetry 
looks to the realities of political violence as the final criterion of poetry’s critical power: 
‘what “judge[s] all poets and philosophers” is the “very amusing sight” of machine-gun 
bullets upending cobblestones “on a street in an embattled city”’. Pound, on the other hand, 
reverses this hierarchy in his observation that ‘all values ultimately come from our [i.e. the 
poets’] judicial sentences’ (CCW 480). In Rose’s ‘metaphysics of … concept and intuition’, 
Miłosz places the emphasis on intuition, on the ineluctable reality of empirical evidence, 
Pound on concept, the abstract autonomy of the poet’s privileged perspective. Lyric 
autonomy, however, need not be the defensive arrogation of moral superiority expressed in 
Pound’s axiom. Hill’s thoughts on lyric autonomy are more fully worked through in the 
poems under discussion in the next section, and lead to a more complex reflection on the 
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relationship between autonomous expressivity and the notion of a socially-responsive 
poetics. 
 
2. Civil Power and Intrinsic Value 
  
We have seen that there is a limit to poetry’s capacity for reflection in ‘Our Word Is Our 
Bond’: any critique of the social appears to be permissible only in exemplary terms. By this 
I mean that the poem may, in its careful regulation of acoustic and semantic divisions of 
language, produce a conceptual and material arrangement that stands as an example (or a 
rebuke) to a world not so arranged. The emphasis is on the formal law of the artwork, not 
on any putatively pre-existing self-expression. We have also seen, in chapter 3, Nettleship’s 
observation that the act of finding the ‘right word’ necessarily changes our ‘consciousness’, 
and how Hill’s approval of this observation harmonises with postmodern notions of the 
constituted ‘I’ which look sceptically upon claims for self-expression. What I am 
suggesting is that the alteration in Hill’s attitude towards the aporia at the heart of the 
concept of intrinsic value also permits a less sceptical attitude towards the idea of an 
originary self-expression motivating language, by allowing into the mix an empirical self. 
He claims that ‘this essay [‘Poetry and Value’] is inescapably confessional’, but also 
observes that there is ‘something artificial or engineered in the premise and mannerism of 
modern confession’ (CCW 480). His recognition that the notion of the immediate self as it 
is presented in so much modern literary works is in fact highly contrived echoes similar 
arguments made within the German and British Idealist tradition. Yet a confessional 
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literature, or a work of art which does not prioritise the act of exposing the self as 
construction of the other, is given more credence in the recent poetry. 
Geoffrey Hill’s collection Canaan, which appeared thirteen years after The Mystery 
of the Charity of Charles Péguy (though, as we have seen, he began composing some of the 
poems that would appear in Canaan in 1986, three years after the publication of The 
Mystery, and the same year that he gave his lecture ‘“Envoi (1919)”’), is usually read as a 
new departure for Hill. It begins with a poem whose political reference points could not be 
more explicit: titled ‘To the High Court of Parliament: November 1994’, it contains 
allusions that point quite clearly to the selling of peerages and the privatisation of public 
services (C 1). This and the other poems in Canaan which bear the same title might be read 
as palinodial, amending the hermeticism of The Mystery in order to address themselves 
explicitly to existing political institutions. The change in subject matter parallels the right to 
debate public affairs Hill, in his Milton lecture, ascribes to private individuals. Hill once 
said in interview that ‘The great poet does not have a social function. The mediocre, yes, 
finds himself one delivering fashionable platitudes to the public. The true poet is 
completely isolated’.7 I find the value-laden way in which a contingent fact is ennobled by 
the words ‘great’ and ‘true’ disturbing, but it is hard to disagree that Canaan’s public 
poetry is no less likely to fall on deaf ears than the more private meditation of The Mystery. 
Nonetheless, a domain of political reference is made newly available in Hill’s poetry from 
Canaan on, which, if it does not always take its political coordinates from contemporary 
events, still allows for the possibility of a politically-active voice to be heard above the 
intensities of modernist formalism. 
                                                 
7
 Anne Mounic, ‘Le poème, “moulin mystique”: Entretien avec Geoffrey Hill’, Temporel 6 (2008) 
<http://temporel.fr/Le-poeme-moulin-mystique-Entretien>, accessed 6 December 2009. 
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 Hill’s collection A Treatise of Civil Power was first published as a limited edition 
by Clutag Press in 2005, and reprinted, with substantial amendments and additional poems, 
by Penguin in 2007.8 While not explicitly concerned with contemporary political issues, the 
poems in these two volumes bear the traces of a prolonged preoccupation with the variables 
of formalist and committed poetry, particularly as they emerge in the newly-felt pressure to 
give voice to a self construed in confessional and social terms. The books’ shared title 
alludes to Milton’s tract A Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes. Milton’s 
treatise is a comparatively austere piece: unlike his other prose tracts, citations from 
historians of the church, patristic commentaries, and ‘heathen’ philosophers and poets are 
markedly absent from A Treatise of Civil Power: predominance is given to Milton’s voice 
and his Biblical allusions. His object (as the treatise’s subtitle has it) is to ‘shew that it is 
not lawfull for any power on earth to compell in matters of Religion’.9 Hill’s volumes, by 
contrast, are constituted to a large degree by citation, from literary, historical, theological 
and philosophical sources. Power and religion are presented as inextricably, and violently, 
interwoven, and while the presence of an authorial subjectivity threatens to push the 
political dimension to the background, this ‘I’ is constituted by a recognition of these 
political and religious anxieties.  
 In the poem ‘A Treatise of Civil Power’ (T1), Hill writes ‘I want to know what I’m 
worth, we all do’. The line occurs in a context in which money, friendship, philosophy, 
music and sex generate a centrifugal diction calibrating various forms of value with what 
Hill calls ‘intrinsic value and its attendant fictions’, echoing the terms of his Tanner 
                                                 
8
 A Treatise of Civil Power (Thame: Clutag Press, 2005). A Treatise of Civil Power (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 2007). References in text as T1 and T2 respectively. T1 is unpaginated. 
9
 John Milton, Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Don M. Wolfe et al., 8 vols. (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1953-82), vol. 7, ed. Robert W. Ayers, rev. ed. (1980), 239. 
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lectures from three years earlier.10 Not that intrinsic value, and its corollary ‘civil power’, 
are to be comfortably defined amidst the convulsion of propositional and descriptive 
sentences that threaten to upset the exploratory tact of Hill’s prosody. In a contemporary 
poem, Hill writes ‘I still can’t tell you what that power is’, though he goes on to add 
‘Money’s not civil power in itself; / more the enforcer’ (‘A Précis or Memorandum of Civil 
Power’, T2 30). Civil power, as Hill sees it, has no fixed identity that can be discovered in 
or by poetry. By contrast, in his sonnet to Henry Vane, Milton asserts that Vane knew 
‘Both spiritual power and civil, what each means, / What severs each’ so that ‘The bounds 
of either sword to thee we owe’.11 However, while the sonnet suggests that the boundaries 
of state and church power were cleanly demarcated in Milton’s time, this is of course a 
fantasy. Milton’s poem is polemical in that it argues for a Parliamentarian’s strong belief in 
the desirability of the separation of church and state. Its metaphorised, sharply defined 
categories of power express a certainty construed against the background of the complex 
arbitration of these categories’ boundaries. Vane is presented as an isolated case in a 
political context where the jurisdictions of state and religious power are anything but clear. 
 Acutely aware of the absence of any firm definition of state power, the anxieties 
articulated in ‘A Treatise of Civil Power’ are in part produced by the compensatory need to 
negotiate this power’s encroachments upon private, religious and artistic wills. If civil 
power is not something that can be conclusively identified, at least by poets writing in the 
twenty-first century, the private identities of all those it affects are open to the same blind 
but corrigible strategies of approach, contact, and recoil as characterise the tentative 
                                                 
10
 T1 was published in 2005, but Hill’s poetry notebooks show him working on it from 2003. Leeds 
University Library, Brotherton Collection MS 20c Hill/2/1/62. The Tanner lectures were delivered in 2000. 
11
 John Milton, ‘To Sir Henry Vane the Younger’, in Complete Shorter Poems, ed. John Carey, 2nd edn. 
(London and New York: Longman, 1997), 331. 
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negotiations of any public, political settlement. To approach the issue in this way accords 
with Hill’s notion of the aporetic quality of definition (recall one of Rose’s definitions of 
aporia: ‘the difficulty …  even of deciding on the meaning of terms’). Hill gestures towards 
the difficulty of definition in ‘To the Lord Protector Cromwell’: ‘Look up aphasia and 
aporia their origins’ (T1, T2 17). Aligning aphasia and aporia in this way also aligns the 
piόρος or passage and φάσις or speech (with perhaps a nod to the φήτης, or speaker, in 
prophet): being in a pathless situation or aporia entails speech impairment, or speech loss. 
Hence Hill’s complaint in the preceding lines: ‘Say I would beg / out of this hire-house of 
ceaseless allusion. / I want out from this mire, say, of bluish flame’ (T1, T2 16). 
 A consequence of this pathlessness is the natural desire to identify some form of 
singular value that could help calibrate the extent of civil power’s incursions into the self. 
Just before the lines quoted above, Hill writes: ‘If the WORD be not with us, what is our / 
present legal position?’ With no immediate sense of intrinsic value – here given 
imaginative embodiment in the unmediated word of God – the relationship of the individual 
to the constitution of the state threatens to become arbitrary. Like Hill’s Tanner lectures, 
these poems consider money as one possible overarching grammar of value. But a strange 
reversal of priorities occurs in the poems. In ‘A Treatise on Civil Power’, Hill writes: 
‘Coins rather than philosophy. Philosophy, / in general, seems groundless’ (T1). Hill’s 
lectures, as we have seen, make extended use of philosophy in order to demonstrate that 
value as embodied in coinage does not provide an adequate analogy for moral value. But it 
seems, at least in the organisation of national and subjective metaphors threading Hill’s 
poetry, the coin carries more weight: ‘my Commonwealth shilling from an oddments box’ 
(‘On Reading Milton and the English Revolution’), ‘I had a calling for England: that silver 
piece / I would pierce and hang at my neck, anyday’ (‘To the Lord Protector Cromwell’), 
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old coins’ inscriptions ‘compound[ing] / fact with myth ... corner-and key-stones of the just 
nation’ (‘A Treatise of Civil Power’, T1). 
 Again, this is a case of Hill devaluing the contribution of philosophy while still 
relying upon philosophical ideas of the kind we’ve encountered repeatedly in this thesis. 
Critically, in the examples quoted above, the coin’s value is dependent less on its material 
substance than on the relations between subject and nation it embodies. Hill writes that 
‘Coinage becomes / degraded or debased; but, altogether, / workaday splendour marks its 
sphere of use’ (‘A Treatise of Civil Power’, T1). This is consonant with his criticism, in 
‘Poetry and Value’, of Ruskin’s concept of monetary value and intrinsic value (a criticism 
which, as we’ve seen, derives to a large extent from his readings of the British Idealists). 
Money ‘as a sign of relations’ can be viewed as a source of intrinsic value: value associated 
with one’s belonging to a tradition of thought concerned with the construction of a ‘just 
nation’, as opposed to an ‘intransitive’ value where – by analogy with the inherent value of 
a coin’s substance – a sentimental prejudice is dogmatically held to rise above political and 
historical realities. This is why Hill writes that ‘Money’s not civil power in itself’: civil 
power is constituted by the set of forces operative in the state at any one time.  Like civil 
power, intrinsic value is something which is constantly changing, transitively dependent on 
the interactions of law and subjective will, rather than an intransitive hypostatisation of 
political or private will. 
 Poetry and music are characterised by a similar push and pull between law and 
sentiment. In one of Hill’s most recent volumes, Oraclau / Oracles, the poet observes that 
‘It is not nothing having to make sense / Of moods that argue so with case and tense’ (O 2). 
This feeling of private meaning exceeding the bounds of traditional syntax is first explicitly 
sounded in A Treatise of Civil Power, which complains repetitiously of the conflict 
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between the critical capacities of the imagination and the form that governs its expression.12 
‘Poetry’s unjust also, an endless wrangle / between truth and metre ... / where metre chiefly 
wins’ (‘A Treatise of Civil Power’, T1): in a remarkably pessimistic figuration of poetry’s 
metrical resources, metre is deemed to be damaging to critical perception. Under these 
conditions, form, traditionally the bearer of melodious truth sung with fullthroated ease, is 
subjected to turbulent upheaval: ‘Something lyric would be to our advantage / but damned 
if I can oblige. A civil power’s / unlyrical’. Working through the transitions between self 
and state produces a text that contains abrupt switches of tone, diction and rhythm. When 
Hill writes ‘No working transition – I’d assay to claim / the poem as at once cruder and 
finer’, the material of the poem is acknowledged to be both an impediment to the poet’s 
capacity to address public issues in a private voice, and something that can be formed to 
leap equivocally between registers. As the poem changes between ‘European war’ (V) to 
the speaker’s sex life (VII) to Biblical exegesis (XV) and so on, its diction varies from 
stage-direction (‘Cast me desire / implanted in the camera angle’), paronomasia (‘Harmonia 
sacra is not money scares’), pseudo-philosophical discourse (‘There is genius in money, / 
and hazard, but not immanence exactly’) and wince-inducing confession (‘I cannot 
sufficiently / regret not being adequate to the occasions / that sexual power displays’). 
Remaining within the constraints imposed by conventional syntax, Hill’s poem ‘A 
Treatise of Civil Power’ leaps between formal modes of address (‘Lords and Commons...’), 
responses to inferred questions, citations from Milton’s political tracts, panegyrics to 
individual writers and politicians, puns, lyrical descriptive passages, and passages of 
                                                 
12
 This conception of poetry has affinities with Idealist philosophy: ‘This conflict between the general form of 
a proposition and the unity of the Notion which destroys it is similar to the conflict that occurs in rhythm 
between meter and accent’. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), 38. 
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theoretical assertion. Some sense of unity is imposed in the poem’s form: forty two stanzas 
of eight lines, each line approximating four or five stresses (a small number of stanzas end 
with a line of one, two or three stresses). A tension exists between Hill’s assertion of his 
own expressive will (the poem begins ‘I scorn to tell this just like anyhow’), and his 
recognition that a writer’s intent tends to be obliterated by the objective fact of his 
circumstances. ‘I yield to stage direction,’ he writes, and concedes that the contribution of 
empirical reality to the circumstances of his composition includes the empirical reality of 
language as material object: ‘Better start counting obstacles and best / language the 
obstacles their own way’. 
Hill appears to concede that adequately to begin to address the question of living in 
the modern state, of having a legal position determined by an unfathomably far-reaching 
concatenation of forces, requires an interrogation of the connective prescriptions and 
proscriptions of conventional syntax and metrics. After all, form, he says, damages truth. 
But despite complaining of ‘the unending tug between / syntax and sentiment’, Hill refuses 
the symptomatic and investigative unlacing of syntax that characterises contemporary 
experiments with form.  Indeed his antipathy towards certain (regrettably unnamed) 
practitioners of poetic experimentation is palpable: ‘Superabundant maiming of appearance 
/ is not modernism but melodrama’. Syntactic and typographical improvisation is viewed 
reductively by Hill as histrionic rebellion, the sufficient and necessary dose of anarchy to 
provide a frisson of radicalism without any serious engagement. Deeper reading in the 
history of post-Poundian poetics would have given Hill a much-needed corrective to this 
view, but his harangue does at least indicate what modernist formalism means to him. It 
would involve precisely adhering to the obligations enjoined by the struggle to articulate 
imaginative reflection within the bounds of poetic metre and syntax; if the creative 
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manipulation of syntax is melodrama, then this struggle must, despite its damaging 
imperatives, be productive of a more sustained engagement. 
 
3. ‘In Memoriam: Gillian Rose’ 
 
The second edition of A Treatise of Civil Power contains an elegy to Gillian Rose, the 
philosopher to whom Hill had previously credited his understanding of the aporetic in 
‘Rhetorics of Value and Intrinsic Value’. ‘In Memoriam: Gillian Rose’, structured around 
fourteen free verse stanzas of variable length, is addressed in the first person to the 
philosopher. In this it is akin to The Mystery, and like the earlier poem, it begins with a 
question to which Hill expects no answer:  
  
 I have a question to ask for the form’s sake: 
 how that small happy boy in the seaside 
 photographs became the unstable man, 
 hobbyist of his own rage, engrafting it 
 on a stock of compliance, of hurt women.  
 
Hill goes on to write: ‘You do not need to answer the question / or challenge imposture. / 
Whatever the protocol I should still construe’ (T2 35). The conflict between syntax and 
sentiment here centres on the status of these last four words. ‘I should still construe’ can be 
read as accepting the responsibility for the poet to construct his own private history 
(addressed in the first five lines) or, alternatively, as an imperative to investigate and 
interpret the terms (the ‘protocol’) according to which he can do so. It perhaps ruefully 
notes, too, that even if Rose could answer back, Hill would ignore her and construct his 
own version of events. But the phrase admits of another reading, providing we take the 
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pronoun (as with Rimbaud’s ‘Je est un autre’) as a noun: ‘“I” should still construe’. The 
first person singular should still possess grammatical integrity in its relation to other 
elements in the sentence. This provides a sense that insists on the ethical imperative to seek 
a way of maintaining the borders of individual subjectivity in the midst of the prevailing 
powers of public authority. The confessional form attempts to find a voice for the self who 
is at the mercy of external forms of power.  
Power is this time construed in terms offered by Rose’s final three books, or 
‘primers’ (T2 37), Mourning Becomes the Law, Love’s Work, and Paradiso.13 The ‘primer’ 
to which Hill’s elegy alludes most frequently is Rose’s memoir Love’s Work. In this book 
Rose describes the experience of love as analogous to the work of philosophy, both of 
which are envisaged as processes involving risk and difficulty. Appropriately enough, the 
question with which Hill begins the poem has to do with the genesis of difficult love, of the 
speaker’s ‘rage’ and its symbiosis with ‘a stock of compliance, of hurt women’. Love’s 
work, for Rose, involves the recognition of power and violence on the part of both 
participants of a relationship; any attempt to imagine or create a domain of self-reliance 
which extols an ideal of unconditional love removes the possibility of justice, since it 
evades the work necessary to negotiate the power wielded by the other. Analogously, any 
philosophy which erases the recognition of power in reason is doomed to permanently 
divorce the application of reason from political reality. Thought must recognise its own 
violent investments in order to retain the ability to negotiate the ‘middle’ – the already 
begun world of contradictions which define human relations. This negotiation is what Rose 
                                                 
13
 Incidentally, Rose was taught philosophy by J. L. Austin’s widow Jean Austin, though Austin apparently 
didn’t meet Rose’s expectations. Rose imagines Jean Austin horrified at the possibility that the girls in her 
charge ‘might imagine that philosophy had some substance which exceeded the celebrated idea that certain 
kinds of proposition have illocutionary or perlocutionary force’. See Gillian Rose, Love’s Work (London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1995), 121. 
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calls ‘love’s work’, a process she has ‘been charting, accomplishing, but, above all and 
necessarily, failing in, all along the way’.14 This failure is acknowledged in Hill’s second 
stanza: 
 
   There are achievements 
 that carry failure on their back, blindness 
 not as in Brueghel, but unfathomably 
 far-seeing.  
(T2, 35) 
 
Not the blindness depicted in Brueghel’s painting The Blind Leading the Blind, which 
shows six blind men stumbling towards a ditch, but a ‘far-seeing’ blindness, one which 
works not according to a pre-established system, but equally, not arbitrarily. These lines 
amount to a formal, aesthetic reworking of Rose’s tentative but incremental definition of 
aporetic ethics: 
 
If metaphysics is the aporia, the perception of the difficulty of the law, the difficult 
way, then ethics is the development of it, the diaporia, being at a loss yet exploring 
various routes, different ways towards the good enough justice, which recognises 
the intrinsic and the contingent limitations in its exercise.15 
 
Imagined as a conversation, or ‘agon’, between Hill and Rose, ‘In Memoriam’ extends this 
notion of an aesthetic reformulation of, or dialogue with, Rose’s own aesthetically-derived 
philosophy. This is why Hill’s initial question is ‘for the form’s sake’: it establishes a 
provisional arena within which questions of aesthetic and philosophical judgement can be 
addressed. If form, syntax, and metre are inconvenient checks on a writer’s intention, they 
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 Love’s Work, 71. 
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 Ibid., 116. 
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nevertheless provide the necessary constructive edifice within which thought can begin. 
Hill’s dialogic form imagines Rose’s anger (ambiguously presented as an actually existing 
fact – ‘Your anger against me’ for ‘poetry’s / assumption of rule’ – for which however 
there is no evidence in Rose’s published texts) at poetry’s arrogation of legislative power. 
Described as an ‘abdication / of self-censure’, poetry’s aspirations to political efficacy, Hill 
agrees, are worthy of Rose’s ‘contempt’. By contrast, he writes, metaphysics is erotically 
‘re-wedded to the city’, and given aesthetic form in the figure of Phocion’s wife, depicted 
in Poussin’s painting The Ashes of Phocion Collected by his Widow, which in turn forms 
the subject of Rose’s essay ‘Athens and Jerusalem: A Tale of Three Cities’. In this essay, 
Rose takes issue with the view of Poussin’s painting as a representation of an act of private, 
individual justice in the face of monolithic civil injustice, of ‘pure, individual love [in 
opposition] to the impure injustice of the world’. 16  Rose argues that the actions of 
Phocion’s wife, burying and mourning her husband outside the city’s boundary walls, do 
not represent an act in defiance of the politics of the community, a privileged moment of 
immediate ethics. Rather, this moment represents the necessary act wherein she ‘reinvent[s] 
the political life of the community’, carrying out rites that reorganise the contours of 
political judgement in the subject, so that, having mourned, it can continue a politically-
active life: ‘To acknowledge and to re-experience the justice and the injustice of the 
partner’s life and death is to accept the law, it is not to transgress it – mourning becomes 
the law’.17 
 Law is to be accepted not as an impassible cipher enjoining retreat into oneself, but 
as a historically-constructed arrangement of constitutional prescriptions and prohibitions 
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 Mourning Becomes the Law, 25. 
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which, when they come into contact with an individual’s set of determinative activities, 
generate a plethora of impasses. Recognition of both civil and subjective power is the first 
step in the ethical act of reconfiguring the organisation of these various political, 
intellectual and emotional determinants, and I would argue that Hill’s sense of the 
determinative capacity of modernist art has been modified by his reading of Rose. Hill’s 
poetry, in its late phase, shifts between political and personal power relationships: in 
section 7 of ‘In Memoriam’, for instance, the poet is driven to a consideration of ‘broken 
love’. Echoing Rose’s observation that ‘[t]here are always auguries, not only of future 
difficulties but also of impossibility’, 18  Hill speaks of the signs of love’s failure as 
ubiquitous, ‘met with everywhere / like postcards of Manet and Monet, Van Gogh’s shoes’ 
(T2 36). Hill is evoking the initial aftermath of a failed affair, the ‘bitter innocence’, in 
Rose’s words, of the lover left behind, moored in ‘hateful self-regard’, incapable of the 
necessary work that would enable her to love again, to ‘[k]eep your mind in hell’ without 
despairing.19  
Hill’s emblems of private despair – the mechanically reproduced postcards of 
famous artworks – brings into view again the question of the critical possibilities of lyric 
formalism. Van Gogh’s painting A Pair of Boots is a crux in Fredric Jameson’s discussion 
of postmodernity and the requirement to imaginatively reconstruct the social situation of 
the artwork’s production. Without this act of the imagination, ‘the painting will remain an 
inert object, a reified end product impossible to grasp as a symbolic act in its own right’.20 
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 Love’s Work, 65. 
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 Ibid., 66-8. 
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 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2003), 7. 
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Rose’s discussion of postmodern philosophy’s ‘despairing rationalism without reason’21 
weaves together philosophical and erotic despair, and ‘In Memoriam’ – via the 
paradigmatic image of reproduced, deauraticised art – supplements this with an account of 
the fate of autonomous art in modernity and postmodernity. Benjamin’s conception of aura 
as the central figure in his diagnosis of modern poetry – aura as the critical distance 
essential to pre-modern artworks – is reworked in Adorno’s aesthetics as a negative quality 
retained (pace Benjamin) by any modern art that aspires to critical objectivity. To abandon 
lyric autonomy would be to abandon any hope that art could enable the construction of new 
forms of conceptuality regarding the social.  
 The final two stanzas of ‘In Memoriam: Gillian Rose’ are concerned with just this 
cognitive potential of poetry. Section 13 encapsulates the argument: 
  
 Poetry’s its own agon that allows us 
 to recognize devastation as the rift 
 between power and powerlessness. But when I 
 say poetry I mean something impossible 
 to be described, except by adding lines 
 to lines that are sufficient as themselves. 
(T2 38) 
 
The ‘agon’ that constitutes poetry – what Hill had elsewhere complained of as the 
conflicting energies of afflatus and syntax – turns out to be the activating precondition of 
poetry’s critical power. Formalist autonomy (‘lines that are sufficient as themselves’) is the 
only definitional characteristic of poetry Hill will allow himself; its resistance to description 
is symptomatic of the crisis of identity facing modern art: the removal of its legitimating 
ground (whether that is understood retrospectively as science, religion, propaganda or 
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social critique) enjoins an augmented, self-legitimating, autonomy. Renewal as much as 
mourning is proper to the situation so cognised by self-sufficient art: after the evocations of 
broken public and private truces, the poem’s conclusion, Hill writes, ‘is not the end, / more 
like the cleared spaces around St Paul’s / and the gutted City after the fire-raid’. This 
clearing is not some sudden access to epiphanic vision, bracketing off the troubled world 
and enabling pristine renovation, but is, rather, the occasion for incremental, tentative 
assessment and construction, founded on the recognition of violence.  
Despite Hill’s insistence in ‘In Memoriam’ on the self-sufficiency of poetic form, 
there is, as I hope to have shown in this section, a turn, in his post-Canaan verse, towards 
the critical capacities of a subjectivity which exceeds the constitutive elements of prosody, 
of the confessional ‘I’ whose newly-found confidence generates its own truths which 
sometimes conflict with those expressed by form. This additional determinative factor 
ushers in new vectors in the attempt to organise the field of the poem’s perception, not least 
of which are, as we have seen in the consideration of this poem, the resources offered by 
philosophy (albeit the confessional, aestheticised philosophy of Gillian Rose). There’s a 
certain reluctance, though, in Hill’s final admission that the transformative possibilities of 
art, while not exhausted, need to be supplemented by philosophy’s resources: ‘I find love’s 
work a bleak ontology / to have to contemplate; it may be all we have’ (T2 38). This elegy 
for a philosopher ends with an estranging syntax, where ‘to have to contemplate’ sounds as 
both a complaint at the necessity of philosophy, and as a self-correcting jump from one 
infinitive (‘to have’) to another (‘to contemplate’); and where the repetition of ‘have’ at the 
end of the line sets up a standing vibration between its various associations of possession 
and obligation. On the one hand, the poet, Hill believes, is obliged to continue art’s 
traditionally-held task of reflecting upon the world, of deploying its formal resources in the 
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service of critical mimesis: the apprehension of reality in ways that permit its critique. But 
on the other hand, modern art can no longer claim to be in full possession of the grounds of 
its own technique: the commodification of its repertoire of formal gestures mocks its claims 
to autonomy. Dispossessed of its privileged status, Hill’s art turns, as we have seen 
throughout this chapter, to philosophy, which is entrusted with ever increasing 
responsibility until, in this late poem in Hill’s career, he reluctantly admits to its necessity. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the notes accompanying Hill’s lecture on T.H. Green in the Leeds archive, is a passage 
Hill has transcribed from Dorothea Krook’s study Three Traditions of Moral Thought: 
 
The best [philosophers] … are, like the best poets, a perpetual threat to the 
conventional distinction between the abstractness of philosophy and the 
concreteness of poetry. For they give us, so intensely, the sense of being in touch 
with the concrete, indeed of never having lost touch with it, but only of having, as 
Coleridge says, generalized the particulars of experience, and generalized in such a 
way as to involve ultimately no loss of particularity.1 
 
Though this passage doesn’t make it into ‘Perplexed Persistence’, a similar statement by 
Krook is quoted there, on ‘the significant common ground that may be seen to exist 
between poetry and philosophy when both are viewed as products of the creative 
imagination’.2 It is the closest Hill comes to admitting, albeit via the words of another, a 
sense of shared activity between poetry and philosophy; characteristically, he then truncates 
its likelihood: ‘It is in this domain that Green, who had so much to say, has so little to give’ 
(CCW 124). It has been one of the aims of this thesis to trace this combination of proximity 
and distancing, which perhaps is the only available way for Hill to articulate his attitude to 
these overlapping domains.  
One of the presuppositions of this thesis has been that modernist thought is defined 
by this uneasy relationship with organised rationality. My argument in the introduction that 
this discomfort is not confined just to so-called postmodern intellectuals, but that their 
                                                 
1
 Leeds University Library, Brotherton Collection MS 20c Hill/5/1/75. See Dorothea Krook, Three Traditions 
of Moral Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 17. 
2
 Krook, Three Traditions of Moral Thought, 10. Cited CCW 124. 
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interrogation of the damaging effects of Enlightenment reason is merely the latest 
manifestation of a phenomenon traceable back to the German Idealists, opened a way to 
think about why Hill might have been attracted to idealism as a tradition in Anglophone 
philosophy. I began by suggesting what precisely is at stake in Hill’s wavering stance 
towards philosophy. Focusing on Hill’s similarly uncertain attitude towards ‘vision’ in 
poetry, I argued that Hill’s difficulty in accepting this concept unreservedly revolved 
around the possibility of objective knowledge. Hill’s attitude towards this notion pauses 
between a scepticism which views its claims as extravagant and anachronistic, and a 
confidence that ascribes credibility to it within certain limits. Since Hill’s conflicted 
attitude towards philosophy’s truth-claims is similarly fluctuating, I argued that an 
understanding of his attitude towards philosophy will help to discover the limits within 
which Hill might assent to the notion of poetic ‘vision’. 
I proceeded to outline a minor tradition of Anglophone writing from the 1980s and 
1990s in which writers like Peter Dews, J.M. Bernstein, Howard Caygill and Gillian Rose 
effected a return to Kantianism and Hegelianism, in a reaction against a tendency to view 
these philosophers’ claims to objectivity as damagingly normative. This was not to 
advocate an uncritical acceptance of systematic metaphysics or a reactionary dismissal of 
the ideas of, say, Derrida and Foucault and their followers. Rather than segregating 
conceptuality from pleasure and pain, they sought to re-cognise the relations between 
pleasure and pain and the normative conceptuality of metaphysics. One solution to Krook’s 
desiderated overlapping between philosophy and poetry would be to turn philosophy into 
mere play with language, where this play is granted cognitive legitimacy by the example of 
poetry. However this would also necessitate a conception of poetry as mere play with 
language, quixotically effacing the conceptual element of language. To follow Rose et al 
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would be to recognise the impossibility of ignoring the conceptual in philosophy and in art, 
training the gaze instead upon the coincidences and fractures between thought and being 
that constitute objectivity. 
My argument has been that Hill tacitly joins this movement, not just by a recent 
interest in Rose’s writings, but by a life-long critical engagement with British Idealism, 
both in its embryonic form in Coleridge’s borrowings from Kant and Schelling, and in its 
fully-fledged manifestation in the works of T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley. The rest of the 
thesis was concerned with reading Hill’s criticism and poetry for its strategies of 
recognition of the difficulties of objectivity or universality. Following Bernstein’s account 
of Kant’s Critique of Judgement, I returned in particular to certain concepts from that work: 
aesthetic reflection and the sensus communis. Both concepts allowed for the intermixing of 
conceptuality (a claim to objective knowledge) and subjective affect (the sense in common 
sense, the pleasure or pain in aesthetic judgements of taste). As Bernstein argues, Kant’s 
notion of his theory of judgement as ‘a bridge to span the “great gulf” ... separating the 
realms of freedom and nature’ is erroneous. Instead, Bernstein says, Kant’s theory is more 
like ‘a sepulchre to stand over their lost unity’, offering ‘a recognition of their present 
intractable but contingent separation’.3  My reading, in the introduction, of some early 
poems of Hill’s attempted to show in detail how microscopic aesthetic decisions such as are 
involved in the construction of a poem’s syntax and prosody can offer unique ways of 
recognising such ‘separations’ within former unities.  
Coleridge has long been recognised as an important constituent of Hill’s work, and 
he also happens to stand at the source of British Idealism. Yet no studies have yet been 
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 J.M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 18. 
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published on Coleridge’s place in Hill’s thought. The first section of this thesis began the 
process of teasing out the implications of this important relationship. It traced the channels 
through which Kantian ideas were brought to Britain via Coleridge’s writings, and in the 
process showed how those ideas of Coleridge most cherished by Hill in fact could often be 
traced back to German Idealism. A connection was thus created between Hill’s ideas of the 
aesthetic apprehension of the social (as propounded in his essay ‘Redeeming the Time’) 
and wider, idealist, ideas about art’s capacity to recognise previously unknown aspects of 
the social. In tandem with this, a reading of Hill’s long poem The Triumph of Love made a 
claim for its status as a Coleridgean poem, and brought into play the possibility of a 
specifically poetic (rather than philosophical) debate about the anxieties of the mind bound 
to the enterprise of objective thought. 
If Coleridge might be said to fulfil Krook’s desire to blur the distinction between 
philosophy and poetry, T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley are prima facie more likely to 
reinforce the distinction. My second section examined Hill’s approach to these minor 
philosophers. In particular Hill’s enthusiasm for Bradley’s philosophy permitted a closer 
analysis of what might constitute a philosophical poem. I could ask this question thanks in 
large part to Hill’s connection of certain of Eliot’s poems (in particular ‘Marina’), which he 
termed ‘Bradleian’, to the syntax of Bradley’s philosophical writings. This Bradleian 
syntax comes to be associated with a notion of judgement always threatening to subside 
into solipsism, and I read some of the poems collected in Canaan in this light. Judgement 
also predominates as a legislative metaphor in Hill’s later poem Speech! Speech! Here, I 
argued, more weight is granted to the speaking subject, producing a crisis in objectivity that 
is reflected in the diacritical accents and deliberately halting prosody that mark the text.  
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My final section considered some of the already existing alternatives to Hill’s 
wrestle with objectivity. On one side we have the example of Ezra Pound, for whom 
‘vision’ (objective truth) was an unquestioned prerogative of the poet, whose status as final 
arbiter of truth extended to the reformation of monetary and foreign policy for sovereign 
states. On the other side are those poets (like Czeław Miłosz) for whom the final arbiter is 
empirical reality: a poem’s truth is predicated on its proximity and fidelity to social facts 
(often distressing or violent facts). Having already noted how Hill’s prose often 
approximates a form of empiricism (it relies on the historical analysis of fragments of 
speech – words, phrases – to deduce wider social facts about the speaker’s environment), I 
considered the case of J.L. Austin, a philosopher whose theories about language on the face 
of it bear some similarities to Hill’s, and who forms the subject of Hill’s well-known essay 
‘Our Word Is Our Bond’. In the process I concluded that Hill’s attitude is a complicated 
one of embrace (the poetic, historicised nature of Austin’s enquiry is sympathetic to Hill) 
and rejection (Austin’s suspicion of metaphysics finally denies him self-consciousness vis-
à-vis his own philosophy). I pursued the theme of autonomous versus committed poetry in 
a reading of Hill’s poem ‘The Mystery of the Charity of Charles Péguy’. The section 
finished with Hill’s recantation of his earlier sequestering of poetry into the realm of the 
noumenal. It focused on the late lectures ‘Rhetorics of Value and Intrinsic Value’ and 
‘Poetry and Value’ to read his shift from a formalism that read synoptic diagnosis into the 
material elements of language to a realism that granted some degree of critical power to the 
writer vis-à-vis the material he operates with. Some of the consequences of this shift in 
attitude were explored in the recent volume A Treatise of Civil Power. 
It is easier to read philosophy as a kind of cognitive poetry (think of Hegel’s 
looping reiterations and Neitzsche’s aphoristic polemics) than it is to read poetry as a 
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thematised philosophy. Both approaches are misguided, of course: philosophy’s prose 
styles are never developed without an instrumental, disputational aim, and poetry’s own 
mode of cognition should be sought not in its ostensible content, but in its prosody (which 
is equally enmeshed in historical lines of assertion and response). Aside from the 
philosophical echoes, allusions and coincidences in Hill’s poetry, I have tried to 
demonstrate a twofold philosophical content. On the one hand, the lyric’s microscopic 
prosodic and syntactic music permits ways of cognising certain problems often thought to 
be the possession of philosophy (for example, my reading in the introduction of the ways 
‘Of Commerce and Society’ fosters an awareness of the difficulties involved in using 
abstract ideas like ‘liberty’ to work through the aftermath of conflicts). On the other, I have 
discussed how Hill has on occasion conceived poetry as explicitly assuming the rhythmic 
qualities of certain modes of philosophical apprehension, as in Eliot’s ‘Bradleian syntax’.  
If my treatment of Hill’s poetry and criticism seemed to smuggle in a philosophical 
lexicon that is antithetical to Hill’s preoccupations as they are traditionally conceived, the 
relevance of the speculation enabled by this lexicon is, I hope, confirmed by two 
considerations. First, Hill’s poetry indisputably emerges from ethical, aesthetic, theological 
and political questions which have traditionally been treated as philosophy’s domain of 
expertise. While I have argued that part of Hill’s attitude to poetry and philosophy is 
defined by a rivalry over this domain, such an attitude could only arise from a familiarity 
with philosophy’s inroads and settlements. This leads to the second reason philosophy can 
be argued to have had a constitutive effect on Hill’s work, which is the frequent 
philosophical nature of Hill’s allusions in his critical prose. I hope to have shown that his 
poetry cannot be separated from his criticism, leaving the sensuous, living matter on the 
side of poetry and the abstract, technical analysis on the side of prose. Rather, the 
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remarkable density of references to philosophy and philosophers in his criticism (a density 
there for anyone to see, but rarely remarked upon) points to an impassioned engagement 
with the varieties of metaphysical experience articulated in their work, an engagement 
which can only have had an impact on his poetry. 
In my focus on philosophy in the Anglophone Idealist tradition I necessarily left 
unexamined some other aspects of Hill’s intellectual interests. Other figures, more marginal 
to Hill’s project and usually meriting only a mention or two in his poetry or criticism, might 
still bear closer study: Emerson, Bergson, Wittgenstein, Adorno and Arendt. Most glaring, 
given his claim that he has been ‘completely moved by philosophy only two times in my 
life: by Simone Weil when I was young; more recently, by F.H. Bradley’, is the absence of 
Weil from my account.4 Weil’s philosophy overlaps with theology more obviously than 
does the tradition of Anglophone Idealism I have been concerned with, and might usefully 
be studied alongside the work of other thinkers, including Joseph Butler, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer and the Cambridge Platonists, who bring a philosophical rigour to bear on the 
theological issues in Hill’s criticism. Such a study would usefully fill out the Christian 
dimension of Hill’s metaphysics, which has only been glanced at here.  
 Finally, I hope to have demonstrated the philosophical foundation of Hill’s thought. 
I have tried to show, moreover, that this foundation is coherent and durable: that a reliance 
upon idealist thought, even if only sometimes as sparring partner, has been a constant 
characteristic of Hill’s writing career. It has provided him with examples and counter-
examples for the case against metaphysics and its putative elimination of the particular in 
the name of the universal: his encounters with Green and Bradley have shown how the 
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 Anne Mounic, ‘Le poème, “moulin mystique”: Entretien avec Geoffrey Hill’, Temporel 6 (2008) 
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focus on relationships in a webbed context of details can set abstract thought moving, and 
how it can freeze when faced with the deceiving hidden abstraction of ‘concrete’, ‘lived’ 
experience in the form of an audience’s demands. Coleridge features as the sage of 
Highgate: the philosopher who made the transition (with greater or less success, depending 
on who you read) from hoarder of abstruse reason to communicator of wisdom, via a 
sensuous, aesthetic mode of articulation. His reluctance to abandon Christian faith as a 
explanatory foundation preceding idealist explanations, and his theories of language as 
revelation (‘if words are not THINGS, they are LIVING POWERS’), expose similar limits in 
Hill’s appropriation of traditional metaphysics, and informs the light-drenched epiphanies 
that occlude thought on occasion in his poetry. On the other hand, J.L. Austin’s suspicion 
of metaphysics tempers Hill’s admiration for Austin’s linguistic sensitivity, for as 
substantial as Austin’s empirical observations are, they threaten to break apart into mere 
substance without the coordinating strategies of abstract thought.  
 In attempting to tread a line between absolute fidelity to the non-identical – to 
whatever is not assimilable to current modes of conceptuality without damage – and 
conceptuality (the long tradition of rationality that makes recognition of particulars possible 
in the first place), Hill’s response to the dissatisfaction with modernity has unfolded itself 
over a few decades in a remarkably measured way. Pausing to consider other possible 
responses to a perceived calamity in modern values (Pound’s complex approach of 
claiming supreme poetic authority while devaluing prosodic authority in the textual density 
of The Cantos; the sacrifice of poetic authority for a concomitant expansion of associative, 
unconscious reference for the surrealists; the radical confinement of reference to the arena 
of an austere object world with ultimate authority in Beckett), one has an idea of the 
options Hill had at his disposal but chose not to employ. Hill’s concern with public art – 
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with a mandate that meanings must be elaborated in shareable spaces – entails a reluctance 
to accept any artistic choice that assumes such spaces to be inaccessible from the start. On 
occasion this has meant that his effort to recuperate moments of atonement from a 
splintered sociohistorical context has resulted in an aesthetics of mimetic fidelity: being 
‘pitch-perfect’ often seems to mean merely reverberating sympathetically with the already 
existing. A more nuanced idea of the concrete is defined by Charles Altieri (alluding to 
Hegel) as ‘not a condition of immediacy, but as a specific kind of relation between 
phenomena and interpretive systems’.5 At certain moments, either through equivocation 
and syntactic ambiguity (as in the early poems), or a staging of private preoccupations in a 
parodically public discourse (as in The Triumph of Love), Hill’s poetry fulfils the demand 
implied in T.H. Green’s warning: ‘Abstract the many relations from the one thing, and 
there is nothing’. It realises a notion of the concrete that permits, in the foregrounding of 
relations and their historical shifts, the recognition of existing ways of relating to the world, 
and, by extension, the recognition that such relations are corrigible.  
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